The limits of justification: Critique, disclosure and reflexivity
| Author | Lois McNay |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116670294 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(1) 26–46
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116670294
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Article
The limits of justification:
Critique, disclosure
and reflexivity
Lois McNay
Oxford University Somerville College, UK
Abstract
I argue that Forst’s justification paradigm is less radical than claimed in that it fails to
establish an immanent connection between the role of justification as a transcendental
principle and as a tool of disclosing, reflexive critique. I maintain that the construal of
justification as a trans-historical principle, by definition, shields it from systematic criti-
cism and consequently constrains critique’s capacity for reflexive self-scrutiny.
Reflexivity is ignited by disclosure to the degree that it is reflection on the non-identical
elements of social life that may prompt critical re-evaluation of a theory’s conceptual
framework. Justification critique’s capacity for disclosure, and hence reflexivity, is cru-
cially limited, however, by Forst’s reliance on a tendentious concept of noumenal power,
which does not satisfactorily explain the complex, material dynamics through which
structural inequalities are reproduced. It is further stymied by a disregard of the latent
power dynamics often at work in actual conversations about justice that subvert for-
mally equal relations of justification. In short, the lack of reflexivity is evident in Forst’s
failure to adequately consider how entrenched asymmetries of power may require him
to advance beyond an abstract, one-dimensional account of mutually owed justifications.
Keywords
Immanence, transcendence, justification, critique, power, reflexivity, disclosure
Introduction
One of the defining premises of Frankfurt School critical theory is that, given the
situated nature of all thought, emancipatory political critique necessarily has
immanent foundations. Critique is politically effective when it is guided not by
transcendental principles but by existing values and norms embedded within the
practices and struggles of a given age. The task of critique is to identify these
Corresponding author:
Lois McNay, Oxford University Somerville College, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6HD, UK.
Email: lois.mcnay@some.ox.ac.uk
endogenous normative resources, reconstructing them in such a way as to establish
the evaluative emancipatory perspective from which it diagnoses a particular social
order. Although he aligns himself with the Frankfurt school tradition, the critical
theory of Rainer Forst is distinctive because it rejects this founding premise of
immanence on the grounds that it deprives critique of the independent normative
foundations necessary to support truly emancipatory claims. To be universally
binding, critique must have the context transcending validity that can only be
derived from free-standing principles. Forst finds such autonomous grounds in
the principle of justification which he maintains represents the transcendental
core of practical reason. Mindful however of the ‘metaphysical slumber’ that
may ensue from this idealising move, Forst also insists, in line with the
Frankfurt School approach, that to be genuinely radical critique must be con-
cerned above all to develop a critical theory of existing injustice and to build
into itself the capacity for reflexive self-scrutiny. Power is the ‘first question’ of
justice and normative theory is empty unless accompanied by a disclosing focus on
oppressive, dominating and other unwarranted social hierarchies. Attentiveness to
power also implies that critique understands itself as a type of reflexive practical
knowledge that critically evaluates its conceptual limitations and blind-spots in
response to changing social practices. Justification critique’s inherent capacities
for disclosure and reflexive self-scrutiny are indispensable in ensuring its radical
trajectory and avoiding the pre-democratic, prescriptive tendencies that Forst finds
so problematic in mainstream ideal theorising.
In this article, I argue that Forst’s paradigm is less radical than claimed in so
far as it fails to establish an immanent connection between the role of justifi-
cation as a transcendental principle and as a tool of disclosing, reflexive critique.
My primary concern is with the feasibility of the critical rather than ideal side
of his project and I maintain that the construal of justification as a trans-
historical principle, by definition, shields it from systematic criticism and con-
sequently constrains critique’s capacity for reflexive self-scrutiny. In a general
sense, reflexivity is ignited by disclosure to the degree that it is reflection on the
non-identical elements of social life, on that which doesn’t fit in, that may
prompt critical re-evaluation of a theory’s conceptual framework. Justification
critique’s capacity for disclosure, and hence reflexivity, is crucially limited, how-
ever, by Forst’s reliance on a tendentious concept of noumenal power which
does not satisfactorily explain the complex, material dynamics through which
major structural inequalities are reproduced. Its normative scope is further sty-
mied by a disregard of the latent power dynamics often at work in the actual
conversation about justice that subvert formally equal relations of justification
and make it difficult for certain individuals to be taken seriously as democratic
interlocutors. In short, the lack of reflexivity is evident in Forst’s failure to
adequately consider how entrenched asymmetries of power may require him
to advance beyond an abstract, one-dimensional account of mutually owed
justifications. Vacillating inconsequently between transcendent and immanent
perspectives, I conclude that justification critique is in fact a self-undermining
theoretical enterprise.
McNay 27
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