The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections
| Published date | 01 January 2002 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512102023001006 |
| Author | Andreas Schedler |
| Date | 01 January 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections
ANDREAS SCHEDLER
ABSTRACT. In developing an analytical framework for the comparative
study of processes of democratization by elections, this article first lays
out the techniques of electoral manipulation authoritarian rulers employ
to control electoral outcomes. It argues next that manipulated elections
tend to trigger two-level games in which electoral competition is “nested”
inside electoral reform, and outlines the causal interaction and strategic
interdependence of the two levels. It describes the basic strategic choices
and strategic dilemmas actors face in iterative cycles of conflict. It
analyzes the uncertainties of results, relations of power, and strategic
responses that characterize the game. Finally, it explains how actors may
cope with its ambivalent and uncertain nature—they may devise “mixed”
strategies or privilege one level of the game over the other.
Keywords: Democratization • Elections • Electoral reform • Legitimacy
Nested games
As political regimes move from authoritarianism to democracy, “founding
elections” are supposed to mark the institutional break with the authoritarian past.
In the first transitions within the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington,
1991) in southern Europe and South America, the convocation of elections
signaled the inauguration of a new democratic era. Military rulers had banned
political parties and suspended electoral politics, and when they allowed the
electoral arena to open again they withdrew to the barracks rather than standing
for election themselves.
Later transitions have often taken a different turn. Rather than quit the
political scene, authoritarian rulers opted for entering the electoral arena
themselves. But, turned into candidates, authoritarian incumbents contaminate
electoral contests. Since they stand for election not to lose power but to legitimate
their continuity in office, they commonly try to distort and control the electoral
process in order to minimize the risk of defeat. By “borrowing cunningly some
features of democracy in order to substantively avoid it” (Case, 1996: 438) the new
electoral autocrats practice “democracy as deception” (Joseph, 1998b: 56, 59).1
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The elections they call for are therefore not foundational but transitional. They
inaugurate no new democratic regime but a new phase in the struggle for
democracy.
This article develops an analytical framework to guide our normative
evaluations of transitional elections. More importantly, it proposes a heuristic
model to advance our empirical understanding of the political logic of flawed
elections. In a first step, it discusses the manifold instruments ruling parties may
deploy to contain the democratic uncertainty of political elections. The “menu of
electoral manipulation” it sketches, with loose empirical illustrations from new
democracies, covers the whole sphere of electoral governance. It includes old
themes: fraud, repression, and unfairness. But it also includes issues that to date
have received little attention: the manipulation of actors, cleavages, and rules of
competition.
Moving on from the comparative anatomy of manipulation to the comparative
politics of manipulation, the article argues that the deployment of manipulative
strategies rarely leads to a stable regime “equilibrium.” Opposition parties usually
do not accept flawed elections as the endpoint of democratization. Rather, they
take them to be a mere way-station on the long road toward genuine electoral
democracy. Manipulated elections accordingly tend to trigger cycles of conflict
that revolve around issues of electoral governance. Rather than becoming
institutionalized they set countries on paths of democratization by elections. In
such transitions from authoritarian rule, electoral competition and the struggle
for electoral reform unfold simultaneously and interact in “nested” two-level
games.
The article outlines the causal and strategic interaction between the two game
levels, discusses the structural ambivalence, the strategic choices, and the
conflicting imperatives actors face, and delineates strategies actors may devise to
manage the ambivalence and uncertainty associated with the multi-layered “nested
game” (Tsebelis, 1990) of democratization.
The Menu of Manipulation
According to the standard script of transitions from military rule, authoritarian
incumbents tend to do two things when confronted with pressures for regime
change (short of simply repressing dissent). Initially, they may agree to liberalize.
They do this under the illusion of keeping things under control, but normally
things get out of control. Later, they may agree to hold elections under the
condition of obtaining certain institutional safeguards. The “vital interests” they
wish to protect commonly include property rights, military autonomy, and
impunity from judicial prosecution. In later transitions, authoritarian rulers have
been innovating. They have broadened their repertoire of “survival strategies”
(Brumberg, 2000). Instead of liberalizing they have been democratizing to
legitimate their continued monopoly of power. Instead of negotiating extra-
electoral guarantees, they have been devising electoral safeguards to protect their
vital interests. Once “exceptional” (Lamounier, 1989: 43), the Brazilian recipe of
“distorting rather than disbanding the basic institutions of political democracy”
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 22) has found adept imitators all over the world.
But how do rulers manage to “retain power while cultivating some semblance of
electoral legitimacy” (Skidmore, 1989: 30)? Generally speaking, they have a broad
array of safeguards at their disposal. By fine-tuning various complementary
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