The origins and (failed) adaptation of a dominant party: The UMNO in Malaysia
| Author | Hidekuni Washida |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891118771759 |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
The origins and (failed)
adaptation of a dominant
party: The UMNO
in Malaysia
Hidekuni Washida
Toyo University, Japan
Abstract
Why do some ruling parties attain dominance and remain in power? Focusing on a key case of a
dominant party, the UMNO in Malaysia, this article explores its origins and an adaptation strategy
under declining dominance. Regarding the origins, the article argues that a leader’s credible
commitment to providing electoral security for local elites enables collective action to develop
resource and spatial advantages. Specifically, the first section revisits the historical process and
explains how an initial electoral setback provided leaders with an opportunity to launch admin-
istrative reforms, which enabled them to overcome local reluctance and promote the party as a
centrist patron. The second section explores why the UMNO declined since 2008 and how it tried
to survive. Based on a survey data analysis, it argues that the UMNO found room to play a spatial
strategy of “Rikerian Offence” to reinforce its role as a chauvinistic patron, even at the cost of
abandoning the center.
Keywords
autocracy, commitment problem, dominant party, Malaysia, resource and spatial advantages
Introduction
Scholars have shown that dominant parties help autocratic regimes endure (e.g. Geddes, 1999),
because parties mitigate elite conflict (Brownlee, 2007) and help the leader to credibly commit to
sharing power and benefits with elites and masses (Magaloni, 2008).
1
Parties also provide long-
term career incentives for elites to invest their efforts in party development (Svolik, 2012). In
particular, by conducting multiparty elections, leaders can obtain valuable information about the
Corresponding author:
Hidekuni Washida, Toyo University, Hakusan 5-28-20, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 112-8606, Japan.
Email: washida@toyo.jp
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2019, Vol. 4(1) 61–80
ªThe Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891118771759
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distribution of support (Magaloni, 2006) and elites’ loyalty and capacity (Blaydes, 2011; Reuter
and Robertson, 2012). Furthermore, monopolistic control of legislative power and state resources
enables dominant parties to prevent the exit of elites and masses (Magaloni, 2006, 2008). Such
control also marginalizes opposition parties at ideologically radicalized issue spaces, which makes
it difficult for them to form a unified opposition front (Greene 2007, 2008; Templeman, 2012).
Despite agreement about the functions of dominant parties, there has been continuous debate
regarding why some autocracies successfully develop dominant parties but others do not (e.g.
Brownlee, 2007; Reuter, 2017; Slater, 2010; Smith, 2005; Templeman, 2012). In addition, there
have been debates about why some dominant parties fail to remain in power (e.g. Greene, 2007,
2010; Magaloni, 2006; Reuter and Gandhi, 2010; Templeman, 2012), and how they elaborate
survival strategies in the face of declining dominance (e.g. Greene, 2008; Magaloni, 2006).
The purpose of this article is to explore the origins and an adaptation strategy of a dominant
party by focusing on the UMNO (United Malays National Organization), a core party of the former
ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front, formerly the Alliance Party). Despite
frequent mention of the UMNO as the key case of a dominant party (e.g. Greene, 2007, 2010;
Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Templeman, 2012; Reuter, 2017) and the existence of insightful compara-
tive historical analyses (e.g. Brownlee, 2007; Kuhonta, 2011; Slater, 2010), there is room for
further exploration.
For example, existing studies have paid limited attention to how leaders succeeded in taking
over state-level prerogatives to establish a centralized politico-bureaucratic machine. In addition,
we need further research to explain the sudden decline in 2008 and the UMNO’s conservative
backlash after the election. To understand the party’s resilience (and defeat), this article focuses on
the initial stage of organizational development during the postindependence years and its adapta-
tion strategy since 2008. Specifically, it argues that leaders’ credible commit ment to provide
electoral security for local elites had been the key for collective action to develop resource and
spatial advantages.
Understanding the embryonic stage of party development is crucial because it constrains the
subsequent resilience of a party (e.g. Brownlee, 2007; Slater, 2010; Smith, 2005; Templeman,
2012). Like some important cases (Smith, 2005: 436, 440), the UMNO started merely as a loose
umbrella for autonomous organizations, and it suffered from local-level factionalism and center-
periphery friction just after independence (Moore, 1960: 112, 120–145).
As Reuter (2017) argues, it is important to explore why and how collective action arose to
establish a strong, centralized, politico-bureaucratic machine by overcoming a two-sided commit-
ment problem between a leader and local elites. A leader avoids committing themselves to the
party unless they can be sure that elites will be loyal to them, while local elites will not relinquish
control over their autonomous resources unless they can be sure that leaders will share the benefits
of governing with them (Reuter, 2017: 48–58). In particular, the UMNO leaders needed to over-
come the states’ reluctance to subordinate their prerogatives. By exploiting the opportunity of
electoral setbacks in postindependence years, leaders tactically expanded their control over admin-
istrative infrastructure and resources to meet the demand of electorates. Although existing studies
have highlighted the significance of post-1969 dynamics, the first section sheds new light on the
process of party development by demonstrating that the initiative after the 1959 election was
crucial for its organizational breakthrough.
In addition, examining an adaptation strategy during declining dominance is important for
understanding party resilience and limitations. The positive cycles of a party’s dominance rely
on the ability to retain a legislative supermajority, which creates a centripetal drive by
62 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4(1)
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