The Moral Case for Peace: Principle Versus Pragmatism
| Published date | 01 October 1976 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787600500406 |
| Author | Martin Graham |
| Date | 01 October 1976 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
1139
THE
MORAL
CASE
FOR
PEACE:
PRINCIPLE
VERSUS
PRAGMATISM*
MARTIN
GRAHAM
*
This
essay
won
the
1975
Cecil
Peace
Prize,
which
is
awarded
annually
for
the best
essay
submitted
on
a
subject
falling
within
the
field
of
International
Relations.
The
competition
is
open
to
all
students
under
25
at
any
University
College
in
Great
Britain.
The
world
is
full
of
pragmatists.
The
field
of
thought
on
international
relations
being
no
exception,
the
ideal
of
peace
has
traditionally
drawn
most
of
its
support
from
considerations
of
its
utility.
&dquo;Peace
is
in
everyone’s
interest&dquo;,
we
are
told,
and
there
can
be
little
doubt
that
the
argument
that
war
in
the
long
run
serves
no-one
is
a
sound
one.
Nevertheless,
Immanuel
Kant
was
able
to
hail
peace
as
the
&dquo;highest
political
good&dquo;
without
paying
any
attention
to
its
utility.
The
purpose
of
this
article
is
to
attempt
to
show
the
superiority
of
Kant’s
morally-based
approach
over
its
more
common
alternative
-
the
advocacy
of
peace
based
on
utilitarian
considerations.
An
essential
tenet
in
the
Rationalist
case
for
world
govern-
ment,
or
international
law
of
some
kind,
has
been
that
anarchy
inevitably
leads
to
chaos.
That
is
to
say
that
the
absence
of
common
government
over
sovereign
states
must
cause
the
inter-
national
situation
to
degenerate
into
a
&dquo;state
of
utter
confusion,
totally
lacking
in
any
sort
of
order
or
arrangement&dquo;.’
A
situa-
tion
cannot
then
be
avoided
where
independent
nations
are
reduced
to
a
formless
and
un-ordered
co-existence,
analogous
to
chess
pieces
in
a
game
where
all
rules
of
play
have
been
suspended.
Uncontrolled
war
brings
with
it
hardship,
waste
and
insecurity.
Rousseau,
to
take
one
example,
was
desperately
con-
cerned
about
his
observation
that
destruction
and
war
seemed
to
be
the
necessary
consequence
of
the
&dquo;system&dquo;.
He
was
quick
to
point
out
that
limitless
competition
between
states
was,
in
the
long
run,
in
the
interest
of
none.2
He
cited
in
particular
the
interruption
of
commerce
and
the
expense
of
keeping
stand-
ing
armies
as
some
of
the
defects of
war.
Rousseau,
as
we
shall
see,
is
a
typical
example
of
a
philosopher’s
interest
in
peace
being
roused
by
the
pernicious
effects
of
war.
In
the
same
way,
Hume
felt
that,
as
a
matter
of
prudence,
men
should
sacrifice
their
inclination
to
&dquo;indulge
in
unlimited
freedom&dquo;
or
to
&dquo;seek
dominion
over
others&dquo;
in
order
to
build
a
peaceful
order
which
would
serve
the
interests
of
all.
Thus,
to
Hume,
the
need
for
1
Shorter
Oxford
Dictionary
definition
of
"chaos".
2
The
body
politic
was,
to
Rousseau,
"forced
to
compare
itself
in
order
to
know
itself".
("The
State
of
War",
p.171,
see
below,
p.5).
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