The Militant Strain: An Analysis of Anti-Secular Discourse in Britain
| Author | Steven Kettell |
| Published date | 01 August 2015 |
| Date | 01 August 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12119 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 5 V O L 6 3 , 5 1 2 – 5 2 8
doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12119
The Militant Strain: An Analysis of Anti-secular
Discourse in Britain
Steven Kettell
University of Warwick
Issues about the relationship between the religious and the secular have become increasingly prominent in recent
years. In Britain, one of the central themes around this topic has been the emergence and propagation by leading
religious and political figures of a concerted anti-secular discourse. This warns of the dangers posed by a militant,
aggressive and intolerant form of secularism which is said to be driven by an ideological desire to force religion out
of the public square, representing a clear threat to religious freedoms and social morality. This discourse has been
shaped by a number of interrelated causal dynamics, but the religious and political influences involved differ
substantially. Respectively, these relate to ongoing processes of secularisation and the increasing use of identity
politics, set against the changing capacities of the British state and the electoral considerations of the Conservative
Party.
Keywords: anti-secularism; discourse; secularisation; identity politics; religion
The boundary between the religious and the secular is intrinsically political. The forms
taken by this division determine the extent and the terms of religious engagement in the
public sphere, and shape a variety of factors including matters of public policy, debates
around freedom of speech and issues concerning multiculturalism, security and the use of
medical and scientific technologies. The demarcation between the religious and the secular
is also variable, porous and highly contested, embodying deep-seated power relations and
being constructed, maintained and reproduced by a variety of social, cultural and political
forces. With the public influence of religion having experienced something of a resurgence
since the latter decades of the twentieth century, these themes have been a source of
increasingly evident tension in many parts of the world.
The relationship between the religious and the secular has been the subject of much
scholarly debate. Among the central issues involved here include the normative merits of
secularism (e.g. Habermas, 2011; Modood, 2010; Rawls, 1997; Taylor, 2011); the con-
ceptual validity of the religious/secular dichotomy itself (e.g. Fitzgerald, 1997); institu-
tional relations between religion and the state (e.g. Fox, 2006; Madeley, 2009); processes
of secularisation (e.g. Casanova, 1994; Norris and Inglehart, 2004); as well as the influence
of religion on a variety of particular issues such as voting behaviour, party systems, social
capital and political engagement (e.g. Gu and Bomhoff, 2012; Kalyvas and Kersbergen,
2010; Minkenberg, 2010; Wuthnow, 2002).
One area that has been relatively overlooked within these debates, but one that is of
critical importance for understanding secular–religious dynamics, is the use of public
discourse. As the principal means by which actors seek to persuade public opinion and to
frame the terms and content of public debate, the issue of public discourse represents a key
site of contestation, engaging attempts to promote and legitimise – and, conversely, to
© 2014 The Author. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
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invalidate and undermine – a variety of objectives, behaviours and courses of action. In this
way, the use of public discourse is a central part of the exercise, reproduction and
legitimation of political power (see, for example, Fairclough, 2000; Wodak, 2009).
Scholarly analyses of the use of public discourse in the context of religious–secular
relations, though, remain limited. While debates around secularism and religion attract a
high level of attention, studies into the issue of public discourse are few in number, and
have centred on a small number of topics. Most research in this area has concentrated on
developments in the United States, either examining the discourse of religious groups in
general (e.g. Knutson, 2011; Lichterman, 2008) or its use by the broader Christian Right
movement (e.g. Jelen, 2005). Research into the use of public discourse in Britain has
primarily focused on debates around the impact of homosexual issues (e.g. Hunt, 2007) or
on wider attempts by religious organisations to legitimise a role for faith in the public
sphere in a more general sense (e.g. Kettell, 2009).
A core theme in recent debates about the relationship between the religious and the
secular in Britain has been the emergence of a vigorous anti-secular discourse. Propagated
by leading religious and political figures, this claims that a militant, aggressive and intolerant
form of secularism is seeking to drive faith out of the public square, posing a serious threat
to religious freedoms and endangering the moral health of the nation. The purpose of
this article is to examine the conditions underpinning the rise and development of this
anti-secular discourse, exploring some of the possible reasons why it has emerged at this
particular point in time and why it has assumed the specific form that it has. The explanation
for this centres largely on two overlapping but nonetheless divergent sets of interests:
religious and party political. Key issues for the former involve the challenges posed by
secularisation and the dynamics of identity politics in promoting a greater role for faith in
the public sphere. For the latter, the main objectives and motivating factors are based on the
changing nature of governance and the electoral fortunes of the Conservative Party.
Barbarians at the Gates?
In Britain, recent debates about the role of religion in the public sphere have been marked
by the emergence of an avowedly anti-secular discourse. Propagated by a range of leading
religious and political figures, this claims that religion (and Christianity in particular) is
being marginalised and forced out of the public square by a militant, aggressive and
intolerant brand of secularism. Presented as posing a serious threat to religious freedoms as
well as to the moral health of the nation, militant secularism is said to be fuelled by an
ideological cocktail of anti-religious sentiments, combined (somewhat paradoxically) with
politically correct concerns about the rights and sensitivities of minority social groups, most
notably Muslims and homosexuals. Driving this, it is claimed, is a collection of actors and
organisations, foremost among which stand secular cause groups (principally the National
Secular Society and the British Humanist Association) and high-profile public intellectuals,
such as Richard Dawkins and A. C. Grayling. Left-leaning sections of the media, as well
as elements within the judiciary and organisations such as the Equality and Human Rights
Commission, are often highlighted too.
The intensity of this discourse has increased since the turn of the century. Although
there is no simple way to measure its prevalence with any degree of detail or accuracy, one
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S T E V E N K E T T E L L
useful indicator, to the extent that most public discourse is now reflected through the prism
of electronic media, is the frequency with which key phrases relating to anti-secular
concerns appear in internet search results. In contrast to software designed to search media
outputs, such as LexisNexis, internet search data cover a wide range of outlets and forms
of public discourse, including traditional media, but also a variety of other sites such as
blogs, online fora and social networks. While this method is far from perfect (being shaped,
among other things, by the algorithms of the particular search engine used, as well as by
the continually expanding nature of the internet itself ), the exercise nevertheless provides
a useful barometer, albeit a rough and impressionistic one, for the growth of anti-secular
discourse. Examining key terms and phrases in anti-secular discourse using advanced search
tools provided by Google (which is unique among major search engines for allowing data
to be filtered by region and date) reveals substantial growth in their use, particularly from
the midpoint of the decade. The terms ‘secular fundamentalism’ and ‘radical secularism’,
for example, show a moderate and uneven rate of increase, while references to ‘militant
secularism’ rose from a total of just 10 search results in 2005 to 455 in 2012, only slightly
ahead of ‘aggressive secularism’, the use of which grew from 5 to 398 hits over the same
period. The figures for all four terms combined show an increase from 0 results in 2000,
to 27 in 2005 and 948 in 2012 (see Figure 1).1
The growth of anti-secular sentiments underpinning this discourse can be seen in other
ways. A 2009 opinion poll conducted by ComRes found that 58 per cent of Christians felt
that living according to their faith in Britain had become more difficult compared to five
years ago, with this figure rising to 66 per cent when the time frame was extended to two
decades (Premier Christian Media, 2011). A recent survey by the Evangelical Alliance
(2012), Britain’s largest umbrella group for evangelical Christians, found that 77 per cent
of evangelicals thought that it was becoming harder to live by the Christian faith, and a
2010 poll revealed that 93 per cent of Christians...
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