The Moral Case for Post—Cold War Development Aid
| Date | 01 June 1996 |
| Published date | 01 June 1996 |
| Author | Roger C. Riddell |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209605100201 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ROGER
C.
RIDDELL
The
moral
case
for
post-Cold
War
development
aid
Since
its
origins
at
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War,
develop-
ment
aid,
known
more
accurately
as
official
development
assis-
tance
(ODA),
has
been
provided for
four
main
reasons:
to
further
the
strategic
and
political
interests of
donors;
to
further
the economic,
including
commercial,
interests
of
donors;
in
response
to
a
series
of
imperatives
arising
from
historical
rela-
tions
between
donor
and
recipient;
and
for
ethical
or
moral
reasons.
The
purpose
of
this
article
is
to
look
closely
at
the
last
reason.
More specifically,
the
article
focusses
on
the
moral
case
for
aid
in
the
post-Cold
War
era:
has
the
case
for
aid
changed,
and
if
so
in
what
ways?
The
answer
is
yes
and
in
a
number
of
crucial
ways.
THE
'OLD'
MORAL
ARGUMENTS
FOR
AID
Many
supporters
of
aid
have
traditionally
argued
that
the
moral
case
for
aid
is
based
simply
on
the
proposition that
poor
people
need
to
be
helped;
and
aid
(often
defined
simply
as
external
help
provided
as
a
gift)
is
a
good
means
by
which
the
needs
of
the
poor
can
be
met
and
their
poverty
eradicated,
or
at
least
reduced
sufficiently
to
enable
them
to
live
a
more
human
life.
As
I
argued
some
ten
years
ago
in
Foreign
Aid
Reconsidered,
this
'gut
reaction' assertion
is
both
an
inadequate
and
an
incom-
plete
basis
for
arguing the
moral
case
either
for aid in
general
Senior
Research
Fellow,
Overseas
Development Institute,
London.
This
article
is
based
on the
first
of
a
1965-6
public
lecture
series,
'Ethics
in
International
Affairs,'
under
the
auspices
of the
Centre
for
Peace
Studies
at
the
Irish
School
of
Ecumenics.
IhternationalJournal
LI
SPRING
1996
192
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
or for
rich (industrialized
country)
governments
to provide
aid.'
Without
revisiting
the
different
stages
of
what
in
places
turned
out
to
be
quite
a
complex
discussion,
it
was
argued
that
the
moral
case
for
aid
should
be
based on
several
propositions.
First,
there
has
to
be
an
acceptance
of
a
moral
obligation
to
help.
Once
accepted,
however,
it
by
no
means
follows
that
there
is
a
moral
case
for
providing
aid.
To
argue
the
case
for
govern-
ments
to
provide
development
aid
(and
even
today
governments
provide
90
per
cent
of
all
aid
flowing
from
rich
donors
to
poor
recipients)
it
is
necessary
to
show
that:
1 Governments
have
moral
obligations,
perhaps
based
on
the
notion
of
'human
solidarity,'
to
intervene
in
the
economy;
these
obligations
can
extend
to
other
countries, their
gov-
ernments,
or
citizens
of
countries
outside
the government's
immediate
legal
jurisdiction
and
are
more
important
than
some
unmet
moral obligations
a
government
has
to
its
own
citizens.
2
Foreign
aid
does
indeed
help
to
improve
the
living
stan-
dards
of
the
poor
for
whom it
is
given,
or,
if
it
does
not,
policies
can
be
changed
to
ensure
that
it
will.
And,
finally,
3
There
is
no more
effective
way
to
help the
poor
than
by
giving
aid
to
the
Third
World.
To
put
the
same
points
slightly
differently,
when
the
needs
(for
which
read,
usually,
poverty)
of
the
potential
recipients
are
placed
alongside the
ability
of
donors
to
help,
donors
feel
they
ought
to
help
and
that
the
vehicle
of
help
should
be
aid because
the
donors
are
convinced
that
aid
can
make
a
difference
in
meeting
the
need,
namely
reducing
poverty
and
enhancing
development.
The
moral
case
for
development
aid,
it
should
be stressed,
was
not
based
on
the
argument
that
aid
was
necessary
for
devel-
opment,
that
without
it
there
would
be
no
development.
Such
a
proposition
has
been
challenged repeatedly
by
historical
i
Roger
C.
Riddell,
Foreign
Aid
Reconsidered
(London
and
Baltimore:James
Currey
and Johns
Hopkins
University
Press
1987),
esp.
part
I.
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