The National Causes of State Construction in France, Russia and China
| Author | Rosemary H. T. O'Kane |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1995.tb01697.x |
| Date | 01 March 1995 |
| Published date | 01 March 1995 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1995),
XLIII,
2-21
The National
Causes
of
State
Construction in
France,
Russia
and China
ROSEMARY
H.
T.
O’KANE
Uniuersity
of
Keele
General lessons about state construction are drawn from concentration on the
‘Terror’ years of three post-revolutionary regimes: the Jacobin in France,
17934;
the
Bolshevik in Russia,
1918-21;
and the Chinese,
195CL3.
These three
cases
are chosen
in order to develop
a
direct challenge to
Skocpol’s
claims about state building in
States and Social
Reuolurions. The findings show that early state building is not,
primarily,
a
rational, centralizing, mobilizing, response
to
war and
foreign
war
in
particular. It is civil war which is of greater importance to an understanding
of
the
development of revolutionary states and it is only after civil war is over that
permanent state construction
can
begin. Comparison for differences,
as
well
as
similarity, at this crucial point at the end
of
civil war shows that, along
with
the
importance of practical domestic policies as
a
basis
for
support, the essential
foundation for the post-revolutionary state
is
central control over the revolutionary
forces
of
internal coercion.
In recent years Skocpol’s theory of social revolution has captured centre stage,
seemingly pushing all other theories into the wings.’ The theory has attracted
such a following both because of its emphasis on the state and state building
after
the revolution and because
of
its consideration
of
international factors.
At the same time, the theory has also attracted considerable criticism,
particularly in respect
of
the explanations offered for the differing outcomes
of
the French, Russian and Chinex revolutions, on which the study is
based.’
Skocpol contrasts the ‘professional
-
bureaucratic state’ involving ‘national
markets and capitalist private property’ in France, with ‘the development-ori-
ented party
-
states’ in, loosely, their industrial (Russia)
or
agrarian (Chinese)
varieties3 Attention has not, however, focused on the early stage
of
state
building. Following a ‘liberal’ phase in which each state failed to achieve
consolidation, these modem states began, according to
Skocpol,
with the
coming to power
of
the Jacobins in France in
1793,
the Bolsheviks in Russia
in October 1917 and the Chinese Communists in China in 1949.
’
T.
Skocpol,
Stares
and
Social Revolutions: a Cornpararive Analysis
of
France, Russia
mrd
China
(Cambridge., Cambridge University Press,
1979).
’See
S.
Taylor,
Social Science and
Reuolurwns
(London, Macmillan,
1984),
M.
S.
Kimmel,
Revolurion:
a Sociological Approach
(Oxford, Polity,
1990)
and
P.
Calvert,
Revolution and
Counter-Reuolution
(Buckingham,
Open
University Press, 1990).
’
Skocpol,
States and Social Reuolurions,
p.
162.
6.
Polilical
Stud&
Amialion
1995.
Published
by
Blackwell Publishers.
l08Covlcy
Road.
Oxford
OX4
IIF,
UK
and
238
Miin
Street.
Cambridge.
MA
02142.
USA
ROSEMARY
H.
T.
O’KANE
3
In all three revolutionary situations, political leadership and regimes
-
the
Jacobin and then the Napoleonic in France, the Bolshevik in Russia, and
the Communist in China
-
emerged to reestablish national order, to
consolidate the socioeconomic transformations wrought by the class up-
heavals
from
below, and to enhance each country’s power and autonomy
over and against international
competitor^.^
The factor which Skocpol singles out as similar for each of these consolidating
regimes is the pressing need to mobilize for war. Whilst ‘war’ for Skocpol
includes both foreign and civil war, in line with her general international
interest, it is foreign war to which she gives the greater emphasis. It will
be
argued here that it is not foreign war but civil war which is central to an
understanding of state formation and this will
be
demonstrated through
examination
of
the same three cases
of
revolution (France, Russia and China)
which Skocpol employs to build her generalization. Crucially, it will
be
shown
that permanent state construction cannot begin until after the civil
war
has
ended and that even at this stage there is no guarantee that state construction
will succeed. Through moving the
focus
of enquiry away from the start of
Jacobin, Bolshevik and Chinese Communist rule towards the critical period at
the end
of
civil war the crucial lesson emerges that, along with the advantages
of
practical poiicies which carry popular support, the fundamental basis
of
permanent state building in post-revolutionary society is the establishment of
central control over the revolutionary forces of internal coercion.
Skocpol
on
War
and
State
Centralization: Comparison
for
Similarity
The Jacobins, Bolsheviks and Chinese Communists, each ‘state-building lead-
ership~’ were, in
Skocpol’s
view, ‘the people who created administrative and
military organizations and political institutions to take the place
of
pre-revolu-
tionary monarchies’. What they created were ‘centralized, bureaucratic state
structures’?
In respect of France, Skocpol argues for the importance of involvement in
foreign war and the consequent need for centralized mobilization to win the
war, as follows:
Ultimately it was the French declaration
of
war in Austria in April
1792
-
involving the nation in the
first
of
a series
of
international conflicts
that were to embroil
Europe
until
181
5
-that delivered the coup de grace
for
the liberal phase of
1789-91.
This act set in motion the processes
of
government centralization and popular political mobilization that were to
culminate first in the Montagnard
Term
of
17934,
and then in the
Napoleonic Dictatorship.6
To emphasize this crucial importance of war she continues:
under the aegis
of
mobilization
for
war and military intervention in unstable
internal politics, a centralized bureaucratic state had been constructed,
to
be
Skocpol,
Stales and Social Revolutions,
pp. 1634.
5Skocpol,
Siutes
and
Social Revolutions,
p.
168.
She
makes
it
quite
clear
that
by ‘military
organizations’
is
meant
the
army.
(See,
for
example, p. 163.)
Skocpol,
States and Social Revolutions,
pp.
1854.
0
Political Studies Association,
1995
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