The logic of transnational outbidding: Pledging allegiance and the escalation of violence
| Published date | 01 May 2020 |
| Date | 01 May 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319880939 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
The logic of transnational outbidding:
Pledging allegiance and the escalation
of violence
Megan Farrell
Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The phenomenon of outbidding, in which terrorist groups escalate their attacks in response to competition from
other groups, has long been studied in a domestic terrorism context. If groups exist in the same state, they may
compete with one another for the same resources from civilians of that state. This article argues this outbidding logic
also exists in a transnational context. Leveraging a sample of Salafi-jihadist groups that are in competition for
resources based on shared ideology, this article explores the full effects of this competition on the quantity and
severity of groups’ attacks. Building on this outbidding logic as a theoretical lens, Salafi-jihadist groups adjust their
attack profiles in response to competition from other groups following this same ideology. This effect is particularly
evident among groups that pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIS. Once pledged, affiliates must now compete with
other affiliates for the additional potential resources and recruits who follow the ‘brand’ of al-Qaeda or ISIS.
Consistent with this theory, after examining the attacks of all Salafi-jihadist groups from 2001 to 2014, this article
finds increased competition among groups results in more attacks and a selection of more severe targets and types of
attacks. Affiliate groups respond to competition to the greatest degree.
Keywords
alliances, ideology, political violence, terrorism
Introduction
Outbidding occurs when a multiplicity of terrorist
groups is present within a single state and must simulta-
neously vie for the same sources of support. In order to
gain support from domestic civilians, they must utilize
increasing levels of attacks in order to differentiate them-
selves from other groups and gain a market share of
support (Bloom, 2005). Empirical support for this the-
ory, however, has always been mixed (Crenshaw, 1985;
Chenoweth, 2010; Findley & Young, 2012a; Nemeth,
2013; Conrad & Greene, 2015).
The level of observation within these terrorism studies
provides one reason why we may detect little consensus.
Groups are often pooled into a single-state observation
(i.e. a group within a given state is compared against only
other groups within that same state). Two issues may
stem from this measurement choice. First, this method
does not allow for groups to be in competition with one
another across borders, such as an affiliate terrorist group
of al-Qaeda in Iraq competing with an affiliate of
al-Qaeda in Lebanon. Second, this level of observation
often creates an artificial market of competition. For
example, single-state studies would induce the expecta-
tion that separatist groups operating in northeast India
are in competition for the same resources as Indian Isla-
mic groups operating near Kashmir. This assumption is
clearly not tenable. Still, outbidding in this domestic
setting paradoxically remains one of the most widely
cited theories of terrorist groups’ motivations and actions
(Kydd & Walter, 2006).
This article adds to the growing body of literature
addressing critiques of domestic outbidding in two ways.
First, I instead examine the transnational nature of
Corresponding author:
megan.farrell@utexas.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(3) 437–451
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319880939
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