The organizational ecology of global governance
| Author | David A Lake |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066120959407 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120959407
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(2) 345 –368
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066120959407
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JR
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The organizational ecology
of global governance
David A Lake
University of California San Diego, USA
Abstract
The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not governed,
what legitimate powers any governor may hold, and whose political preferences are
instantiated in rules. The array of actors who comprise the current system of global
governance has grown dramatically in recent decades. Especially notable has been the
growth of private governance organizations (PGOs). Drawing on organizational ecology,
I posit that the rise of PGOs is both required and facilitated by disagreements between
states that block the creation of what might be otherwise effective intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). In a form of “double-negative regulation,” states block IGOs,
which in turn leave open niches that are then filled by PGOs, which then both
complement and sometimes substitute for state law. The organizational ecology
approach outlined here extends and refocuses inquiry in systematic ways that give us a
fuller understanding of how and why PGOs have emerged as one of the most striking
features of the contemporary world order. The key innovations in this paper are to
(a) shift the level of analysis from single agents or populations of agents to the entire
field of GOs, including states, IGOs, and PGOs and (b) draw on principles of ecology to
understand the composition and dynamics of systems of governance.
Keywords
Globalization, global governance, transnational civil society, foundational theory,
governance, state sovereignty
The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not governed,
what legitimate powers any governor may hold, and whose political preferences are
Corresponding author:
David A Lake, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521, USA.
Email: dlake@ucsd.edu
959407EJT0010.1177/1354066120959407European Journal of International RelationsLake
research-article2020
Article
346 European Journal of International Relations 27(2)
instantiated in rules. The array of actors who comprise the system of global governance
has grown dramatically. Especially notable has been the growth of private governance
organizations (PGOs) such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) discussed briefly later.1 The rise of PGOs has been
greeted enthusiastically by many who see them as progressive manifestations of global
civil society, and I should note that I intuitively share this enthusiasm. But our under-
standing of how and why PGOs have arisen is incomplete. Most analysts explain the
growth of PGOs as a response to essential functions otherwise unfulfilled in global poli-
tics. This is not incorrect. Yet, our understanding of the emergence of PGOs is enriched
by organizational ecology.
Drawing on ecological theory, I posit that the rise of PGOs is a response to disagree-
ments between states that block the creation of what might otherwise be effective inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs). Observers have, of course, recognized that
disagreements between states have blocked action by IGOs and opened the door for
PGOs. An organizational ecology approach, however, grounds this observation in a
larger theory with three specific implications. First, an organizational ecology approach
stresses the importance of looking at governance as a field and not just a single popula-
tion of agents.2 In other words, the approach turns our attention to the interactions of
populations of organizations. It also prompts us to ask what is missing. What is absent is
often as important as what is present, and organizational “holes” are revealed only by
theory and plausible counterfactuals. Second, the approach highlights that ecologies are
interactive and complex with often unintended consequences. Like all evolutionary theo-
ries, organizational ecology presumes there is no designer who manipulates situations to
bring about an intended result. Rather, what we observe is the product of local decisions
by many different agents. Third, an ecological approach helps us understand how popu-
lations are both competitive and synergistic. In global governance, organizations com-
pete to set rules and, by attracting adherents, gain resources from a pool that is in the
short run fixed. Too many sets of rules are equivalent to no rules at all—each actor can
then simply follow the rules it prefers (Locke, 2013: 15–16)—and all organizations
require resources to survive. At the same time, the ways in which private transnational
governance has evolved promote specialization and differentiation between agents and,
thus, create new populations. Where public regulation often fuses rule making, monitor-
ing, and enforcement in a single organization (e.g. the United States Food and Drug
Administration), private governance is dependent on the cooperation of the regulated
entities and, thus, cannot commit to objectivity. As a result, new populations of inde-
pendent auditors and monitors have arisen to implement private regulations, a synergis-
tic response to how a particular ecological niche has been filled.
Finally, and more generally, an organizational ecology approach prompts the question
of whether the particular path-dependent ecology that has emerged is socially optimal.
This is more a question than a conclusion, but one worth asking. All rules are biased,
reflecting the interests of some actors and not others. Who governs matters. Although
PGOs represent global civil society, their structure, organizational needs, and the require-
ment of self-financing risk creating a neo-liberal bias in global governance. This is not
so much a matter of counting PGOs at the international level compared to, say, the
domestic array of GOs within democratic states. Rather, it flows from the diffuse nature
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