The paradox of poor representation: How voter–party incongruence curbs affective polarisation
| Author | Nahema Marchal,David S Watson |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211048502 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211048502
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(4) 668 –685
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/13691481211048502
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The paradox of poor
representation: How voter–
party incongruence curbs
affective polarisation
Nahema Marchal and David S Watson
Abstract
Research on the relationship between ideology and affective polarisation highlights ideological
disagreement as a key driver of animosity between partisan groups. By operationalising
disagreement on the left–right dimension, however, existing studies often overlook voter–party
incongruence as a potential determinant of affective evaluations. How does incongruence on
policy issues impact affective evaluations of mainstream political parties and their leaders? We
tackle this question by analysing data from the British Election Study collected ahead of the 2019
UK General Election using an instrumental variable approach. Consistent with our expectations,
we find that voter–party incongruence has a significant causal impact on affective evaluations.
Perceived representational gaps between party and voter drive negative evaluations of the in-
party and positive evaluations of the opposition, thus lowering affective polarisation overall. The
results offer a more nuanced perspective on the role of ideological conflict in driving affective
polarisation.
Keywords
affective evaluations, ideology, incongruence, representation, United Kingdom
Animosity and dislike across political lines – also known as ‘affective polarisation’ – is
increasingly characteristic of Western mass publics (Boxell et al., 2020; Finkel et al.,
2020; Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2019; Wagner, 2021). This is a worrying trend that
poses several threats to social cohesion. Previous studies suggest that negative partisan
affect may have negative consequences on interpersonal trust (Carlin and Love, 2018),
makes citizens less likely to seek diverse perspectives on issues or compromise in politi-
cal debates (Gervais, 2015; Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015) and more likely to dis-
criminate against out-partisans in hiring (Gift and Gift, 2015) and economic exchanges
(McConnell et al., 2018). Partisan rivalry is also a key driver of prejudice (Westwood
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Corresponding author:
Nahema Marchal, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 1 St Giles, Oxford, OX13JS, UK.
Email: nahema.marchal@oii.ox.ac.uk
1048502BPI0010.1177/13691481211048502The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsMarchal and Watson
research-article2021
Original Article
Marchal and Watson 669
et al., 2018) which, at its most extreme, can lead to severe forms of dehumanisation
(Martherus et al., 2021) and severe forms of aggression (Kalmoe and Mason, 2019).
While its origins are still disputed (Iyengar et al., 2019), a growing number of schol-
ars suggest that interparty animosity is largely explained by voters’ perceived ideologi-
cal differences between themselves and out-partisans on a wide range of issues
(Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016). Drawing on tradi-
tional spatial models of party competition, studies in this line of work tend to treat
ideology as one dimensional – measuring congruence between parties and voters or
between political elites along the left–right ideological dimension (Bougher, 2017;
Gidron et al., 2019; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016). In Europe, however, scholars
have long underscored the multidimensional nature of the political space – one that also
incorporates social, cultural and value-based cleavages (Albright, 2010; Bornschier,
2010; Kriesi, 2010; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). Despite being mostly congru-
ent at the ideological level, Western European parties and their supporters can often
find themselves at odds on policy issues that are poorly captured by the general left–
right dimension, such as the question of European integration (De Vries and Marks,
2012; Thomassen, 2012), with deleterious consequences for traditional voter–party
relationships (Hobolt and Rodon, 2020).
While the impact of ideological disagreement with the out-party on affective polari-
sation is well established, in contrast we still lack a clear understanding of how dissimi-
larity in beliefs between oneself and one’s own party may impact affective evaluations
of political parties and candidates. Can ‘principled’ dislike extend to one’s own party?
Shedding light on this question is important for a couple of reasons. First, it brings
nuance to the debate about the micro-foundations of affective partisan polarisation. If
perceived ideological disagreement were indeed – as recent scholarship suggests – the
main driver of negative political affect, then not seeing eye-to-eye with a party on policy
issues should elicit negative evaluations of said party, regardless of partisan allegiance.
If the opposite were true, however, this would underscore the primacy of partisan team-
ism in shaping affective evaluations. Second, teasing out these mechanisms will also
inform the most effective strategy to curb political animus within the electorate. Should
policy considerations be the primary driver of affective evaluations, then reducing party
hostility may be best achieved by emphasising areas of compromise between political
parties. If, on the contrary, even in-party disagreement does not impact voters’ affective
dispositions, then efforts to depolarise the electorate should put a greater emphasis on
moderating partisanship.
This study contributes to these debates by examining how voter–party incongruence
impacts affective evaluations of parties and candidates in the United Kingdom. To do so,
we leverage data from the 2019 British Election Study (BES) and use an instrumental
variable design intended to isolate causal effects. The article is structured as follows. In
the following section, we first provide a theoretical overview of affective polarisation and
formulate hypotheses about the role that policy incongruence might play in shaping citi-
zens’ affective evaluations. After outlining our research design, we then test how policy
incongruence impacts affective evaluations of parties and candidates alongside other
demographic factors. Consistent with our expectations, we find that incongruence, espe-
cially on issues salient to voters, has a significant impact on affective evaluations.
Perceived representational gaps between party and voter have a negative effect on evalu-
ations of the in-party and a positive effect on evaluations of the opposition. Our data show
that incongruence over policy preferences is, in fact, causally linked to lower levels of
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