The Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel
| Date | 01 April 1981 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788100700105 |
| Published date | 01 April 1981 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
1035
THE
PEACE
TREATY
BETWEEN
EGYPT
AND
ISRAEL
by
DR.
MICHAEL
AKEHURST
I-The
origins
of
the
Peace
Treaty
THE
roots
of
wars
often
stretch
far
back
into
the
past,
and
the
roots
of
peace
treaties
sometimes
do
the
same.
The
origins
of
the
Peace
Treaty
concluded
between
Egypt
and
Israel
in
1979’
can
be
traced
back
to
resolution
242,
passed
by
the
Security
Council
in
November
1967,
which
recommended,
in
outline,
the
terms
of
a
settlement
of
the
Arab-Israeli
conflict.2
In
the
first
two
opera-
tive
paragraphs
of
resolution
242
the
Security
Council
1.
A.flirm[ed3
that
the
fulfilment
of
Charter
principles
re-
quires
the
establishment
of
a
just
and
lasting
peace
in
the
Middle
East
which
should
include
the
application
of
both
the
following
principles:
(i)
withdrawal
of
Israeli
armed
forces
from
territories
occupied
in
the
recent
conflict;
(zit)
termination
of
all
claims
or
states
of
belligerency
and
respect
for
and
acknowledgement
of
the
sovereignty,
territorial
integrity
and
political
independence
of
every
state
in
the
area
and
their
right
to
live
in
peace
within
secure
and
recognized
boundaries
free
from
threats
or
acts
of
force;
2.
Afhrm[edj
further
the
necessity
(a)
for
guaranteeing
freedom
of
navigation
through
inter-
national
waterways
in
the
area;
(b)
for
achieving
a
just
settlement
of
the
refugee
problem;
(c)
for
guaranteeing
the
territorial
inviolability
and
poli-
tical
independence
of
every
state
in
the
area,
through
measures
including
the
establishment
of
demilitarised
zones.
Resolution
242
was
only
a
recommendation,
but
it
was
accepted
as
the
basis
of
a
settlement
by
Egypt,
Israel
and
Jordan;
1
Text
in
18
International
Legal
Materials
1979
362.
2
Text
in
17
International
Legal
Materials
1978
1469.
1036
Syria
accepted
it
later,
in
i974.3
The
resolution
contained
only
an
outline
of
a
settlement,
and
for
several
years
it
proved
impossible
to
reach
agreement
on
detailed
rules
giving
effect
to
the
principles
contained
in
the
resolution;
indeed,
the
resolution
would
probably
never
have
been
passed
if
it
had
not
papered
over
major
dif-
ferences
between
the
parties
with
ambiguous
phrases.
The
delay
in
converting
resolution
242
into
a
detailed
peace
settlement
was
caused
partly
by
disagreement
over
the
substance
of
such
a
settle-
ment,
but
disagreement
over
procedure
was
also
partly
to
blame.
The
Arab
states
were
prepared
to
talk
to
mediators
appointed
by
the
United
Nations
or
by
the
United
States,
but
they
were
not
prepared
to
enter
into
direct
negotiations
with
Israel.
Apparently
the
Arabs
feared
that
entry
into
direct
negotiations
might
be
con-
strued
as
implied
recognition
of
Israel;
in
their
eyes
recognition
is
a
big
concession
which
should
be
made
in
return
for
similar
concessions
by
Israel
during
the
final
stage
of
the
search
for
a
settlement,
instead
of
being
made
gratuitously
at
the
beginning
of the
search
for
a
settlement.
No
international
lawyer
would
regard
entry
into
direct
negotiations
as
implying
recognition,4
but
public
opinion
in
Arab
countries
might,
and
an
Arab
leader
who
entered
into
direct
negotiations
with
Israel
without
getting
any-
thing
in
return
might
be
accused
of
betraying
the
Arab
cause.
Israel,
on
the other
hand,
tended
to
insist
on
direct
negotiations,
partly
because
this
was
the
only
thing
on
which
the
Israeli
cabinet
could
agree;
Israel
had
a
coalition
government
who
did
not
agree
among
themselves
about
the
terms
of
a
settlement
with
the
Arab
countries.
This
deadlock
was
only
partly
broken
by
the
appoint-
ment
of
Gunnar
Jarring
as
the
Secretary-General’s
Special
Re-
presentative
in
the
Middle
East
shortly
after
resolution
242
was
passed;
Israel
frequently
argued
that
Gunnar
Jarring
should
act
as
a
go-between
only
during
the
early
stages
of
the
search
for
3
The
Israeli-Syrian
disengagement
agreement
of
31
May
1974
recites
that
"this
agreement ...
is
a
step
toward
a
just
and
durable
peace
on
the
basis
of
Security
Council
resolution
338";
Security
Council
resolution
338
in
turn
called
upon
the
parties
concerned
to
implement
resolution
242.
Resolution
242 has
not
been
accepted
by
the
Palestine
Liberation
Organization,
which
dislikes
the
resolution’s
description
of
the
Palestin-
ians
as
a
"refugee
problem".
The
PLO
regards
the
Palestinians
not
as
refugees
who
should
be
re-settled
somewhere,
but
as
a
people
who
are
entitled
to
form
a
State
of
their
own.
4
It
is
possible
to
have
many
kinds of
dealings
with
an
unrecognized
state
or
government
without
implied
recognition
taking
place;
see
Manfred
Lachs,
"Recognition
and
Modern
Methods
of
International
Coopera-
tion",
35
British
Year
Book
of
International
Law
1959
252.
For
an
explanation
of
the
Arabs’
reluctance
to
recognize
Israel,
see
Michael
Akehurst,
"The
Arab-Israeli
Conflict
and
International
Law",
New
Zealand
Universities
Law
Review,
Vol.
5
(1973),
pp.231,
234-7.
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