The normativity of democracy
| Published date | 01 July 2019 |
| Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Author | Roberto Frega |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116684760 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2019, Vol. 18(3) 371–392
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116684760
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Article
The normativity
of democracy
Roberto Frega
IMM-CNRS, Paris, France
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the normative grammar of the
concept of democracy by distinguishing two levels at which a political concept may play
a normative function, and proceeds by analysing the concept of democracy at these
two levels. It distinguishes in particular between normativity as ‘norm-compliance’ and
normativity as ‘paradigmatic’ and contends that the concept of democracy has a nor-
mative content that extends over both levels. A model of democracy consistent with
this approach is then outlined based on a sociological account of democratic patterns of
interaction. The structure of the paper is as follows. In sections one and two, I distin-
guish two meanings of normativity and introduce the concept of ‘paradigm normativity’.
In section three, I provide examples of rival ‘paradigm normative’ concepts. In section
four, I provide an account of democracy as a ‘paradigm normative’ concept and in
sections five and six, I present its two most important theoretical features.
Keywords
Democracy, democratic theory, ontology of democracy, pragmatism, social
interactionism
The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the normative grammar
of the concept of democracy by distinguishing two levels at which a political con-
cept may play a normative function, and proceeds by analysing the concept of
democracy at these two levels. A model of democracy consistent with this approach
is then outlined. The article has a hermeneutical or articulatory rather than justi-
ficatory aim. No attempt will be made to provide a justification either of democracy
in general or of this specific account. Indeed, the whole thrust of the exercise is to
advance our understanding of the theoretical potential of the concept of democ-
racy, conceived as a norm for collective action. This aim explains why a purely
conceptual strategy is avoided, and historical and sociological arguments are intro-
duced so as to give empirical substance to ideas. My expectation is that such an
Corresponding author:
Roberto Frega, CNRS, 190 av., de France, Paris 75013, France.
Email: fregarob@gmail.com
exercise will help us improve our understanding of the democratic project, which
has shaped western, and, at increasing pace, non-western societies over the last two
centuries. In particular, I wish to reflect upon what is gained and what is lost by
making democracy the cornerstone of political theorizing.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In sections one and two, I distinguish
two meanings of normativity and introduce the concept of ‘paradigm normativity’.
In section three, I provide examples of rival ‘paradigm normative’ concepts. In
section four, I provide an account of democracy as a ‘paradigm normative’ concept
and in sections five and six, I present its two most important theoretical features.
Two senses of normativity
1
According to a widely shared view, a concept is normative when it provides a
benchmark against which to assess actions, events, or states of affairs. Stephen
Darwall captures this basic understanding when he writes that: ‘[s]omething is
said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails that some action, attitude
or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state
one ought to be in’ (Darwall, 2001). This conception is generally formulated in
terms of norm compliance, where compliance may come by degrees and describes
the adequacy of a piece of reality to an external standard fixing, the condition in
which that piece of reality should find itself. Its basic intuition is that a normative
concept provides a standard against which a portion of reality can be assessed.
In the domain of politics, to which the concept of democracy belongs, the concepts
of pleasure, utility, equality, freedom, justice and domination are normative in that
sense. Indeed, each provides a standard against which the value or appropriateness
of an action, event, or state of affairs can be assessed in terms that are politically
relevant. For example, when we say that an institution is organized according to
criteria of social equality, that a regime is just, that a constitution respects human
freedom, or that a social arrangement enables individuals to pursue their utility or
their happiness, we are using these concepts in a normative way, that is, we use
them to assess an action, event, or state of affairs and to assign it positive value.
Democracy is clearly a normative concept in that sense. When we say that a regime,
an organization, or a procedure is ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’, what we mean is
precisely that this regime, organization, or procedure is politically good or bad, and
the concept ‘democracy’ specifies in what sense good or bad. Let us call this first
conception ‘norm compliant’.
There is also a second major way in which a political concept can play a nor-
mative function. According to this second view, rather than defining a benchmark
with limited object validity, a normative concept provides a general framework for
interpreting human reality. When used in this way, a concept has the capacity to
provide a comprehensive and overarching interpretive framework which accounts
for the whole of political reality as well as other major normative concepts.
This second sense of normativity cannot be reduced to a merely larger form of
norm-compliance. A political concept with paradigmatic normative scope is a con-
cept that aspires to offer a comprehensive account of the largest possible portion of
372 European Journal of Political Theory 18(3)
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