The power of an elector in the Spanish parliament: A study compared with power indices
| Author | Julio R Fernández,Inés Gallego,Andrés Jiménez-Losada |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221076342 |
| Published date | 01 December 2022 |
| Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Theoretical Endeavors |
The power of an elector in the
Spanish parliament: A study
compared with power indices
Julio R Fernández
Department of Applied Mathematic II, University of Seville, Spain
Inés Gallego
Department of Didactics of Mathematics, University of Seville,
Spain
Andrés Jiménez-Losada
Department of Applied Mathematic II, University of Seville, Spain
Abstract
The main goal of this article is to study, from a game theory perspective, the composition of the
Spanish Parliament according to Article 68 of the Spanish Constitution, although the proposed
model is applicable to the reduction of other representation chambers. It even allows for the spor-
adic design of the chamber in periods of crisis such as those we are currently experiencing. We
use power indices to analyse feasible allocations of seats among the circumscriptions, modifying
the size of the Parliament and considering different minimum initial numbers of seats per province.
We propose two modifications of the composition following the cubic root rule of the de jure
population. Finally, we compare the results of the general elections of December 2015 and
June 2016 for the election of the members of the Congress of Deputies (Spanish Parliament)
with the current system, which distributes a total number of 350 deputies among the provinces,
with an initial minimum of two deputies (system 350/2), with another distribution system that dis-
tributed 360 deputies with an initial minimum of one deputy per province (system 360/1).
Keywords
Banzhaf index, law electoral reform, power of an elector, Shapley-Shubik index, Spanish Parliament
Corresponding author:
Julio R Fernández, Higher Polytechnic School of Seville, University of Seville, C/Virgen de África 7, 41011 Seville, Spain.
Email: julio@us.es
Theoretical Endeavors
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2022, Vol. 7(4) 1210–1231
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/20578911221076342
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
Introduction
In Spain, the system of parliamentary representation consists of two legislative chambers; the
Lower House is the Congress of Deputies, and the Upper House is the Senate. The system of
representation in the Congress of Deputies is proportional and that of the Senate is majority. The
objective of this article is to analyse, using power indices, the composition of the Congress of
Deputies of Spain, taking into account the provisions of Article 68 of the Spanish Constitution
1978, of 29 December (hereinafter CE78), and in the Organic Law 5/1985, of 19 June, of the
General Electoral Regime (hereinafter LOREG). In essence, the Spanish electoral system has
great stability, since the modifications that the LOREG has introduced do not affect essential
aspects already contemplated in Law 1/1977, of 4 January, for Political Reform, and in the
Royal Decree-Law 20/1977, of 18 March, on Electoral Rules that regulated the elections of
1977, 1979 and 1982. Among these aspects, it is worth mentioning the composition of the
Congress with 350 deputies and an initial minimum of two deputies per province, the distribution
of deputies between districts, the rule of allocation after the holding of elections and the electoral
barrier. The analysis of the Spanish Electoral System has been the object of study since the holding
of the general elections since 1977. Among many published works, we can mention Sartori (1980),
who studied the results of the elections held in Spain between 1977 and 1982, considering that
electoral system favoured a bipartisan tendency, distorted by the presence of regionalist parties.
Rae and Ramírez (1993) analysed the Spanish electoral system, highlighting the discrimination
of the national political parties that remain in third and fourth place with respect to the first two
forces and with respect to the regionalist parties, as well as the overrepresentation of the less popu-
lated provinces. Bilbao (1994) studied the possibilities of reform of the current Electoral Law,
within the framework of the Constitution, in order to favor effective and responsible governments.
Márquez and Ramírez (1998) studied the proportionality and governability of the Spanish electoral
system. Ramírez and Márquez (2010) and Ramírez (2006) analysed the constitutional limitations
that affect the election of the Spanish Congress of Deputies and proposed a possible modification
of Article 68 of the Constitution and a two-level distribution. Martínez (2017) has also studied the
proposals for reform of the Spanish electoral system made by two political parties currently repre-
sented in the Congress of Deputies. Uribe-Otarola (2017) has analysed the characteristics of the
election of the Congress of Deputies, as well as the possible reforms within the framework of
the Constitution, having as working hypothesis that the effects of the majority system designed
in the Transition have been diluted over time, and highlighting that the current system has favoured
stability and governability. For this work, the content of the Report of the Council of State (2009),
which is the supreme advisory body of the Government of Spain, on the Proposals to modify the
General Electoral System of 24 February 2009, has also been taken into account. The report only
includes reforms of the electoral law that do not require constitutional reforms. In section 4, final
considerations, of this report, it is clear that:
the weight of the vote differs ostensibly depending on the circumscription in which the right to vote is
exercised and that the correspondence between the number of seats and the number of votes of some
electoral candidates presents important imbalances.
The cost of obtaining a seat is present in the Spanish electoral system from the moment Article
68.2 of the Constitution provides for a minimum initial representation per province, currently estab-
lished in two deputies (Article 162.2 of the LOREG). Consequently, 100 seats in the chamber, plus
Fernández et al. 1211
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