The Paradox of Proportional Representation: The Effect of Party Systems and Coalitions on Individuals' Electoral Participation
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00491.x |
| Date | 01 October 2004 |
| Author | David Brockington |
| Published date | 01 October 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Paradox of Proportional
Representation: The Effect of Party
Systems and Coalitions on Individuals’
Electoral Participation
David Brockington
University of Plymouth
Empirical findings based on aggregate data have found that proportional representation (PR) has
a mixed relationship with electoral participation. Large party systems, thought to be one of the
benefits of PR in increasing turnout, instead depress turnout. This article examines two theories
that seek to account for this paradox – that coalition governments resulting from larger party
systems serve to depress turnout, and that larger party systems increase the complexity of the deci-
sion environment for voters. By combining individual-level data from the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems with contextual measures of effective number of parties, coalition structure
and disproportionality, this article tests for interactions between the characteristics and attitudes
of individuals and the contextual influences on electoral participation. The frequency of coalitions
that violate the minimal-winning rule depresses turnout, especially among supporters of major
parties. By accounting for variations in coalition governments, larger party systems appear, on
balance, to enhance, rather than depress, individuals’ propensity to vote. Limited evidence is
reported that indicates that this participation-enhancing role of larger party systems is not evenly
distributed across the electorate, as those lacking a university degree may find the decision envi-
ronment created by larger party systems more complex.
Most scholars agree that proportional representation (PR) is associated with higher
levels of electoral participation. Generally, this relationship has been tested at the
aggregate level with cross-national samples. Powell (1980) finds a 7.3 percent
increase in turnout associated with PR in a study of thirty countries. Blais and
Carty (1990) observe similar results, with PR associated with an increase of 7
percent in a study of twenty countries. Franklin (1996) reports a benefit of 12
percent for PR contained in his analysis of twenty-nine countries. The relationship
between PR and higher turnout has also been demonstrated on samples of smaller
jurisdictions within single countries. Turnout appears to be higher among Swiss
cantons with PR (Ladner and Milner, 1999). Moreover, participation is estimated
to have increased by around five percentage points among municipalities in the
US that have recently adopted cumulative voting, when compared both to previ-
ous turnout levels under plurality arrangements and jurisdictions with similar
demographic and to regional characteristics that have retained plurality rules
(Bowler et al., 2001).
It seems clear that PR matters, but the underlying reasons are not so obvious.
Previous research has been typified by aggregate studies, which are fundamentally
ill-suited to test hypotheses at the individual level. Although such an observation
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2004 VOL 52, 469–490
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470 DAVID BROCKINGTON
does not undermine the extant findings, it becomes critical when considering
causal hypotheses. The limitations of aggregate research have become manifest in
the past several years, with the paradoxical finding that, whereas PR appears to
enhance electoral participation, large party systems appear to depress political
participation.
These results appear incongruous when one considers that institutional explana-
tions for the relationship between PR and higher turnout (as opposed to cultural
explanations) hinge, to varying degrees and levels of explicitness, on the nature of
the party system fostered by institutional arrangements. Elites react to the incen-
tives offered by the institutional arrangements by creating parties, which offer the
mass electorate more meaningful choices and greater mobilization efforts, which
in turn lead to higher levels of participation. This elegant, parsimonious explana-
tion suffers when confronted with the empirical reality of the paradox discussed
above. Indeed, the institutional explanation may be missing the point entirely, as
it becomes possible to consider that electoral rules, party systems and increased
levels of turnout owe more to unmeasurable cultural causes than institutional
explanations are willing to grant.
Scholars are aware of this potential pitfall, and two explanations have been offered
that are consistent with the institutional theory on the relationship between elec-
toral rules and turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998). First, larger party systems
under PR virtually guarantee that some form of coalition government will result.
With key decisions one step removed from the electorate, voters will feel less effi-
cacious and therefore less likely to expend the resources necessary to cast a ballot.
Second, large party systems may confuse voters with a myriad of choices, result-
ing in costlier information and attenuation in the heuristic value of the partisan
cue.
The problem experienced until now is an inability to directly test such hypotheses
with aggregate data. Beyond the usual methodological problems associated with
drawing individual-level inferences from aggregate data, information on the
preferences and characteristics of individual voters from across a variety of elec-
toral settings simply did not exist. Ideally, to answer the question ‘Why does PR
enhance turnout, whereas the large party systems thought to be fundamental to this rela-
tionship appear to depress turnout?’, individual-level data are critical.
In this article, I will address this question with models of participation and efficacy
that combine individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) with contextual measures on the nature of the party system and
coalition structure in fifteen democracies. The advent of a large-scale, consistent
survey instrument administered immediately after elections in countries operating
under a variety of institutional arrangements allows us to shed some light on the
relationship between electoral rules, party systems and electoral participation.
Party Systems and Enhanced Participation
Several theories seek to explain the interactions between individual voters and
institutional rules that lead to higher levels of turnout under PR. Single-member
district (SMD) elections conducted under plurality rules strictly limit choices
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