The politics of quangocracy
| Date | 01 August 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148119836350 |
| Author | Sandra van Thiel |
| Published date | 01 August 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Breakthrough Commentaries |
836350BPI0010.1177/1369148119836350The British Journal of Politics and International Relationsvan Thiel
research-article2019
Breakthrough Commentary
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
The politics of quangocracy
2019, Vol. 21(3) 522 –529
© The Author(s) 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148119836350
DOI: 10.1177/1369148119836350
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Sandra van Thiel
Keywords
agency, arm’s length governance/government, public sector, quangos, steering
The Politics of Bureaucracy (Peters, 2018) offers a comprehensive introduction to com-
parative public administration, not only between countries and administrative systems but
also over time. A comparison of the first and the latest editions shows that today’s public
bureaucracy has changed in many ways. The introduction of new techniques, copied from
the private sector, such as performance management and market competition has left its
mark on the government bureaucracy (see Peters, 2018: chapter 10). Also, under the
influence of the New Public Management paradigm, government bureaucracies around
the world have been slimmed down, hollowed out and sold in parts to the private market
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). As a result, public sectors have become fragmented. Public
services nowadays are delivered by a plethora of organisations that citizens still perceive
to belong to ‘the government’ but which in fact are not, or no longer, part of the govern-
ment bureaucracy. I will refer to these organisations as quangos (quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations) although the term ‘agency’ has become more common to
use (see Peters, 2018: chapter 9; Pollitt et al., 2004; Verhoest et al., 2012). While there is
much to say about the term ‘quango’ (see, for example, Barker, 1982), I prefer to use it
here mainly for stylistic reasons to capture how large parts of the bureaucracy have been
turned into a quangocracy.
The creation of the quangocracy was expected to make policy implementation (includ-
ing regulation and public service delivery) more cost-efficient. As quangos operate fur-
ther away from the political centre – at arm’s length – they would be less prone to the
political influences that plague the government bureaucracy, a fact that permeates Peters’
book. However, in practice, we find numerous examples of politicians’ persistent ‘med-
dling’ (Pollitt, 2005) with quangos. In this commentary, I will explain why quangos suffer
from the same fate as government bureaucracy and why countermeasures that have been
developed do not really seem to work. In honour of Guy Peters’ work, I have labelled the
contribution The Politics of Quangocracy.
First, I will say a bit more about the different types of quangos and their proliferation.
Then, I will explain why politicians seemingly cannot stop meddling with quangos, even
Public Administration, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Sandra van Thiel, Public Administration, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9108 (Room EOS 2.314), Nijmegen
6500 HC, Gelderland, The Netherlands.
Email: s.vanthiel@fm.ru.nl
van Thiel
523
when applying some of the new instruments that have been developed for the arm’s length
management of quangos. Finally, I will relate these observations to some of the key tenets
of Peters’ book.
Quangocracy
Quangos come in many different forms and shapes but are found in all countries and at
all levels of government (Van Thiel, 2012). Some are still quite close to the government
bureaucracy but have been granted small degrees of management autonomy, as illus-
trated by the cases of the Next Steps Agencies in the United Kingdom or the Agenzia in
Italy. A second category consists of various public bodies with legal independence and
autonomy, for example those concerned with personnel and finances. Examples include
the statutory bodies in Australia, public establishments in France, Non-Departmental
Public Bodies (NDPBs) in the United Kingdom, Crown Entities in New Zealand and
the Dutch ZBOs. Finally, there are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and foundations,
which are private law bodies with a public mission, and owned or founded by the gov-
ernment. The quango-concept encompasses them all, but there are of course important
differences between the different categories. In this commentary, I will be mainly writ-
ing about the first two categories (at the central level of government), as they have been
most studied.
From the 1980s on, New Public Management (NPM) reforms led to a strong increase
in the number and types of quangos in most Western countries. From the 1990s on,
quango creation proliferated in Central and Eastern European and developing countries,
often in response to requirements from the European Union and donor organisations,
respectively (see Verhoest et al., 2012, for an overview of 30 countries). From the 2000s
onwards, politicians became more critical about quangos as the public sector became
fragmented and difficult to coordinate (Christensen and Laegreid, 2008). New reforms
were announced, some of which aimed to reduce the number of quangos. However, the
results of the reforms always as intended, as the example of the ‘bonfire of the quangos’
in the United Kingdom shows: instead of the projected 73% cut in the number of NDPBs,
only 8% was abolished or merged (Flinders et al., 2014).
It should also be noted that quangos are not a recent phenomenon; some have existed
for a long time, and some countries like Sweden have a long-standing...
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