The long-term electoral implications of conflict escalation: Doubtful doves and the breakdown of Israel’s left–right dichotomy
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221088038 |
| Author | Alon Yakter,Mark Tessler |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
The long-term electoral implications
of conflict escalation: Doubtful doves
and the breakdown of Israel’s left–right
dichotomy
Alon Yakter
School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs, Tel Aviv University
Mark Tessler
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
Abstract
What prolonged implications does conflict escalation have on voting behavior? The literature focuses primarily on
the immediate effect of violent events on voting in nearby elections, leaving open questions about longer-term
consequences. This article examines this question by studying Israel, where violent escalation in the Israeli–Pales-
tinian conflict in the early 2000s was followed by an unexpected electoral outcome: the emergence and consolidation
of a new centrist bloc that transformed a longstanding Left-Right partisan divide into a three-bloc system. Using two
decades of survey data, it is argued that this shift is best explained by a long-term attitudinal change toward the
conflict by many Israelis after the escalation. Rather than a strictly hawkish shift, many voters have become ‘Doubtful
Doves’: supportive of territorial compromise in principle, but skeptical about reaching an agreement with the
Palestinians in practice. This underdiscussed attitudinal structure, dovish but doubtful, has formed a new electoral
base for centrist parties, breaking the traditional Left-Right dichotomy. These findings illustrate that violent periods
in conflicts can cause non-trivial long-term changes in popular attitude structures and voting patterns, which, under
the right conditions, can trigger electoral re-equilibration.
Keywords
conflict attitudes, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, public opinion, violence, voter behavior
Introduction
How do violent episodes shape voter behavior in
ongoing conflicts? The relationship between conflict and
voting has received increased scholarly attention in
recent years. This literature focuses predominantly on
immediate changes in voting behavior after violent
events, particularly greater support for hawkish and
oppositional parties in nearby elections. These findings,
however, leave open questions about the longer-term
electoral implications of violent episodes in ongoing con-
flicts. Do short-term shifts in voting patterns persist,
revert to their old means, or experience more complex
changes after the violence subsides? What attitudes
underlie long-term trends? And what other factors dee-
pen or obstruct such processes? A longer-term look into
these questions in conflicts that experienced significant
escalation is necessary for a fuller understanding of the
nexus between conflict, violence, and voting behavior.
We examine these issues by studying voting behavior
in Israel over the past two decades. Recent structural
changes in Israel’s electoral patterns, particularly the
emergence of a stable centrist party bloc, challenge exist-
ing expectations about voting after violent episodes.
Corresponding author:
ayakter@tauex.tau.ac.il
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(3) 504–520
ªThe Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221088038
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Since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in
1967, the primary Left-Right divide in Israel has been
defined by ideological disagreements about these terri-
tories, eclipsing and co-opting other issues and identities
(Shamir & Arian, 1999; Arian & Shamir, 2008). In this
dichotomy, the Left represents dovish support for
territorial compromise and negotiations with the
Palestinians, whereas the Right stands for hawkish pre-
ferences for Israeli control of the territories and distrust
of the Palestinians.
In the early 2000s, the Israeli–Palestinian peace pro-
cess collapsed and was followed by the Second Intifada, a
large-scale violent escalation lasting several years. How-
ever, rather than internal shifts within the Left- Right
dichotomy, as the literature expects, the following years
exhibited an unfamiliar outcome: the emergence and
consolidation of a new centrist bloc and a de facto
three-bloc system. The new centrist parties borrow ele-
ments from Left and Right, explicitly locating themselves
between these two camps (Hazan, 1997). The political
center also includes niche parties organized around
secondary issues (Meguid, 2005; Wagner, 2012) but
holding similar centrist positions on the conflict. The
breakdown of the old dichotomy is illustrated in Figure 1,
which plots Knesset seat shares by partisan blocs since
the late 1960s.
1
The graph also dispels the common
notion that the Center merely substituted the Left, evi-
dent by the lack of a clear negative correlation between
the two blocs (e.g. in 2009 and 2013) and by occasional
leftist seat gains (e.g. 2013 and 2015).
2
Using survey data from the past two decades, we argue
that the breakdown of Israel’s Left-Right dichotomy is
closely related to the conflict’s escalation in the early
2000s. The Israeli case demonstrates that periods of
intense conflict can create longer-term changes in voter
attitudes and behavior that differ from strictly hawkish
shifts. We argue that since the mid-2000s, many Israeli
voters have become ‘Doubtful Doves’: supportive of ter-
ritorial compromise in principle, like the Left, yet skep-
tical of the practical prospects for peace with the
Palestinians, like the Right.
3
This doubtful dovishness
rejects core elements of both the left-wing and right-
wing agendas and increases demand for murkier partisan
options in-between. It is, we show, the clearest attitudi-
nal attribute of centrist voters beginning in the mid-
2000s. Once this bottom-up demand was met with a
top-down supply of new centrist parties, particularly
after the establishment of Kadima in 2006, the Israeli
Figure 1. Knesset seat share by partisan blocs, 1969–2019
1
We distinguish six partisan blocs. Three ideological blocs (Left,
Center, Right) are identified by their substantive agendas,
particularly on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Three sectarian blocs
(Ultra-Orthodox, National-Religious, and Arabs) are categorized by
explicit mobilization of religious and ethnic subgroups. We classified
parties into blocs by their written platforms and organizational history
and validated our scheme using previous studies. More details appear
in Online appendix A.
2
The perceived Center –Left trade-off seems more fitting for the
2019–20 elections, yet it remains unknown whether this is a new
structural change or an idiosyncratic result.
3
The term ‘Doubtful Doves’ equates dovishness with support for
territorial compromise under current conditions. Nevertheless, some
self-identified hawks may support territorial compromise under
different structural conditions that are not yet met. We choose this
terminology for simplicity and to reflect real-time partisan
disagreements.
Yakter & Tessler 505
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