The Pivotal Role of the Enemy in Inducing Hope for Peace
| Date | 01 August 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718797920 |
| Published date | 01 August 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
797920PCX0010.1177/0032321718797920Political StudiesLeshem
research-article2018
Article
Political Studies
2019, Vol. 67(3) 693 –711
The Pivotal Role of the Enemy
© The Author(s) 2018
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in Inducing Hope for Peace
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718797920
DOI: 10.1177/0032321718797920
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Oded Adomi Leshem
Abstract
Protracted conflicts are also termed “intractable” in part because they are perceived as irresolvable
by those mired in the prolonged dispute. The conflict’s perceived irreconcilability leaves little
reason for citizens to strive for peace which, in turn, might further exacerbate the conflict. The
central question posed in this study is whether hopelessness regarding the possibility for peace can
be alleviated among citizens embroiled in protracted conflicts. Results from an experimental study
administered in Israel show that hope can be instilled, even among those most skeptical, when an
outgroup member claims that peace is possible but not when an ingroup member claims the same.
A follow-up study revealed that hope induced by the experimental interventions withstood a
period of conflict escalation and elicited active support for peacebuilding. The study demonstrates
that hope inducement is a useful tool for carving a pathway out of detrimental structures of
intractability.
Keywords
protracted conflict, political persuasion, hope, conflict resolution, Israel, Palestine
Accepted: 9 August 2018
The most enduring international disputes are often defined as protracted conflicts.
Protracted conflicts are violent, persist for at least a generation, and are perceived to
revolve around existential issues (Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2013; Kriesberg, 1998). The vio-
lent nature of the conflict, along with its resilience to subside, generates a common per-
ception that the conflict will never be resolved (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). This lack of
hope, in turn, keeps the conflict prolonged as it leads parties to invest resources in prepa-
ration for expected confrontations rather than to the attainment of an “unattainable” reso-
lution (Bar-Tal, 2007). The lack of hope for peace further discourages the adversaries to
negotiate, even after they reach a hurting stalemate (Pruitt, 1997). At least theoretically,
hopelessness regarding the feasibility of peace should not be considered only as an obvi-
ous outcome of protracted conflicts but also as one of their sources.
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA
Corresponding author:
Oded Adomi Leshem, George Mason University, Arlington Campus, 3434 N. Washington Blvd., Arlington,
VA 22201-4411, USA.
Email: oleshem@gmu.edu
694
Political Studies 67(3)
This article explores the connection between citizens’ hope for peace and the condi-
tions for conflict resolution. As such, this work seeks to contribute to the literature in
political psychology and the microfoundations of international conflicts. Although dis-
tinct in their approach, both subfields aim to explain political processes by looking at
micro-level phenomena such as citizens’ perceptions, opinions, and political behavior.
Micro-level research is particularly relevant in protracted conflicts such as the one in
Israel–Palestine, where both societies are fully and deeply involved in the conflict.
The conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians illustrates the typical features of
protracted conflicts (Azar et al., 1978; Kriesberg, 1998). It is a long-standing and violent
conflict that demands enormous investment from the rival parties and has a significant
influence on both regional and international stability (Brecher, 2017; Dowty, 1999;
Kelman, 2010). As in other protracted conflicts, its severity is also expressed in the per-
vasiveness of detrimental belief systems the parties have created to validate their under-
standing of the conflict’s nature (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). Although the conflict is
asymmetrical, with Israel being the main powerholder, both societies strongly adhere to
detrimental beliefs regarding the ingroup, the outgroup, and the conflict (Canetti et al.,
2015). One of these beliefs is the conflict’s innate irreconcilability (Bar-Tal, 2007;
Coleman, 2003). It seems that neither Palestinians nor Israelis believe that a negotiated
peace deal is possible (Shikaki, 2002). The prevalence of hopelessness regarding the fea-
sibility of peace is demonstrated in public polls that show that half of the Israeli and
Palestinian publics believe that the conflict will go on forever (Telhami and Kull, 2013).
