The Legality of Assaulting Ideas
| Published date | 01 August 2007 |
| Date | 01 August 2007 |
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.2007.71.4.279 |
| Author | Gary Slapper |
| Subject Matter | Opinion |
OPINION
The Legality of Assaulting Ideas
Gary Slapper*
Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for Law, The Open University
Humanity is not at its best when racist. A madness at the heart of racism
was captured in a letter Groucho Marx wrote to an exclusive country
club that had just barred his family from its swimming pool as it did not
admit Jews. Marx wrote to the club, referring to his daughter Melinda,
and asked, ‘Since my daughter is only half-Jewish would it be alright if
she went in the pool only up to her waist?’
Historically, racism in Britain was common. It even hissed from
people in high places, including the Bench. In the 1970s and 1980s,
various Acts prohibiting racist conduct were milestones on the path to
civilisation. More recently, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
extended the field of unlawful hate-mongering. It prohibits the stirring
up of hatred on religious grounds. The Act, however, stipulates that it is
not an offence to attack the ideas of any religion or body of thought. That
licence is a good thing. In allowing such assaults on ideas, the law
protects a freedom of immeasurable importance in a democracy.
The most significant thing about anyone’s beliefs is that they are just
that: beliefs. We inhabit a society comprised of a considerable palate of
supposed fundamental truths, many of which are oppositional. Society
is organic. It is not inert. It develops, and the best way for it to develop
smoothly and peaceably is for all ideas to be subject to rigorous public
debate.
Racism
In relatively recent history, society was tolerant of racist attitudes even
among those occupying elevated office. In a trial in London in 1978 at
the Central Criminal Court, a jury found that a man who had in a speech
used the words ‘niggers, wogs and coons’ was not guilty of inciting racial
hatred. The trial judge, however, Judge Neil McKinnon QC, himself a
white Australian, had told the jury that the words in question were not
necessarily inflammatory because, among other reasons, the judge’s
nickname at school had been ‘nigger’ and he had not been offended to be
called that name. He said:
In this England of ours at the moment we are allowed to have our own
views still, thank goodness. (The Times, 7 January 1978)
In his closing remarks, after the racist had been acquitted, the judge said
to him in court, ‘By all means propagate the views you have . . . I wish
you well’.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Open University or The Journal of Criminal Law.
279
To continue reading
Request your trial