The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece
| Author | Sofia Vasilopoulou |
| Published date | 01 August 2018 |
| Date | 01 August 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718770599 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718770599
Politics
2018, Vol. 38(3) 311 –326
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395718770599
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The party politics of
Euroscepticism in times of
crisis: The case of Greece
Sofia Vasilopoulou
University of York, UK
Abstract
This article traces the trajectory of party Euroscepticism in Greece drawing upon theories of
issue competition. It demonstrates that the economic dimension of the multiple crises facing the
European Union (EU) contributed to a Eurosceptic shift in public opinion, the electoral success of
Eurosceptic parties, new parties populating the Europhile end of the spectrum, and the formation
of a coalition government united not by ideological affinity but by a common Eurosceptic and
anti-austerity agenda. Mainstream parties maintained their pro-EU agendas and challenger parties
offered both pro- and anti-EU policy options to the electorate. The prospect of power resulted
in the progressive softening of Euroscepticism among challenger parties. EU issue salience was
relatively high across the party system and remained so during the crisis. Although Greek parties
justified their pro- and anti-EU attitudes using a number of frames, economic arguments were
prevalent at the height of the crisis and challenger parties of the left intensified their claims of
the EU interfering in national politics. The findings have implications for our understanding of the
evolving nature of Euroscepticism and the ways in which it may feature in domestic party politics.
Keywords
crisis, Euroscepticism, framing, Greece, party competition, position, salience
Received: 4th October 2017; Revised version received: 15th December 2017; Accepted: 2nd February 2018
Introduction
Greece has been at the forefront of Europe’s multiple crises. The country was one of the
leading protagonists in the Eurozone crisis, often described in the media as the ‘sick man
of Europe’. Greece’s financial crisis not only put the future of the euro currency in ques-
tion but also the country’s membership of the monetary union. The country was also one
of the frontline states during the refugee crisis due to its proximity to sender regions, such
as the Middle East and North Africa. It was criticised for failing to provide adequate
reception facilities despite receiving funding from the European Union (EU) for this pur-
pose (Guild et al., 2015). The UK 2016 referendum in favour of Brexit served to revive
Corresponding author:
Sofia Vasilopoulou, Department of Politics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK.
Email: sofia.vasilopoulou@york.ac.uk
770599POL0010.1177/0263395718770599PoliticsVasilopoulou
research-article2018
Special Issue Article
312 Politics 38(3)
discussions about the possibility of a spill-over effect on Greece’s Eurozone and/or EU
membership.
Against this background, this article aims to study the ways in which the multiple
crises facing the EU have impacted upon party-based Euroscepticism in Greece through
an analysis of party competition over European integration, including EU issue position,
EU issue salience, and EU issue framing. In doing so, this article differentiates between
mainstream, that is, centre-left and centre-right parties that routinely alternate in govern-
ment; and challenger parties that do not ordinarily participate in government (Van de
Wardt et al., 2014). Classifying parties with reference to a framework that differentiates
between populist and non-populist political actors on the basis of Mudde’s (2004: 543)
definition of populism as an ideology that views society separated into two antagonistic
groups, that is, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, is less helpful in the case of
Greece. This is because research has shown that Greece is a populist democracy, with
populism observed across the party system rather than by specific actors (Pappas, 2013;
Vasilopoulou et al., 2014).1
Drawing upon theories of party competition and Euroscepticism (De Vries and
Hobolt, 2012; Helbling et al., 2010; Sitter, 2001; Taggart, 1998; Van de Wardt et al.,
2014; Vasilopoulou, 2018; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), the article hypothe-
sises that in times of crisis, (1) mainstream parties will maintain their positive EU posi-
tion but are likely to increase EU issue salience; (2) challenger parties will emphasise
their extreme positions on the EU, but the prospect of government participation is likely
to result in them softening their Eurosceptic agenda; and (3) frames related to the spe-
cific nature of the crisis are likely to predominate across the party system. Challenger
parties are also likely to further criticise the EU for interfering in member states’
domestic affairs.
Findings suggest that Europe’s multiple crises coincided with high levels of politi-
cal polarisation over the question of Europe. Both pro- and anti-EU parties entered the
system, offering the electorate a number of different options on the question of Europe.
A coalition government was formed on the basis of its common Eurosceptic, anti-
establishment, and anti-austerity agenda. Support for the mainstream pro-EU New
Democracy declined, whereas the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) – a previ-
ously minor challenger party – effectively replaced the mainstream pro-EU Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK) as the main left-wing contender for power.
The Greek case confirmed assumptions suggesting that mainstream parties would
maintain their pro-EU agendas. However, contrary to expectations, not all challenger par-
ties put forward Eurosceptic positions. Challenger parties offered both pro- and anti-EU
policy options to the electorate. SYRIZA’s progressive softening of its Euroscepticism
once it became one of the main contenders for power also supports the theoretical assump-
tions. EU issue salience was relatively high across the party system and remained so dur-
ing the crisis. Finally, although Greek parties justified their pro- and anti-EU attitudes
using a number of frames, economic arguments were prevalent at the height of the crisis
and challenger parties – particularly of the left – intensified their claims of the EU inter-
fering in national politics.
The article commences with a short historical discussion of Greek Euroscepticism. It
further unpacks the nature of multiple crises in the Greek context. It continues by outlin-
ing the theoretical framework with reference to EU issue competition, including issue
position, issue salience, and issue framing. It subsequently tests the theoretical proposi-
tions through the use of expert survey data and the analysis of party manifestos.
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