The material conditions of non-domination: Property, independence, and the means of production
| Published date | 01 July 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14748851211050620 |
| Author | Alexander Bryan |
| Date | 01 July 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The material conditions of
non-domination: Property,
independence, and the
means of production
Alexander Bryan
Harvard University, USA
Abstract
While it is a point of agreement in contemporary republican political theory that prop-
erty ownership is closely connected to freedom as non-domination, surprisingly little
work has been done to elucidate the nature of this connection or the constraints on
property regimes that might be required as a result. In this paper, I provide a systematic
model of the boundaries within which republican property systems must sit and explore
some of the wider implications that thinking of property in these terms may have for
republicans. The boundaries I focus on relate to the distribution of property and the
application of types of property claims over particular kinds of goods. I develop this
model from those elements of non-domination most directly related to the operation
of a property regime: (a) economic independence, (b) limiting material inequalities,
and (c) the promotion of common goods. The limits that emerge from this analysis sup-
port intuitive judgments that animate much republican discussion of property distribu-
tion. My account diverges from much orthodox republican theory, though, in challenging
the primacy of private property rights in the realization of economic independence. The
value of property on republican terms can be realized without private ownership of the
means of production.
Keywords
Property, non-domination, republicanism, economic independence, private property
One of the most prominent topics within republican political theory in recent years has
been that of political economy. This body of work has two main strands, which,
though complementary and overlapping, are concerned with different kinds of questions.
The first of these involves analyzing the structural relations of modern economies.
Corresponding author:
Alexander Bryan, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, USA.
Email: alexbryanemail@gmail.com
Article
European Journal of Political Theory
2023, Vol. 22(3) 425–444
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14748851211050620
journals.sagepub.com/home/ept
Understanding domination as a form of unfreedom that can emerge from complex
structural relations, this work explores how existing economic structures—such as the
labor market, debt relations, and the role of currencies in the global financial system—
leave some individuals subject to domination (Anderson, 2015; Bryan, 2021;
Gourevitch, 2013, 2015; Herzog, 2019; Preiss, 2021). The second involves the defense
of particular models of political economy on republican grounds. These include a
mixed capitalist economy, forms of socialism, an economy based on rights of exit in
competitive markets, and various kinds of property-owning democracy (Muldoon,
2019; O’Shea, 2020; Taylor, 2017; Thomas, 2017). The central question of this strand
concerns what kinds of economic institutions and relationships will optimally promote
non-domination and minimize the possibility of the emergence of new relations of
domination.
A component of republican thinking about the economy on which all of this work
relies, but which remains comparatively under-theorized, is the relationship between
freedom as non-domination and property ownership. The strong relationship posited
between the two is a characteristic featureofrepublicanism,andthebenefits of
owning property and the vulnerabilities that can be generated from certain property
arrangements are concerns that animate much of the work regarding republican
political economy. However, the coordinates of this relationship remain relatively
uncharted beyond some well-established claims (such as that excessive material
inequalities threaten non-domination). A more systematic account of the demands
that a commitment to non-domination makes on the organization and distribution of
property would help to illuminate the choice between economic systems from within
a republican framework and provide greater clarity to the republican discussions of
property.
In this paper, I will provide an account of the boundaries within which a property
regime based on the value of non-domination must sit. To do this, I must first
provide an analysis of the value of property ownership within a republican framework.
I argue that this value can be encapsulated in three functions that property is uniquely
equipped to perform for republicans: (a) promoting economic independence; (b) limit-
ing material inequalities; and (c) promoting common goods. I specify each of these in
turn and show that limitations on material inequality and the promotion of common
goods can be conceived as checks, or constraints, on the primary function of
promoting economic independence. As I will demonstrate, this model supports the
intuitive judgments that animate much republican discussion of property
distribution and overlaps with existing accounts of property constraints within the
literature (Dagger, 2006; White, 2000). It also, though, diverges in important ways,
including with regard to the role of private property rights in promoting economic
independence.
In making this argument, the paper contributes to the emerging literature on repub-
lican political economy in two ways. First, it demonstrates that engaging with the jus-
tificatory foundations and specifications of property is crucial to evaluating the
desirability of any particular kind of property system from a republican perspective.
Paying attention to the specific rights and empowerments that can produce a condition
426 European Journal of Political Theory 22(3)
To continue reading
Request your trial