The persevering power of provincial dynasties in Thai electoral politics
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221142132 |
| Author | Paul Chambers,Srisompob Jitpiromsri,Katsuyuki Takahashi |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue: Political Dynasties in Asia |
The persevering power of
provincial dynasties in Thai
electoral politics
Paul Chambers
Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University,
Thailand
Srisompob Jitpiromsri
Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University—Pattani,
Thailand
Katsuyuki Takahashi
Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University,
Thailand
Abstract
Provincial clans and dynasties have long been crucial in Thai electoral politics. Their influence was
felt since before the 1969 poll. Post-1988 and post-1992 political space gave clans room to expand
in power. But their sway has been interrupted by several factors, including military coups, changing
constitutions, and national transformations. Thailand’s March 2019 general election, December
2020 provincial administrative organization elections, and March 2021 subdistrict administrative
organization elections demonstrated the persistence of provincial clan influence owing partly to
the 2019 end of military dictatorship but also to the needs by national parties to partner with pro-
vincial political families to achieve success and finally because local clans saw an opportunity to
revitalize their power. In 2022 Thailand, provincial clans and dynasties appear to be alive and
well. This study examines the historical evolution of provincial dynasties involved in Thai electoral
politics in four different provinces. The study analyzes the reasons why only some provinces have
experienced clan (familial) domination, strategies for and obstacles to dynastic family control over
provincial politics, and the future of dynastic provincial families in Thailand’s democratic future.
Corresponding author:
Paul Chambers, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Naresuan University,
Phitsanulok, Thailand.
Email: pwchambers@gmail.com
Original Research Article
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2023, Vol. 8(3) 787–807
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/20578911221142132
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
Keywords
clan, dynasty, election, family, province
Introduction
Provincial political families have long dominated Thai electoral politics. These powerful families
early on amassed wealth as rural businesspeople collaborating with military regimes and often
assisting to direct voter canvassing networks for military-favored candidates—some of which
were members of the families themselves. In return, military officials helped them to further
amass their local power. After 12 years of no elections, Thailand finally saw a poll in 1969. It
was from this election that political space began to expand. Political families began competing
for seats in parliament’s Lower House. If successful, they could try to affect public policy as a
means of extracting rent to improve the well-being of their province, constituents, and family.
But elected governance did not last: the 1971 coup forced political families to wait and run their
candidates again in 1975; the dissolution of that parliament compelled still new elections in
1976; and the military once again seized power later that year. A new election did not occur
until 1979, with semi-democratic stability continuing until the 1991 coup. It was during this
time that provincial dynasties began to entrench their power in electoral politics. The brief
1991–1992 junta, followed by a renewal in expanding democracy, provided even more political
space for dynasties to germinate. Their power grew not only at the national level but also in
local- and city-level politics, where elections were permitted beginning in 1994. By the late
1990s, dynasties seemed to be at the apex of power. However, constitutional re-engineering, the
twin coups of 2006 and 2014, and national transformations involving ideological upheaval inter-
rupted the embedded clout of dynastic political families. Nevertheless, since the end of junta
rule in June 2022, there has been a resurrection of provincial clan influence, as seen in the
March 2019 general election, the December 2020 provincial administrative organization (PAO)
election, and the March 2021 subdistrict administrative organization (TAO) election. The three
polls offered substantial opportunities for political families to re-entrench themselves. In 2022
Thailand, these clans and dynasties continue to be important players in electoral politics, though
they are more important in some provinces than in others.
This study looks at the historical evolution of provincial dynasties in Thai electoral politics. To
this end, it seeks to build upon earlier work on the subject.
1
It asks the following questions. What
has been the history of the rise of and sway by dynastic political families over some provinces while
other provinces have not experienced such familial domination? What have been obstacles to dyn-
astic domination over provinces by political families? What accounts for the post-2019 resurrection
of political families once again? Using historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
(defined in Teehankee and Chambers [2023] of this Special Issue), this study argues that legacies of
autocracy and a reaction to insecurity led to the construction of a neo-patrimonial web of dynastic,
path-dependent relations between patrons and clients designed to protect the dynasty’s interests.
This path produced dividends for political families who could successfully combine the following
tactics: elite decision-making, coercion, ready capital, and close alliances with either powerful poli-
ticians or the military, facilitating the ascension and sustaining of provincial political family dyn-
asties across time. The study then concentrates on the balances of power among dynastic families in
four provinces. The first represents the case where one family is dominant at the macro level, and
788 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8(3)
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