The New Professional Econocracy and the Maintenance of Elite Power
| Author | Aeron Davis |
| Published date | 01 October 2017 |
| Date | 01 October 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716674023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
674023PSX0010.1177/0032321716674023Political StudiesDavis
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Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(3) 594 –610
The New Professional
© The Author(s) 2017
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Maintenance of Elite Power
Aeron Davis
Abstract
This article begins by asking how have elites, who are more fragmented, transitory and precarious
than ever, continued to do so well out of discredited, financialised capitalist democracy? One
possible answer lies in what I term the new professional econocracy. As the article reveals, an
increasing proportion of elite figures at the top of business and government now have educational
and/or professional experiences of economics and related disciplines. On the one hand, this
provides the basis of a shared professional discourse and accompanying set of norms, values and
practices. This unites disparate and mobile elites. On the other hand, such knowledge enables
these elites both to move across sectors and to game the economic and accounting systems that
they have helped construct. Thus, elites reflexively adapt to, and benefit from, economic rules
while also rigidly dictating them to those below.
Keywords
elites, polyarchy, economics, neoliberalism
Accepted: 28 July 2016
This piece looks to explain a contemporary paradox in regard to those elites who seem-
ingly now rule Britain. The paradox is one of continuing elite power and privilege in an
era of eroding elite social structures, increasing precariousness and economic crisis.
From one vantage point, elites appear more advantaged than ever. Power and wealth
are more concentrated in fewer individual hands, larger corporations and institutions.
Inequality is rising fast. Neoliberal economic policy regimes, which clearly benefit those
at the top, have remained in the ascendancy for some decades. However, from another
vantage point, memberships of many traditional elite social structures, from exclusive
schools and social clubs to interlocking networks, all once considered fundamental to sus-
taining elite power, are in decline. In addition, elite leadership positions are more short-
term, and institutions and national polities more unstable. In effect, today’s leaders are less
Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK
Corresponding author:
Aeron Davis, Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross,
London SE14 6NW, UK.
Email: aeron.davis@gold.ac.uk
Davis
595
culturally homogeneous and socially connected, and more precarious and mobile. In which
case, the question posed is, how are elite power and inequality being perpetuated?
Part of the answer suggested here comes out of what I term professional econocracy.
This has emerged because an increasing proportion of those at the top have educational or
professional experiences of economics or related disciplines such as accounting and busi-
ness studies. The political, industrial and organisational shifts that have been facilitated
by neoliberal economic policy dominance (Davies, 2014; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009),
New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995), financialisation (Froud et al., 2006;
Palley, 2013) and the ‘audit society’ (Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000), have boosted their
numbers significantly.
As discussed here, econocracy advantages contemporary elites in several ways. First,
it links disparate elite sectors and institutions together by providing a common ideology
and policy framework. As such, elite econocrats can now cohere around a sort of shared
lingua franca that continues to operate regardless of institutional instability and elite
mobility. Second, it operates as a form of governmentality (Foucault, 2008), providing a
system of metrological tools, practices and mechanisms to effect a top-down ‘rule by
numbers’. As econocrats are central to both promoting econocratic discourse and estab-
lishing the technical ‘rules of the game’, they are also well-placed to work round them.
Third, econocracy transforms elite instability and mobility into a means of personal gain.
It enables elites to move across sectors and networks more easily. It also facilitates
short-term gaming of systems and evasion of long-term accountability.
The article focuses on the UK case to develop the account and draws on two sources
of data to do so. The first is a demographic audit of elite figures in 2014. Using Who’s
Who and other official sources, the profiles of the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet members,
permanent secretaries in Westminster and Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100
CEOs, were collected and compared to earlier studies. The second source is four overlap-
ping interview-based studies of UK elites in the City (2004–2005), Westminster (2006–
2008, 2013–2014), Whitehall (2006–2008, 2013–2014) and the business community
(2013–2014). These studies produced over 200 semi-structured interviews with senior
figures as well as with those who worked closely with them, such as analysts, journalists
and advisors. At the highest level, interviewees included 24 top fund managers, 40
(shadow) cabinet ministers, 20 permanent secretaries and ministerial special advisors,
and 20 FTSE 100 CEOs.
Sustaining Elite Power in an Age of Fragmentation,
Insecurity and Change
There is a clear paradox when regarding the continuing rise of elite power and inequality
in the current time. On the one hand, elites appear more socially and culturally frag-
mented in many ways. They are less likely to share the exclusive backgrounds, educations
and formal networks that they once did. They are also far more mobile and hold their
positions for much shorter periods. On the other hand, measures of inequality continue to
rise as key elites appear to have more power and greater financial rewards than ever
before. Neoliberal economic policy-making, which benefits those at the top most, has
continued unabated over decades and in spite of a protracted post-2008 economic crisis.
Traditionally, (post-) Marxists and critical elite scholars have focused on the institu-
tions, social networks and cultural influences which sustained the upper echelons of soci-
ety. Wright Mills’ (1956) book on The Power Elite, widely regarded as a defining work
596
Political Studies 65 (3)
here, described several mechanisms for ensuring that elites could find common cause. A
shared ‘class consciousness’ and ‘psychology’ among the elite was generated through a
mix of elite education and social networks. It was also maintained through top institu-
tional positions, exclusive club memberships, and multiple public and private board
appointments. These markers of ‘distinction’ enabled both inter- and intra-elite sector
connectivity. Thus, the bases for elite commonalities to develop were strong and, cumu-
latively, separated elites from the rest, as well as producing more narrow, self-interested
decision-making forums.
This work offered the basis for a critique of pluralists for some decades. Data on elite
class backgrounds, exclusive school and college attendance, board interlocks and club
memberships have all been gathered in the UK (Scott, 1979, 2014 [1991]) and US
(Domhoff, 1967, 2014). Although such research declined after the early 1980s, studies
have continued to analyse data on these indicators across varied elite networks (e.g.
Cronin, 2012; Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2013; Maclean et al., 2006).
However, as recent reviews of Mills’ work regularly point out (e.g. Davis and Williams,
in press; Freeland, 2012; Naím, 2013), globalisation, financialisation, and new communi-
cation and transport technologies have dramatically reshaped those very social structures
and institutions upon which elite/class power was founded. So have elements of neoliber-
alism itself. Over decades, the relentless focus on competition, deregulation and state
economic withdrawal have not only advantaged elites, they have also destabilised many
of their established social structures. Such trends have been compounded by the conse-
quences of the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
UK elites are now less linked together by shared social and educational backgrounds.
In certain sectors, such as the judiciary and military officer ranks, private school and
Oxbridge attendance levels remain high (Commission for Social Mobility (CSM),
2014). However, in other sectors, the numbers have been steadily declining for decades.
This has been the case among MPs across all three main parties (CSM, 2014; House of
Commons (HoC), 2010). A total of 33% of MPs in the last Parliament had a private edu-
cation and 24% went to Oxbridge. It has also been the case with permanent secretaries
(Barberis, 1996: 99, 105), whose Oxbridge graduate levels declined from 70% in the
inter-war period to 56% during the Thatcher years. It is the same too with top CEOs, a
majority of whom in the 1970s had such backgrounds. By 2014 (CSM, 2014), just 22%
of FTSE 350 CEOs attended a private school and 18% (12% of the Sunday Times UK
Rich List) had gone to an Oxbridge college.
Recent research on UK elites and social networks (Bond, 2012; Cronin, 2012) has also
noted the decline of exclusive club memberships and questioned their political utility.
Similar declines have been noted in respect to the prevalence of corporate board inter-
locks (Moran, 2003; Schnyder and Wilson, 2014) as...
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