The Macnaughton Rilles
| DOI | 10.1177/002201834000400108 |
| Date | 01 January 1940 |
| Published date | 01 January 1940 |
| Author | O. C. M. Davis |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Macnaughton Rilles1
By O. C. M. DAVIS,
M.D.,
D.Se.
Department
of
Medical
Jurisprudence,
University
of Bristol.
THERE
has been much controversy regarding the relation-
ship between criminal responsibility and insanity, and
a vast amount of literature has been devoted to this
very
important question.
Those
students of law and medicine- who are anxious to
gain an impartial outlook on the matter are met with a serious
difficulty at the outset of their studies.
It
is obviously necessary
for their purpose
that
they should have some knowledge of
the nature of insanity, and be able to recognize
the
difference
between individuals who are considered to be insane and those
who apparently are not so afflicted.
As in medicine, so in law there can be no exact definition
of
the
meaning of the word
"insane".
Charles Mercier
writes:
"Insanity
is often called disorder of mind, and this
it is,
but
it is much more
than
this. Were it disorder of mind
alone we should not be called upon to treat it, for we should
know nothing about it unless we happen to be subject
to it ourselves. What goes on in
the
minds of other people
we can never know, unless and until it is revealed to us by
their
conduct"
(A Text Book
of
Insanity, Allen and Unwin).
The
same author writes
:-"
Conduct is action in pursuit
of ends, and is composed of acts undertaken to attain ends "
(Conduct and its Disorders, Macmillan).
The
question
"sane
or
insane"
largely resolves itself
into acritical comparison of the conduct of an individual
with
that
of an individual in the same circumstances of life
1
This
article
is based on
extracts
from
asmall book,
Mmtalj~l'
and
the
Criminal
Law,
by
O. e.
M.
Davis
and
F.
A.
Wilshere
Wright,
Bristol, 1935.
75
76
THE
JOURNAL
OF
CRIMINAL
LAW
who is considered to be mentally normal.
Such
amethod is
.of necessity somewhat unsatisfactory as there is no fixed
standard
for sane people to comply
with;
furthermore,
many social
and
religious reformers exhibit conduct which
does
not
conform with
that
of their fellow men.
They
have,
in
many
cases, indicated
that
they consider the conduct of
so-called normal people to be ethically wrong, and have
endeavoured to
set
up a higher general
standard
of
conduct.
Mental
disease is invariably associated with some degree
of change
of
conduct,
and
a
student
of insanity must, therefore,
be a
student
of conduct.
When
a
man's
conduct renders him
dangerous to himself or others he is considered sufficiently
insane to be restrained at
the
instance of
the
Law.
It
is essential to realize
that
the
duration of insanity may
extend
from a few
minutes--or
possibly
seconds-to
a
lifetime.
This
is referred to later.
In
accordance with the ancient maxim actus non reum
facit nisi
mens
sit rea, it has long been
the
custom of English
judges
when
summing
up in criminal trials to direct
the
jury
that
in considering their verdict
they
must
give carefuI
consideration to
the
mental state of the prisoner.
Thus
in
R. 'D. Arnold
(17%4)
and
R. o. Ferrers (1760) it was ruled
that
a
man
could
not
be acquitted on
the
ground
of
insanity
unless he was totally deprived of understanding
and
memory,
and
did
not
know
what
he was doing any more
than
an
infant, abrute, or a wild beast.
In
the
former case
Tracy
J,
in charging
the
jury,
said:
"It
is
not
every kind
of
idle
and
frantic
humour
of a man, or something unaccountable
in his actions which will show
him
to be
such
a
madman
as is
to
be exempted from
insanity"
(16 St. Tr., 695,
and
19
St. Tr., 885).
In
R.
'D. Bellingham (1812)
the
test applied was whether,
when
the
act was done,
the
prisoner was capable of distinguish-
ing
right
from wrong, or was
under
the
influence of any
delusion which rendered his
mind
insensible of
the
act
(Collinson Lun., 636).
The
case
of
R. 'D. Oxford (1840) is of special interest
To continue reading
Request your trial