The profile and detection of bribery in Norway and England & Wales: A comparative study
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370818764827 |
| Author | Mark Button,Mari Sognnæs Andresen |
| Published date | 01 January 2019 |
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
European Journal of Criminology
2019, Vol. 16(1) 18 –40
The profile and detection of
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818764827
DOI: 10.1177/1477370818764827
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& Wales: A comparative study
Mari Sognnæs Andresen and Mark Button
University of Portsmouth, UK
Abstract
This paper provides the first significant profile of offenders convicted of bribery in England &
Wales (E&W) and Norway, based upon a sample of 75 cases from E&W and 46 from Norway,
which were collected through searches of the media and other relevant sources between 2003
and 2015. The paper provides a profile of bribe payers and takers: in both E&W and Norway
they are predominantly male, middle aged and involved in a median bribe of between £20,000
and £30,000; the sectors experiencing the most bribes paid are public administration and defence
and the sector paying the most bribes is construction. In both countries, the period from the
start of the crime to conviction was around six years. The paper also notes some significant
differences between the two countries. In Norway there was a larger percentage of higher-grade
professionals involved in bribery and in E&W detection by law enforcement was more common,
suggesting greater interest by such bodies. The average sentence received by offenders was also
slightly higher in E&W. The paper offers many other insights into the characteristics of bribery in
the two countries in a rarely researched area.
Keywords
Bribery, corruption, detection, profile
Introduction
Corruption is seen as one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social development
(Brun et al., 2015: 1; Trivunovic et al., 2011: 2; World Bank, 2006). In the global struggle
against corruption, detection and prosecution are regarded as essential measures. One of
the most salient examples of corruption is bribery and this has received very little aca-
demic research (Gottschalk, 2014; Lord, 2013, 2015; Lord and Levi, 2017). One study of
overseas bribery cases in the UK and Germany found that investigators and prosecutors
Corresponding author:
Mark Button, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, 141 High St, Portsmouth, PO1
2HY, UK.
Email: mark.button@port.ac.uk
Andresen and Button
19
thought that uncovering the case was the most difficult part of the prosecution process
(Lord, 2015: 583). Although there is some research on who detects cases involving over-
seas cases of bribery (OECD, 2014), this project investigates both domestic and overseas
cases that resulted in a conviction in England & Wales [E&W] and in Norway between
2003 and 2015.
Fighting corruption is a global concern that remains high on the international agenda.
This development has partly been driven by international conventions such as the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
which came into force in 1999. It is seen as a key instrument in combatting global cor-
ruption (Transparency International, 2015: 4) and was one of the reasons for the intro-
duction of the UK Bribery Act (Rose, 2012: 487). Similarly, the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has, since it was implemented in 2003, con-
tributed strongly to place the fight against corruption on the international agenda (Brun
et al., 2015: 1). Both these conventions promote the criminalization of bribery (Rose,
2012: 486; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2010: 2), and successful compliance
implies that cases are investigated and prosecuted. In other words, the first step towards
complying with these conventions is successful detection of bribery.
Building on criminological theory, it is debatable to what extent corruption can be
explained solely though this rational choice theory or whether it is better explained
through behavioural concepts such as social and institutional factors (Dimant and
Schulte, 2016: 56; Gilling, 1997: 36; Sutherland, 1941: 32). A case study of bribery com-
mitted on behalf of German companies found that high-ranking employees paid bribes in
the pursuit of an organizational goal, as opposed to personal gain for themselves
(Pohlmann et al., 2016: 95). Pohlmann and his colleagues go on to argue that bribe takers
can be explained through rational choice theory, whereas bribe payers should be explained
by other mechanisms. The environment of the organization or individual is also impor-
tant, because economic, social and political structures are all seen to influence the level
of corruption in a country (Fletcher and Herrmann, 2012: 36). Though there are several
possible explanations as to why people commit bribery, it is generally assumed that a low
risk of detection and punishment will make corruption more prevalent (Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016). Hence, an increased perceived risk of detection, either
by a group or by an individual, could reduce bribery.
Defining bribery
Many of the suggested definitions of corruption are quite broad, such as the Asian
Development Bank (1998: 6), which defines it as ‘the abuse of public or private office
for personal gain’. Even more generally it could be defined as ‘the abuse of entrusted
power for personal gain’ (Transparency International, n.d.) or as ‘selling’ a decision to
the benefit of the bribe payer (Søreide, 2014: 1). These definitions overlap with other
crimes, such as fraud (Button and Gee, 2013: 10; Transparency International UK, 2011:
1) and embezzlement (Johnson and Sharma, 2004: 2).
The legislation in E&W and Norway have different definitions of bribery. The most
recent law, the UK’s Bribery Act 2010, is regarded as one of the toughest in the world
20
European Journal of Criminology 16(1)
(Yeoh, 2011: 50). It defines bribery as an act of offering/giving/promising or requesting/
accepting a financial or other advantage (Ministry of Justice, 2011). To be convicted of
bribery, there must be an intent to influence someone to perform improperly in a relevant
function or activity (Ministry of Justice, 2011: 10). The law applies to domestic cases and
also forbids bribery of foreign public officials (Maton, 2010: 37–8). Prior to the Bribery
Act, corruption was regulated through several laws, including a common law offence
and through three statute laws (Brown, 2007: 181). The Bribery Act replaced most of
these (Maton, 2010: 38), with the exception of cases committed by persons who are
public office holders, which also after the Bribery Act often are prosecuted as Misconduct
in Public Office (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.; Parsons, 2012: 183).
In Norway, the legislation is a part of the Norwegian General Civil Penal Code (the
Penal Code). The law was changed in 2003 and the motivation behind the change was to
establish the strictest anti-corruption regime in the world (Elgesem, 2014). The Penal
Code defines corruption as to give/offer or request/receive/accept an improper advantage
related to position, office or assignment (Økokrim, 2015a). In contrast to the UK Bribery
Act, it is not a condition that the intention of the bribe is to cause any action or neglect
by the receiver of the bribe. The question is whether or not the advantage is improper
(Økokrim, 2015a). Similarly to E&W, the Norwegian anti-bribery legislation covers
domestic cases as well as corruption committed anywhere else in the world (Elgesem,
2014). The Norwegian legislation refers to ‘corruption’, but the described offence is
comparable to the offence under the UK Bribery Act, and the term ‘bribery’ will there-
fore also be used in the Norwegian context.
Though the legal definition of bribery is quite similar in E&W and Norway, given the
complex legislation in E&W it was necessary to define what is understood to be bribery
in this project. The applied definition is built on the legislation mentioned above, and
consists of three main elements. Firstly, there is a financial or other advantage that is
either offered/promised/given or requested/received. Secondly, this advantage is given in
connection with a function, office or assignment. Thirdly, there is an intention that these
actions will make the receiver of the bribe perform improperly or, alternatively, the
financial advantage is in itself regarded as improper. This definition implies that a bribe
paid by one ‘ordinary’ person to another is not regarded as bribery, for example if an
accused person offers a bribe to a witness in order to make the witness give a certain
statement in court. In contrast, it falls under the definition if the accused person attempts
to influence the outcome of the case by offering a bribe to police, a judge or others who
are in a position of trust.
Corruption is a hidden crime (Fletcher and Herrmann, 2012: 17). Hence, the preva-
lence of corruption is difficult to measure, although both perception-based surveys and
more reliable estimates have documented that the extent of the problem is severe (Olken
and Pande, 2011: 42). There is very little measurement of the level of bribery in E&W or
in Norway. One source is the International Crime Victim Survey, which last collected
data in 2003–4 and sought data amongst the general public on bribe-seeking by public
officials....
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