The Politics of Social Censure: Corruption and Bourgeois Liberation in Communist China
| Date | 01 June 1993 |
| DOI | 10.1177/096466399300200204 |
| Published date | 01 June 1993 |
| Author | T. Wing Lo |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
CENSURE: CORRUPTION AND
BOURGEOIS LIBERATION IN
COMMUNIST CHINA
T. WING LO
City Polytechnic of Hong Kong
RADITIONALLY,
THE
official definitions of ’corruption’ have rarely
t been questioned. Corruption is usually regarded as a kind of ’behaviour’
JL (Nye, 1970:566; Huntington, 1970:492), a ’violation of the norms’
(Alatas, 1968: 12; Huntington, 1970: 492) or a ’social illness or social pathology’
(Katsenelinboigen, 1983 : 222). These definitions are based on the assumptions
that a general value consensus and normative order exist in society. Any
violations of the norms or breaches of the legal codes are seen as pathological,
disgraceful and criminal, and are therefore despised and condemned. It is thus
not surprising that corruption is commonly portrayed as ’bringing into question
...
loyalty’ (Palmier, 1983: 208), as ’exercising a legitimate discretion for
improper reasons’ (McMullan, 1970: 319), as being ‘contrasted with the concept
of incentives’ (Katsenelinboigen, 1983: 220), as being ’incompatible with (de-
structive of) any system’ (Rogow and Lasswell, 1970: 54), and even as ’betrayal,
deception and callous disregard for any consequence suffered by the public’
(Alatas, 1968: 12). These negative moral judgements have led many people to
perceive this ’crime’ from a normative perspective, and to exclude the
examination of sociopolitical reality, structural conflicts and historically specific
phenomena behind corruption. To interpret corruption in terms of official
definitions ignores the significance of political dynamics and the power relations
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SOCIAL &
LEGAL STUDIES (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi),
Vol. 2 (1993),195--209
195
196
behind the creation of, and the fight against, corruption. It does not consider the
role which criminalization plays in legitimizing political control.
Institutionalized norms and value consensus are, I believe, not the necessary
conditions for social order. As there are fundamental conflicts of interest in any
society, social order is achieved by a balance of power in which the interests of the
dominant class bloc successfully contain and channel the demands of the
dominated classes (Turk, 1976). Corruption is not just a simple, observable form
of conduct referring to bribery, misappropriation and nepotism. There are
moral-political judgements behind the definition. Many studies have argued that
the definitions of corruption involve complicated political meanings and are
subject to negotiation and manipulation by the dominant class bloc. Its sanctions
have predictable political targets and are influenced by the powerful to achieve
definite political goals, e.g. excluding political adversaries from the political arena
(Bretton, 1962; Chambliss, 1975; Smart, 1983). Thus, corruption is not just
morally wrong or criminal; it is a political reality which involves complicated
structural conflicts and political compromise.
In order to comprehend the moral-political judgements behind corruption in
China, the official interpretations of corruption and belief in the efficacy of
criminalization and the fairness of law enforcement have to be discarded. Rather,
the fight against corruption is best regarded as a form of social censure. According
to Sumner
(1990: 17, 27):
The censures of deviance are key features of the discourses of the dominant; forces
deployed in the policing of what they specify as deviance and dissent. Although often
presented in legal, technical or universal forms, as mere descriptions, they are
organized slanders in what is essentially a political or moral conflict.... [They] are
tied to a desire to control, prevent or punish ... with the potential to mobilize the
forces of law, order and moral purity against targeted sections of the population. The
perpetuity of contestation of social censures in divided societies means that there are
always oppositional, alternative or negotiated forms of censure.... (my emphases)
To understand corruption in China we should, therefore, consider the capacity of
social censures to produce particular forms of social relations, and shift the
theoretical emphasis to the interplay of law, ideologies and political economy. This
Communist state is divided into a dominant class bloc (the Communist Party and
its apparatuses) and a subordinate class (the people). Laws, rules and norms are
principally constituted according to the former’s will, and any violations of the
norms
are punished if they infringe its interests. Moreover, these laws and rules are
used to police dissidents and even political opposition within the Communist
Party. In the following discussion, this contention will be illustrated with an
analysis of the censure of corruption and bourgeois liberation in Communist
China in the 1980s.
