The populism of fear
| Date | 01 January 2003 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1462474503005001293 |
| Published date | 01 January 2003 |
| Author | Paul Chevigny |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Copyright © SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi.
Vol 5(1): 77–96
[1462-4745(200301)5:1;77–96; 029293]
PUNISHMENT
& SOCIETY
The populism of fear
Politics of crime in the Americas
PAUL CHEVIGNY
New York University, USA
Abstract
In democratic countries, at least in the western hemisphere, there has been a political
trend toward appealing to the fear of crime as a popular issue in electoral campaigns,
as well as more generally as a way of attracting public notice. The trend is likely to be
particularly strong in countries in which major offices are openly contested for
election, but economic inequality is pronounced and the willingness or ability of the
government to deliver social services is limited. Under those conditions, there is a
strong temptation to find an issue that will appeal to all classes; the issue of crime and
the consequent fear of insecurity is an obvious issue that is frequently used and is some-
times even exaggerated in the hope of enlisting popular support. This article examines
this phenomenon in recent years in Argentina, particularly in Buenos Aires, in Brazil,
particularly in São Paulo, in Mexico and Mexico City, and in the USA, as exemplified
by New York State.
Key Words
Latin America • politics of crime • populism • security state
INTRODUCTION
For elites in the Americas, north and south, ‘populism’ has often been a dirty word. In
the USA in the 1890s, the word conjured up farmers in the heartland fighting the big
money for debt relief and agricultural sales cooperatives. In contemporary Latin
American politics, populism has included, as the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) put it, ‘large public enterprises, massive subsidy schemes, unmanageable
progressive taxation, restrictive labor legislation, multiple exchange rates and price
controls’ (IADB, 1999: 7). Such economic populism, in short, represents policies that
tend to lead to inflation as well as, sometimes, to social programs (Dornbusch and
Edwards, 1990). At the local level, such populism often took (and still takes) the form
of clientism, through which the politician undertakes to satisfy some basic need of the
individual voter; my favorite example is the Brazilian office-seeker who gave each person
in the crowd one shoe – promising to give them the other one if he was elected.
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PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 5(1)
The IADB reports, with evident satisfaction, that the fiscal reforms and structural
adjustments of the past 20 years in Latin America, while they have not reduced economic
inequality or alleviated much poverty, have at least slowed populism. ‘It is important to
point out that the process of economic reform has been carried out in almost all coun-
tries by democratic governments rather than dictatorships. Increased democracy hasn’t
been accompanied by populism, either. Instead, democracy has ushered in a period of
greater fiscal discipline and smaller deficits’ (IADB, 1997: iii). It is perfectly true that
the policies of austerity and the free-market have limited the possibilities for welfare and
clientism. But they have not eliminated populism, because there are more kinds of
populism than are dreamed of by the bank.
In a democracy, politicians acquire the power to make policy, as Schumpeter put it,
‘by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1947: 269). When there is
widespread economic inequality in the society, the campaigners often try to win the
competition through ‘populism’ – an appeal that pits one group against another, for
example, through fear of an enemy or through economic or racial conflict. The political
systems in the USA, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are at present democratic by Schum-
peter’s definition, and they are all riven by conflicts produced by severe economic
inequality; these are natural seed-beds for populist democracy. At the same time, the
scope for populism is limited. The foreign and even the subversive domestic enemy
became less of a threat after the end of the cold war, although the ground is shifting
again in the USA since 11 September 2001. On the other hand, because of the commit-
ment to control inflation, to budget deficits that are low or non-existent, and to privatiz-
ation and a free market, the appeal to economic populism (for government-sponsored
jobs, much less for extensive social welfare programs) is largely foreclosed. My thesis here
is that in this era of limitations on the service state, the great temptation for democratic
politicians is the appeal to fear of an internal enemy – the fear of violent crime. The
appeal is ready to hand, in many cases, because the policies of structural adjustment, and
the economic crises that brought on the structural adjustment, have led to so much
inequality and economic stress that they often contribute to an increase in crime; never-
theless, politicians still try to exaggerate the crime problem. To be sure, commentators
have seen similar tendencies elsewhere in the world for decades (Hall et al., 1978;
Wacquant, 1999); nevertheless, the temptation of the populism of fear has been
especially strong in the western hemisphere in recent years. I will show the prevalence
of the populism of fear and its influence on election campaign tactics and policy in
Argentina, focusing on Buenos Aires, in Brazil, focusing on São Paulo, in Mexico, and
in the USA, focusing on New York. It appears at the national level in all the countries I
shall discuss here, although more weakly in Brazil; it is strong everywhere in local
politics, however, where much of the actual work of law enforcement is carried out.
