The Obligation to Spend: Presidential Impoundment of Congressional Appropriations
| Author | Vivian Vale |
| Published date | 01 December 1977 |
| Date | 01 December 1977 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1977.tb00462.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
THE
OBLIGATION
TO
SPEND:
Presidential Impoundment
of
Congressional Appropriations
VIVIAN VALE
Ab.strac/.
A
recent major controversy has arisen over the habitual impoundment
(a
term
herein defined)
of
Congressional appropriations by the President through the
O.M.B.
President Nixon. who made unprecedentedly frequent resort
to
the practice, claimed both
constitutional and statutory authority as well as citing historical precedent. These claims
are successively examined, and almost wholly rejected
(as
indeed they already have been
by the federal courts). Rather, impoundrncnt appears as
a
device whereby President Nixon
substituted his own legislative priorities
for
those
of
the Congress. The latter therefore
strictly limited the practice by statute and sought, as a counterpoise, to improve
its
own
budgetary procedures. This recent reform is in turn evaluated, and the balance of responsi-
bility as hetween President and Congress
in
this fiscal area is weighed.
NOT
all the alleged misdeeds
of
President Nixon were recited by the House
Judiciary committee when
in
the summer of
1974
they prepared to impeach
him.
Notable among their omissions was his attempt (as
i’.
seemed) to wrest from
Congress a part at least of that power over the purse once regarded by Madison
as ‘the most complete and effectual weapon
with
which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people’.’ The great impoundment con-
troversy, Chairman Rodino may have felt, had recently been stilled by Con-
gressional legislation.
It
had raged notwithstanding
for
three years, ever since the
92nd Congress met, around tactical objectives as various as the dismantling of
the Office of Economic Opportunity and the conservation of wetlands for water-
fowl. Its implications have earned
it
more than a historical footnote, while the
wider issue of budgetary reform is likely to compel our attention for some years
to come.
As commonly used, the term impoundment may be defined as the deliberate
refusal of the executive to spend
or
obligate sums appropriated by the legislature
for a designated purpose. Broadly speaking, most federal spending proceeds by
two stages.’ First, Congress passes a basic authorization
for
funding a specific
programme
or
project on the strength of which it can get under way. Later
it
enacts an appropriation permitting the relevant department
or
agency to
‘obligate’ the government to the authorized expenditure.
If
the agency
or
depart-
ment does not use this obligational authority within the time specified,
it
normally lapses unless Congress re-appropriates.
1
mpoundment is said to occur
if
the executive either declines to obligate the money voted or refuses to spend it.
Although some appropriations are for multi-year
or
indeterminate periods, most
are for obligations to pay
within
a single fiscal year: for the executive
to
fail to
I
Thp
Federalisr.
no.
LVIII.
2
For a detailed description
of
the
U.S.
budgetary process see
M.
Weidenbaum,
Cong,rssand
/he
Federal
Budge/
(New York, American Enterprises Institution.
1964).
pp.
25-40.
Political
Studies.
Vol.
XXV,
No.
4
(508-522).
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