The new EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: Normative Power in International Relations?
| Author | Lena Partzsch |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12575 |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
The new EU Conflict Minerals Regulation:
Normative Power in International Relations?
Lena Partzsch
University of Freiburg
Abstract
Over the last few years, European NGOs were very successful in raising awareness about international trade in minerals fund-
ing armed conflicts around the world. In May 2017, after more than three years of negotiation, the European Union signed
the new Conflict Minerals Regulation. At first glance, this Regulation demonstrates ‘ethical’or ‘normative’power: The EU uses
its commercial power to promote norms of international peace and security, accepting prospectively higher prices for imports
of minerals. The Regulation also supports a re-centring of the state after two and a half decades of economic liberalization.
However, the EU only follows and lags behind the 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act section 1502. The article shows that the EU does
not reject collective norms, but is incapable or unwilling to put a tight rein on domestic businesses. The new EU Conflict Min-
erals Regulation stands only for symbolic normative power.
Policy implications
•European policy-makers should ensure that international trade in minerals does not finance armed groups in conflict
regions.
•The new EU Conflict Minerals Regulation represents only a first step towards implementing a new norm of foreign
accountability.
•Extractive industries and all companies using (processed) minerals should more rigorously commit to emerging private
standards.
•Individual consumers can contribute to ‘raising the bar’by purchasing ‘ethical’products.
•Eventually, the EU needs to adopt binding regulations that allow holding European businesses legally accountable for vio-
lations of fundamental rights in their global supply chains.
•Exporting countries should cooperate with the EU on changing the rules of the game and establishing conflict-free and
fair trade standards.
Minerals and other natural resources are central to the fund-
ing of the most brutal and protracted civil wars, including the
armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
which has so far resulted in five million deaths and two mil-
lion refugees (Le Billion, 2013; Jeffrey, 2012). In May 2017, the
European Union followed the 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act Sec-
tion 1502 and introduced mandatory ‘due diligence’checks
on importers of tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold (3T&G) to
stop the financing of armed groups through the trade of
these minerals. ‘The rules we agreed upon (...) are a huge
step forward in our efforts to stop human rights abuses and
armed conflict,’said EU Trade Commissioner Malmstr€
om
(European Commission, 2016). She called the new Conflict
Minerals Regulation a ‘(g)ood example of value-based trade’
(Malmstr€
om, 2017). The EU accepts prospectively higher
prices for imports of minerals to ensure international peace
and security; can this be considered ‘ethical’or ‘normative
power’(Manners, 2002) in international relations (IR)? Does
this agreement stand for a ‘re-centring of the state’(Bartley,
2014) after two and a half decades of global market deregula-
tion and laissez-faire government?
The role of Europe and international trade in financing
armed conflicts has been under discussion for a long time.
The term ‘blood’or ‘conflict’minerals has become part of
everyday speech. Although subject to ongoing controversy
(Koubi et al., 2014), scholars found a clear correlation between
a country’s conflict risk and its resource exports to the EU and
other ‘consumer states’(Ross, 2004; de Soysa, 2002). Swilling
and Annecke (2012) go as far as blaming consumer states for
intentionally fuelling armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere
to further access resources at ‘discounted prices’. By giving
priority to economic liberalization and increasingly shifting
regulative authority to the private sector, the EU has generally
accepted the harmful practices of business actors outside its
own borders for a very long time (Sachs and Santarius, 2007).
This contrasts with the concept of ‘normative power Europe’
(Manners, 2002), which assumes that the EU gives priority to
norms such as social justice and human rights, rather than
self-interest, and that these norms result from dialogue with
other states. The concept of normative power Europe also
implies, as I outline below, that the EU has considerable regu-
lative authority over private actors in IR.
Global Policy (2018) 9:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12575 ©2018 The Authors Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Global Policy Volume 9 . Issue 4 . November 2018 479
Research Article
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