The temptations of the populism of fear are prevalent in democracies. It is true that
openly authoritarian regimes are often effectively repressive; they may, for example,
incarcerate proportionately more people than democratic regimes (Greenberg, 2002,
forthcoming). Social control is commonly carried out by close surveillance of the people,
as in Cuba, with repressive actions well targeted for political effect (Chevigny, 1999).
Such regimes, however, do not share the style found in the democracies, including flam-
boyant police abuses in the streets and ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric, a style that creates an
atmosphere of disorder that itself contributes to the politics of crime. Political scientists
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CHEVIGNY
The populism of fear
have remarked that populism casts itself as an ‘anti-system’, in conflict with the poli-
ticians in power (Novaro, 1999: 26; Weyland, 1999); this characteristic is salient in the
populism of fear in democracies. Political campaigners virtually ‘run against the state’,
complaining that the judges, the executive, and the laws themselves are too weak in the
face of crime. They run also against the experts, championing a vengeful, punitive
approach to crime, as contrasted with the more nuanced approach of many criminolo-
gists. The appeal of the politics of crime, moreover, is not limited to those who happen
to be in the opposition; the rhetoric that the voters are threatened with danger, both to
person and property, that the candidate’s anti-crime policies will make them safe, while
his opponent’s proposals will increase the danger, is a pitch that few campaigners,
whether in or out of office, can resist. The temptations of the populism of fear ensnare
politicians, even when they are aware that such politics has something in common with
authoritarian rule, and pulls a democracy in that direction (Dahrendorf, 1985: 160; Hall
et al., 1978).
The sense of danger due to crime as well as the appeal of repressive anti-crime policies,
is amplified by a free press. In Buenos Aires, São Paulo, New York and Mexico City, the
several competing daily papers as well as television and radio feed upon crime to draw
readers, listeners and viewers, who look on with fascinated horror as the media comment
on murders, rapes, and other outrages. The candidates, in turn, seize upon the increas-
ing fear, and the media obliges by reporting more crime. The situation was otherwise
under the dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina; because the governments wanted to
convey a sense of control and tranquility, they often failed to release crime data, and
discouraged the press from upsetting the public. In Mexico as well, before the govern-
ing party began seriously to lose its grip, and the country passed into an economic crisis,
people felt and the press conveyed a sense of tranquility that was difficult for observers
from the north to understand.
Under the democratic regimes that prevail throughout the Americas at present, the
populism of the fear of crime, far from being a dirty word, is just the sort of populism
that elites have been looking for. Free-market relations, together with the weakening of
the service state, induce fear and anxiety in the middle class as well as the poor. People
are afraid that they will lose their jobs, that the economy will slow, or that some other
calamity will occur. Free-market policies only exacerbate such fears, leaving citizens with
the sense that there is no safety net in case of catastrophe, and that if something goes
wrong, they have no one to blame but themselves. With such a constant background of
institutionalized economic and social anxiety, crime can be made a target for the fears
of the populace; it deflects anxiety away from demands for reform and alleviation of
market relations toward a demand for vengeance against criminals (Scheingold, 1991:
17...
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