THE CENSURE OF CORRUPTION AND BOURGEOIS LIBERATION
During the Chinese Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, many
Communist veterans, such as Deng Xiaoping, were labelled revisionists and
197
purged by Mao Zedong. The ultra-leftist Gang of Four, headed by Mao’s wife
Jiang Qing, dominated the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) and brutally
suppressed their political enemies. Their supporters also controlled all govern-
ment and Party organs. When Mao died in 1976, the Gang and the leftists lost
their power, and many Communist veterans were reinstated to their former
posts. In particular, Deng Xiaoping, who had suffered immensely during the
leftists’ domination, regained power and implemented an open-door policy.
However, modernization in the 1980s created a new political crisis characterized
by rampant bureaucratic corruption and rising material needs of the people. The
ccp had launched a series of anti-corruption campaigns to combat economic
crimes. While some of these were rooted in genuine and valid moral principles,
some were political instruments in the power struggle within the dominant
power bloc.
z
_
’
PARTY RECTIFICATION 1983 : OUSTING THE ENEMIES
’
In October 1983, the ccp launched the Party Rectification Campaign to purge it
of corrupt and decadent elements (Benton, 1984; Far Eastern Economic Review,
3 November 1983). Its major goal was to check corruption, abuse of power and
irresponsible bureaucratism. It was said that some cadres violated financial rules
and economic policies, illegally retained profits, wasted public funds, occupied
public property under dubious pretexts and even took part in smuggling, selling
smuggled goods, bribery and profiteering (ccp, 1983).’ These unhealthy
tendencies jeopardized the modernization programmes, impaired the ccp’s
public image and undermined the public’s confidence in the superiority of the
socialist system. The ccp thought Party Rectification was necessary to eliminate
these corrupt and decadent elements. At first sight, the campaign appeared to be a
ccp attempt to reform its corrupt members, but in fact, its purpose was far from
simple. The censure of corruption was highly targeted, and was intended to rid
the ccP of leftist poisons left over from the Cultural Revolution. This is clear from
the three goals of the campaign. The first goal was to correct the leftist and
rightist tendencies in the ccP. The Party said that some members had not
liberated themselves from the leftist thoughts of the past and resisted the
modernization programmes, while others were contaminated with capitalist
ideas and promoted bourgeois liberalization. Both of these incorrect tendencies
were incompatible with Party principles (ccp, 1983). This statement seemed to
have presented a balanced view as regards the leftist and rightist deviations.
Nonetheless, as the following discussion indicates, it was the ’leftist’ faction, not
the ’rightist’ elements, that Deng Xiaoping wanted to uproot.
The second goal was to strengthen discipline by insisting on the principle of
democratic centralization and opposing paternalism, factionalism, anarchism
and liberalism. It was particularly emphasized that some Party members had not
yet overcome the sense of factionalism created during the Cultural Revolution.
They ignored the Party, but encouraged factionalism and nepotism, expelled
opponents, formed cliques for personal benefit, endangered Party unity and
198
obstructed the execution of the ccp’s directions, goals and policies (ccP, 1983).
While the danger of factionalism can, in principle, come from both the ’right’ and
the ’left’, the ccp specified in particular those factions formed during the Cultural
Revolution. It would therefore seem that the leftist faction was the main target of
the censure of corruption.
The third goal expressed Deng’s intention in an even clearer manner by
specifying the targets to be purged:
1. Those who rose to prominence by rebellion. This meant those who
followed the Gang of Four in seeking power during the Cultural Revolution and
rose to prominence thereafter.
2. Those with serious factionalist opinions. This meant those who promoted
the counterrevolutionary ideas of the Gang of Four and formed cliques during
and after the Cultural Revolution.
3. The beaters, smashers and looters. This meant those people who, during the
Cultural Revolution, had framed and persecuted cadres and the masses, extorted
confessions by torture, seriously injured their victims, smashed up institutions,
seized files by force, damaged public or private property and organized violent
confrontations.
The campaign emphasized that purifying the Party was its major goal (ccP,
1983). The real reference point behind the censure of corruption...
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