The Meaning of “Functions” in s.1(1) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018
| Author | Neil Parpworth |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183211052243 |
| Published date | 01 February 2022 |
| Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
The Meaning of “Functions”in
s.1(1) of the Assaults on
Emergency Workers (Offences)
Act 2018: Campbell v CPS [2020]
EWHC 3868 (Admin)
Neil Parpworth
Leicester De Montfort Law School, UK
Keywords
Assault, emergency worker, function, meaning of ‘functions’
The appellant was encountered by police officers in a street in the early hours of the morning whilst in an
intoxicated state. One of the officers attempted to place handcuffs on her and a struggle ensued, during
which the appellant scratched the officer’s thumb causing it to bleed. Following her arrest, the appellant
was taken to a police station. As she was being escorted to the custody suite she kicked another officer.
Later, after she had been detained in a cell, she kicked the leg of the same officer whose thumb she had
earlier scratched. This incident occurred after she had washed her hands under supervision in a corridor.
The appellant was charged with being drunk and disorderly in relation to her conduct in a public place
contrary to s.91(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. She was also charged with three offences of assault-
ing an emergency worker, contrary to s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and s.1 of the Assaults on
Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.
Before the justices, it was argued on the appellant’s behalf that the test as to whether a police officer was
acting in the exercise of their functions as an emergency worker for the purposes of the 2018 Act was the same
as whether an officer was acting in the execution of their duty for the purposes of the offence contrary to
s.89(1) of the Police Act 1996, i.e. assaulting a police officer. It was submitted that prior to her attempt to
place handcuffs on the appellant, the officer whose thumb was scratched (and who was later kicked) had
placed her hands on the appellant without intending to arrest her, thereby acting unlawfully. It was further
submitted that since the arrest of the appellant and the attempt to handcuff her had been unlawful, the subse-
quent actions of the officers at the police station were also unlawful. Accordingly, at no time had the officers
been acting in the exercise of functions as emergency workers for the purposes of s.1(1) of the 2018 Act.
In convicting the appellant of all four offences, the justices held that for the purposes of the s.1(1)
offence, a police officer could be exercising the functions of an officer even if they were not acting in
the execution of their duty within the meaning of s.89(1) of the 1996 Act. It followed, therefore, that
the lawfulness of the officer’s actions prior to the arrest of the appellant had been irrelevant.
Corresponding author:
Neil Parpworth, Leicester De Montfort Law School, UK.
Email: njp@dmu.ac.uk
Case Note
The Journal of Criminal Law
2022, Vol. 86(1) 51–54
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183211052243
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