The politics of senior bureaucratic turnover in the Westminster tradition: Trust and the choice between internal and external appointments
| Author | Ali Halawi,Patrik Marier,Christopher A Cooper |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0952076720929738 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2022, Vol. 37(2) 179 –202
Article
The politics of senior
bureaucratic turnover
in the Westminster
tradition: Trust and the
choice between internal
and external
appointments
Christopher A Cooper
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
Patrik Marier
Concordia University, Montr
eal, Canada
Ali Halawi
World Bank Group, Washington, DC, USA
Abstract
The extent to which new governments appoint and dismiss senior public servants is
widely claimed to be influenced by their country’s underlying administrative tradition.
This is particularly the case within the Westminster tradition where such turnover is
limited in nature, with most appointees coming from within the ranks of the public
service. This article challenges the assertion that turnover in the Westminster tradition
is homogeneously internal. Theorizing that new governments appoint senior public
servants to increase their control over the bureaucracy, and that the desire for control
is negatively correlated to trust, this article develops hypotheses between the trust new
governments harbour towards the bureaucracy and whether they appoint and dismiss
bureaucrats from within or outside the public ser vice. The hypotheses are tested with
Corresponding author:
Christopher A Cooper, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Ottawa K1N 6N5,
Canada.
Email: christopher.cooper@uottawa.ca
Public Policy and Administration
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DOI: 10.1177/0952076720929738
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180 Public Policy and Administration 37(2)
longitudinal data measuring internal and external appointments and departures to the
senior public service in Canada’s provincial governments over a period of 18 years. The
results from various multinomial regression models suggest that political appointments
to the public service are not as homogenous as frequently suggested. Although a
transition in the governing party and a newly elected premier from the same party
of the previous government both lead to an increase in bureaucratic turnover, a newly
elected first minister has a greater incidence of internal turnover than a change in party,
meanwhile the level of external turnover does not meaningfully differ between these
two political events.
Keywords
Bureaucracy, control, politicization, turnover, trust, Westminster
Introduction
The appointment of civil servants is a balancing act. On the one hand, appointed
bureaucrats are guardians of the state and expected to have some independence
from politics. Yet on the other hand, appointed bureaucrats must follow the
directives of the elected government if representative democracy is to function
properly. To ensure the latter, democratically elected governments possess various
tactics to control the bureaucracy (Craft and Halligan, 2017), including the power
to appoint senior bureaucrats (Wood and Waterman, 1991). As governments
sought to tighten their control over the bureaucracy in the late 1970s, scholarship
heeded greater attention to the politics of bureaucratic appointments (Bourgault
and Dion, 1989; Derlien, 1988; Flinders and Matthews, 2010). Further changes
during the last 20 years, including the rise of the 24/7 news cycle, social media and
the permanent campaign, have led some observers to conclude that the desire for
control, alongside efforts to politicize senior public service appointments, has
grown even further (Aucoin, 2012; Diamond, 2019; Marland et al., 2017).
A frequent assertion within this literature is that the number and the nature of
these appointments vary according to a country’s administrative tradition (Bach
et al., 2020; Dahlstr€
om et al., 2011; Peters and Pierre, 2004). In the American,
Southern European and Eastern European traditions, for instance, governments
appoint a large number of loyalists from outside the civil service (Bezes and
LeLidec 2011; Lewis, 2008; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). Within the Westminster tradi-
tion – found in the UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – research
indicates that most appointees originate from within the public service (Bourgault,
2011; Bourgault and Dion, 1989; Mulgan, 1998; Richards, 1996). To date, few
studies have empirically verified whether appointments and departures to the
public service in Westminster countries are mostly internal. Doing so is important,
however, considering allegations that the strong desire for control in the
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