The legacy of foreign patrons
| Author | Niklas Karlén |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343317700465 |
| Published date | 01 July 2017 |
| Date | 01 July 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
The legacy of foreign patrons: External state
support and conflict recurrence
Niklas Karle
´n
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Abstract
Why do some armed conflicts that have ended experience renewed fighting while others do not? Previous research on
conflict recurrence has approached this question by looking at domestic factors such as how the war was fought, how
it ended or factors associated with its aftermath. With the exception of the literature on third-party security
guarantees, the influence of outside actors has often been overlooked. This article explores the role of external states
and suggests when and how their involvement is likely to affect the probability of renewed warfare. The main
argument is that the legacy of outside support creates an external support structure that affects the previous
combatants’ willingness as well as their opportunities to remobilize. This means that armed conflicts with external
state support will experience a greater likelihood of recurrence compared to other conflicts which did not see external
support. The theory is tested using Cox proportional hazards models on global data of intrastate armed conflicts
1975–2009. The findings suggest that external support to rebels increases the risk of conflict recurrence in the short
term as groups receive or anticipate renewed assistance. The results also indicate that it is more important for rebel
groups to have had enduring support over the years in the previous conflict rather than access to multiple state
sponsors. External support provided to governments is not associated with conflict recurrence.
Keywords
civil war, conflict recurrence, external support, third party interventions
Introduction
Many armed conflicts today are recurrences of previous
conflicts (Walter, 2015). Some countries seem to be
caught in a conflict trap that increases the likelihood of
a relapse to civil war after a period of peace. But why do
some armed conflicts recur while others do not? Most
explanations as to why fighting resumes have stressed the
importance of domestic factors such as opportunities for
remobilization (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler
& Rohner, 2009; Themne
´r, 2011) or unaddressed grie-
vances (Walter, 2004; Hegre & Nygård, 2015; Walter,
2015). In contrast to previous explanations, I emphasize
the need to expand our focus to incorporate the influ-
ence that outside states might have on the probability of
renewed warfare. I argue that previous instances of biased
third-party interventions create an external support
structure that influences the risk of conflict recurrence.
This structure alters the opportunities and calculations
made by the former combatants by making it more
attractive to challenge the established status quo. I posit
two theoretical mechanisms as to how this process could
work: facilitation and anticipation. The first mechanism
(facilitation) stresses that remobilization is simply easier
with the assistance of outside states. External states can
directly enable remobilization by providing strategic
advantages such as safe havens, training, and weapons.
This offers actors dissatisfied with the outcome of the
previous war a chance to reorganize and rearm. Factors
that increase the opportunities for remobilization and
which strengthen the resolve of the aggrieved actor are
hence not confined to the borders of the country that has
experienced the civil war. For example, the offensive by
the rebel group LURD, which initiated the second civil
war in Liberia in 1999, only began after the group had
been able to train and regroup in neighboring Guinea.
Corresponding author:
niklas.karlen@pcr.uu.se
Journal of Peace Research
2017, Vol. 54(4) 499–512
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343317700465
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