The Nation-State in the European Communities: Superficial Realities and Underlying Uncertainties

AuthorPaul Taylor
Date01 September 1984
Published date01 September 1984
DOI10.1177/002070208403900305
Subject MatterArticle
PAUL
TAYLOR
The
nation-state
in
the
European
Communities:
superficial
realities
and
underlying
uncertainties
One
of
the
differences
between
students
of
history
and
stu-
dents
of
international
relations
is
that
the
former
tend
to
think
that
the
present
should
be
explained
in
terms
of
the
past,
whilst
the
latter often
reinterpret
the
past
in
the
context
of
what they
perceive
to
be
the
present.
In
studying
the
European
Com-
munities
these
tendencies
may
be
illustrated
by
the
way
in
which some
scholars
assert
that
earlier
attempts
to
develop
an
overarching integration theory
were inevitably
mistaken
while
others
contend
that
the
state
is
an
immutable
underlying
reality
which
functionalists
or
neo-functionalists
and
the
like
were
foolish
to
discount.
To
explore
these
points
is
to take
up
a
more
profound
set
of
problems
about
the
claims
of
social
theory.
Suf-
fice
it
to
say
here
that
it
is
also
arguable
that
in
the
history
of
the
European
Communities
there
are
'realities'
which
are
not
im-
mutable
but
confined
to
particular
periods and
that
the sup-
posed
errors
of
the
past
cannot
be
exposed
in
terms
of
what,
after
all,
may
equally
come
to
be
judged
as
the
myths
of
the
present.
In
this
article
I
evaluate
the
extent
to which
nation-
states
in
the
European
Communities
are
now
constrained
by
their
membership, and
how
far
international
integration
in
Europe
has
challenged
national
sovereignty.'
It
is
useful
at
the
beginning
to
set
out
the
possible
range
of
rela-
Lecture
in
International
Relations,
London
School
of
Economics
and
Political
Science;
author of
The
Limits
of
European
Integration
(1983).
i I
draw
extensively
from
my
book,
The
Limits
of
European
Integration
(New
York:
Columbia
University
Press
1983).
International
Journal
xxxix
summer
1984
578
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
tionships
between
governments and
the
process
of
integration
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
intentions
and
perceptions
of
the
former:
it
is
in
this
context
that
the
presence
or
absence
of
con-
straints
is
likely to
be
revealed. In
a
first
conceivable
relation-
ship
integration
is
viewed
with
enthusiasm
by
governments:
they
see
it as
bringing
long-term
benefits
and
stress the advan-
tages
of
solidarity
with
partners.
Restrictions
upon
the
range
of
policy
options
and
short-term
costs
are
willingly
accepted,
and
powers
are
granted
to
the
regional
international
institutions
which
allow
them
to
take
decisions
which
have
direct
effect
within
states.
In
such
circumstances
it
is
not
appropriate
to
talk
of
the constraint
of
governments
by
integration,
except
per-
haps
in
the
somewhat
peculiar
sense
of
auto-constraint
or
self-
induced
constraint.
The
dominant
element
in
the
attitude
of
governments
is
the
enthusiasm
of
a
willing
subject,
and
supra-
national
powers
within
the
region
reflect
this
commitment.
In
a
second
conceivable
relationship,
however, govern-
ments
recognize
that
involvement
in
the
regional
organization
brings both
benefits and
costs,
and
they
manage
the
relation-
ship
as
far
as
possible
on
the
basis
of
a
self-interested
calcula-
tion.
They
accept
restraints
on
their
freedom
of
action
in
order
to
promote
the
well-being
of
the
regional
system
as
long
as
the
benefits
generated
exceed
the
costs.
But
any
efforts
of
the
re-
gional
institutions
to
extend
their
powers
over
the
states
are
contained:
they become
instruments
of
the
state,
or
at
best
actors
together
with
states.
The
dominant element
in
the
atti-
tude
of
governments
in
the
relationship
is
utilitarian, and
the
overriding
goal
is
one
of
self-realization
in
the
context
of
the
collectivity.
There
is
no
enthusiasm
for
a
process
of
self-abdica-
tion
for
the
sake
of
a
more
general
and longer term
advantage,
as
in
the
first
style
of
relationship.
In
contrast,
in
a
third
conceivable
relationship
states
face
pressures
which
may
impose
themselves
upon
the intentions
and
perceptions
of
states:
governments
are
pushed
to
accept
in-
tegration
against
their
better
judgment
by
outside
circum-
stances
or
internal
developments.
In
this
situation
the working

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