The politics of bounded procurement: Purists, brokers and the politics-procurement dichotomy
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-14-01-2014-B002 |
| Pages | 33-61 |
| Author | Alexandru V. Roman |
| Subject Matter | Public policy & environmental management,Politics,Public adminstration & management,Government,Economics,Public Finance/economics,Texation/public revenue |
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, 33-61 SPRING 2014
THE POLITICS OF BOUNDED PROCUREMENT: PURISTS, BROKERS
AND THE POLITICS-PROCUREMENT DICHOTOMY
Alexandru V. Roman*
ABSTRACT. The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous growth in
the body of literature addressing the importance and the impact of
contracting and public procurement within the context of devolution of
government. The austere budgetary and financial outlooks of the future
suggest that the significance of the area will only continue to grow. As such,
generating explanatory frameworks, within dimensions such as decision-
making and accountability in public procurement, becomes crucial. Drawing
from original research this article suggests one possible frame for
understanding administrative decision-making in complex environments.
Based on semi-structured interviews with public procurement specialists, the
study identifies two decision-making patterns– broker and purist. It is
asserted that the decision-making dynamics exhibited by administrators are
contingent on their perceptions regarding environmental instability, in
particular the political volatility surrounding their work.
INTRODUCTION
The challenges posed by the wicked issues that governments
currently face (Clarke & Stewart, 1997) and the inexorability of the
development of a contract-driven government (Cooper, 2003; Kettl,
2002; Milward & Provan, 2000; Savas, 2000; Sclar, 2000) have
delineated public procurement as an essential dynamic in the
“transformation from governance by authority to governance by
contract” (Van Slyke, 2007, p. 158). In many ways, modern
--------------------------------------
* Alexandru V. Roman, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Public
Administration at California State University San Bernardino. His research
interests include public management, leadership, public procurement and
public corruption.
Copyright © 2014 by PrAcademics Press
34 ROMAN
governance can be described and defined by the webs of contractual
and personal relationships developed within the procurement
environments (OECD, 2007).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) (2010) has identified public procurement as a vital dimension
of economic stability and democratic governance, but has also
suggested that public procurement is the governmental activity most
vulnerable to corruption. The procurement spending of OECD
countries can be as high as 15% of GDP (OECD, 2002). The United
States federal government, for instance, allocates almost 20% of its
budget to procurement (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2009). In 2013
alone the federal government has spent close to $700 billion for
contractual services, supplies and acquisition of assets (Roman &
Thai, 2013). At the state and local levels, governments can attribute
as much as 40% of their budgets to procurement related functions
(Kelman, 2002; United Nations, 2010; USAID, 2009). In this respect,
decision-making during the procurement process is replete with
immense economic, political and democratic consequences (OECD,
2007; Roman, 2013a; Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010).
Until recently, public administration literature has been slow and
at times perhaps even unwilling to dedicate serious attention to
contracting or public procurement questions (McCue & Prier, 2007;
Piga & Thai, 2007; Potoski, 2008;Thai, 2001). In the past decade,
however, scholars have started to pay increasing attention to the
area, which has led to a great deal of quality research efforts. Sclar
(2000), Van Slyke (2003, 2007), Brown and Potoski (2006), McCue
and Prier (2007) and Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2006, 2007,
2009), for instance, have generated explanatory frameworks for
understanding public sector procurement and contract management.
Light (1999), Romzek and Johnston (2002), Johnston and Romzek
(2004, 2008), Price and Riccucci (2005), Keeney (2007), Van Slyke
(2003, 2007) and Chen (2009) underlined the challenges and
implications of contractual and management decisions in the milieu
of the provision of services that were traditionally reserved for
governments (such as social services, prison administration or
military support). Durant, Girth and Johnston (2009) discussed the
contractual tendencies in the light of America’s philosophical
tensions, historical developments at federal level and future
To continue reading
Request your trial