The Political Thought of Friedrich a. Hayek
| Author | Morris M. Wilhelm |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1972.tb01068.x |
| Date | 01 June 1972 |
| Published date | 01 June 1972 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK
MORRIS
M.
WILHELM
Indiana University Southeast
FRIEDRICH
A.
HAYEK~
has formulated what he considers to be the principles of
authentic liberalism. Liberalism, according to Hayek, assumes the value of
individual liberty as an end in itself, the importance of self-interest and limited
rationaIity as features of man’s motivation, and the natural inequality
of
men.
It rejects the idea that an individual’s ‘merit’ should influence society’s rules for
the distribution of resources, insisting that merit can only affect the purely
voluntary ethic of individuals. Liberal political institutions include an inviolate
private sphere and the maintenance of the rule of law, the latter concept assuming
a particularly complex quality in Hayek‘s discussions. Individual liberty is seen
not only
as
an end in itself but also as a means to a social good: liberty serves,
generally, as the mechanism for a progressive economy, a mechanism that co-
ordinates human efforts to produce the greatest material good.
The institutions of
a
state calling itself ‘liberal’, consequently, should reflect
these principles. Hayek regards much of the public policy adopted by Western
nations in recent decades-extensive interference with the economy, massive
welfare programmes or major redistributions of property-as perversions
of
liberalism. He argues that these policies ignore the psychological and economic
grounds upon which genuine liberalism is based, do not achieve a desirable
allocation of resources, and are generally not liberal, in the sense of a commit-
ment to values of individual liberty.
It is the purpose of this paper
to
examine briefly those themes in Hayek’s
thought
that
are substantially political or legal in character,
as
well as certain
relevant psychological, methodological, and moral themes. Hayek‘s economic
analysis is integrally connected to the political and legal concepts that he for-
mulates, derived, as
it
is, from the same psychological, moral, and methodological
premises. It
is
possible, however, to analyze his political thought without elab-
orate reference to the details of the economic theory.2
I
A
graduate of the University of Vienna, Hayek served there as lecturer and as director of the
Austrian Institute of EconomicResearch before hewasappointed in
1931
to theTookeProfessor-
ship
of
Economic Science and Statistics at the London School of Economics and Political
Science.
From
1950 to
1962
he was Professor of Social and Moral Science at the University of
Chicago, and
from
that year until
1967
Professor of Economic Policy at the University of
Frei burg.
2
The most complete exposition of Hayek’s political thought is in his
The Constitution
of
Liberty
(University of Chicago Press,
1960).
His political ideas are also developed in
The
Road
to
Serfdom
(University
of
Chicago Press,
1944),
Individualism and Economic Order
(University
of Chicago Press,
1948),
and
Studies in Philosophy, Politicsand Economics
(University of Chicago
Press,
1967).
These works will be cited as
Constitution, Road, Individualism,
and
Studies
respec-
tively. In ‘The Principles of
a
Liberal Social Order’ (in
Studies,
pp.
160-77)
Hayek offers a brief
and lucid
summary
of the theoretical foundations of his political thought. See Hayek’s
The
Sensory Order
(University of Chicago Press,
1952)
for
a
formulation of
a
theory
of
mind that
Political
Studies,
Vol.
XX,
No.
2
(169-184)
170
POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF
FRIEDRICH
A.
HAYEK
LIMITED RATIONALITY AND SELF-INTEREST
:
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
A
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Among the psychological and moral premises upon which Hayek constructs
his liberalism is the assumption of the limited rationality of man, involving,
particularly, his inability fully to explain human reason or human actions. The
assumption is related to a general theory that Hayek develops in regard to the
foundations of the sensory order.1
A
major conclusion is that:
the capacity
of
any explaining agent must
be
limited to objects with
a
structure possessing
a
degree
of
complexity
lower
than its
own.
If
this is correct, it means that
no
explaining
agent can
ever
explain objects of its own kind,
or
of
its
own
degree
of
complexity, and,
therefore, that the human brain
can
never
fully explain its own operations.2
The ‘intelligent’ use of reason, involving the individual’s use of abstract rules,
is the solution that liberalism sees to the problem of man’s limited rationality.
The dependence upon abstract rules signifies that an individual, aware of his forced
ignorance concerning the totality of circumstances that he should know in order
to
make decisions, accepts
as
rational the discipline of such rules. This acceptance
need not deter anyone from planning his affairs and particularly his economic
activity as best he can, with the assumption that
a
‘discernible regularity’ exists
in the world.3
The proper function
of
the social sciences is implied, as well, in the premise of
limited rationality. The task of the social scientist becomes one of interpreting his
organized observations of the undesigned results of past and present actions of
many individuals as precluding specific situations in the future. Nothing in his
observations permits him to interpret phenomena with such accuracy that a
prediction of the specific action of any individual is possible. The ‘problem of the
social order
is
predominantly
a
problem of how we can best cope with our
constitutional ignorance of most of the facts that guide human action’.-‘ The
social scientist who recognizes the need to rely on an evolved order of abstract
rules of conduct will avoid that ‘intellectual hubris’ to which, Hayek believes,
so
many succumb. He will neither anticipate a ‘universal determinism’-a degree
of perfection in the social sciences that would permit the accurate arrangement of
social institutions in accordance with discoverable laws5 nor will he yield to the
1
See
The Sensory Order, passim.
*
Ibid.,
p.
185.
See
also
The Counter-Revolution ofScience
(Free Press,
1955,
hereafter cited
as
3
Studies,
pp.
43-63, 86-93;
Individualism,
pp.
22-3. 33-56;
‘Kinds
of
Order in Society’,
4
‘The Social Environment’ in
Man’s Contracting World
in
An
Expandiing Universe,
ed.
B.
H.
5
Studies,
pp.
37-9.
Counter-Rarolution),
pp.
18-23.
New Individualist Review,
111,
No.
2
(1964).
pp.
11-12;
Counter-Revolution,
p.
92.
Bagdikian
(Brown
University,
1960),
p.
79.
suggests many
of
the premises that underlie
his
economic and political thought.
An
Agendufor a
Free Society,
ed. A. Seldon (Institute
for
Economic Affairs,
1961),
offers
a
collection
of
papers,
both sympathetic and critical, relating to many
of
the concepts developed in
The Constitution
of
Liberty. Roads to Freedom
(A.
M.
Kelley,
1969),
a collection
of
essays in honour
of
Hayek,
touches mainly upon problems in economic analysis, but several papers in that work, especially
those
of
Machlup, Polanyi and Popper, relate to concepts dealt with in Hayek’s political and
methodological writings; it also offers
a
complete bibliography
of
Hayek‘s writing until
1969.
For
a more detailed analysis
of
Hayek‘s political thought
see
M.
M.
Wilhelm, ‘The Political
Philosophy
of
Friedrich A. Hayek.’ Dissertation, Columbia
University,
1969.
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