Theory
The literature on the sources of protracted conflicts has focused on external, institutional,
and domestic causes on one hand (e.g. Azar, 1990; Brecher, 2017; Zartman, 2005) and
socio-psychological sources on the other hand (e.g. Bar-Tal, 2013; Coleman, 2003;
Kriesberg, 1998). Socio-psychological factors that perpetuate conflict, including citizens’
perceptions about the conflict, the ingroup, and the outgroup, have been studied exten-
sively (see: Halperin et al., 2011; Kudish et al., 2015; Zeitzoff, 2016). Looking at the
Palestinian–Israeli conflict as a case study, scholars have begun to explore how citizens’
expectations for peace facilitate or hinder conflict resolution. Public option research has
found, for example, that Palestinians’ and Israelis’ expectations for peace was a robust
predictor of their support for conciliation and political compromise (Shamir and Shikaki,
2002). In experimental studies, researchers tested whether increased hope for peace elicits
attitudes that are more conducive to conflict resolution (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Leshem
et al., 2016). Results demonstrate that when citizens embroiled in intractable conflicts are
exposed to cues that question irreconcilability, their support for compromise increases.
These experimental designs, however, were limited in several ways. First, the research-
ers did not test whether induced hope elicits behavioral outcomes, such as active support
for peacebuilding. Although support for compromise intensified after hope for peace was
increased (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015), no evidence has yet been provided on whether
increased hope affects political behavior. Second, past studies did not account for the
potential effects created by the sources of the hope-inducing cues. In other words, it is
unclear whether successful hope inducement depends on the source communicating the
hope-inducing information. Third, hope was measured immediately after participants
were exposed to the hope-inducing interventions. However, because reoccurring surges
of violence are typical in protracted conflicts (Zartman, 2005), it is imperative to test
whether induced hope withstands conflict escalation.
Leshem
695
The current study addresses these gaps by posing three questions: (1) Can increased
hope for peace elicit active support for peacebuilding? (2) Does the source of the hope-
inducing information affect the capacity to induce hope for peace? and (3) Can induced
hope withstand conflict escalation? The first two questions were examined in an experi-
mental study conducted in Israel. An unexpected surge of violent confrontations, which
began one day after the data were collected, enabled the examination of the third question
concerning the durability of hope-inducing interventions.
The remainder of the theoretical introduction will include a brief description of hope’s
components followed by an attempt to place hope and hopelessness within the context of
protracted conflict. Last, hope inducement and the role of group membership in political
persuasion will be discussed.
Hope and Hopelessness in Protracted Conflicts
Hope is composed of two distinct, though interdependent, factors: a wish to attain a goal
and an expectation (though not a certainty) that the goal can be attained (Carver and
Scheier, 2005; Stotland, 1969). Similarly, Webster’s dictionary defines hope as “a desire
accompanied by expectation of or belief in fulfillment” and so recognizes both wish and
expectations as innate components of hope. However, the colloquial use of hope can be
confusing. Sometimes hope is used to represent only wishes, without referring to expecta-
tions (e.g. “I hope you have a nice day”). On other occasions, hope represents expectations
as when discovering interesting findings increases one’s “hopes” for journal publication.
Hope, unlike optimism, must contain another component, an active commitment to attain
the desired goal (Breznitz, 1986; Carver and Scheier, 2005; Snyder, 1994). Indeed, we
often critically judge people who make no effort to achieve their hoped-for goal. The addi-
tional requirement of actively pursuing one’s goal resonates with the work of thinkers and
political figures who understood hope as an activity and a tool for political mobilization
(Barber, 2016; Bloch, 1959; Fromm, 1968; Tillich, 1965). According to their approach,
hope for social change can only be judged in the context of commitment and action. As
Fromm notes, if one wishes for social and political change but does nothing but wait for it
to come, one is not genuinely hoping (Fromm, 1968). In line with this approach, some
willingness to act for peace is expected of those who hope for the conflict’s resolution.
As stated, one of the most common beliefs in protracted conflicts is the belief in the
conflict’s innate irreconcilability (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998)....
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