The Moral Economy of Somali Piracy – Organised Criminal Business or Subsistence Activity?
| Date | 01 February 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00192.x |
| Published date | 01 February 2013 |
| Author | Axel Klein |
The Moral Economy of Somali Piracy –
Organised Criminal Business or
Subsistence Activity?
Axel Klein
CHSS, University of Kent
Abstract Somali piracy is increasingly explained in terms of organised criminal business. This article argues that
piracy does not constitute a business and the analogy with organised crime is misleading and can obstruct the search
for a long term settlement. Dismissing the underlying grievance, the destruction of Somali fisheries by foreign
trawlers, with literalist explanations such as ‘pirates are rarely fishermen’ and ‘most targets are cargo ships’, ignores its
function as a ‘legitimating notion’. The concept of ‘moral economy’ is used to explain how along the coast but also
within the diaspora the identity of Somalis as victims is used to legitimize pirate activities. International responses
should therefore focus actively and symbolically on reconstructing livelihoods along the coast, instead of seeking
security sector and criminal justice solution. This is possible and cost effective because Somali piracy is a subsistence
activity driven by lack of employment and investment opportunities, and provides a limited economic stimulus for
coastal micro economies.
The raids on international shipping in the Indian Ocean
by small boats launched from the Somali coast have
spurred a remarkable growth in academic activity (Brue-
ger et al., 2011; Hansen, 2009). The frequency and spec-
tacular drama of these attacks, and the scale of the
international naval response to provide security for mer-
chant ships, have encouraged many commentators to
build up Somalia as the paradigm for 21
st
century piracy,
and extrapolate general principles from the particular
experience of that country.
It is often suggested that state collapse and the
removal of governmental authority as occurred in Soma-
lia during the 1990s is a precondition for pirate activity
(Korteweg, 2008; Verhoeven, 2009). The logical extension
of this analysis, is that ‘the war against piracy is one on
land’, which translates into rebuilding government struc-
tures in Somalia (Boot, 2009; Kraska, 2010; Kraska and
Wilson 2008 ⁄9; Menkhaus, 2007; Rohrer, 2011). The work
by international partners, such as the UN agencies or the
African Union, is therefore focused on building up the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, even
though its authority is limited to a small section of Mog-
adishu and even there upheld by foreign troops and
treasure. A number of international and regional agen-
cies are providing humanitarian assistance for the large
displaced population affected by market failure and
adverse environmental conditions, particularly drought.
Though well received by beneficiaries, these efforts do
not appear to have translated into greater legitimacy for
the transitional authorities. Only in the breakaway repub-
lic of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Punt-
land in north-eastern Somalia has a political process,
based largely on traditional structures, delivered rudi-
mentary government structures. Significantly, the author-
ities’ firm stance is reported to have effectively displaced
piracy in Somaliland (UN, 2010). In Puntland the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continues to focus
on upgrading security capacity. It is believed that a nec-
essary precursor for combating piracy is an effective
albeit rudimentary criminal justice system.
Considerable scepticism surrounds these efforts. ‘Afro-
pessimists’ regard piracy as another manifestation of the
categorical failure of African states to provide political
stability and economic development (Kaplan, 1994). It is
argued that these polities fall apart under pressure from
unbridled population growth, and that violence, often
along ethnic lines, becomes the instrument for resource
extraction and distribution (Collier, 2000; Reno, 2000).
1
With linkages to international markets a critical pre-
condition for power brokers, opportunities open up for
international crime and radical political movements
(Bayard, 1993; Keen, 2005). In a situation where states
are patently unviable Western governments are advised
to prepare for robust military responses (Kaplan, 2009).
A variant critique of the ‘land based’ solution chal-
lenges causal assumptions behind the state collapse – piracy
Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 1 . February 2013
ª2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2013) 4:1 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00192.x
Special Section Article
94
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