The Promise and Pitfalls of Assembled Institutions: Lessons from the Global Environment Facility and UNAIDS
| Published date | 01 February 2017 |
| Author | Erin R. Graham |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12359 |
| Date | 01 February 2017 |
The Promise and Pitfalls of Assembled
Institutions: Lessons from the Global
Environment Facility and UNAIDS
Erin R. Graham
Drexel University
Abstract
Contemporary global governance architecture has been described as fragmented, incoherent, and inefficient. The mandates of
prominent international organizations (IOs) often overlap and coordination is regarded more as the exception than the rule. In
this context, international institutions designed with an explicit coordination mandate hold significant promise. These assem-
bled institutions (AIs), like the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and UNAIDS, formally incorporate IOs in their designs and
seek to coordinate and bring coherence to their work in a given issue area. Although praised for their bold and innovative
designs, little scholarly work has assessed the success of these institutions in fulfilling coordination mandates. The paper intro-
duces AIs as an organizational form and sheds light on two challenges they face that provide barriers to coordination. First,
concerns regarding status and material losses may cause relevant IOs to resist coordination despite ostensibly opting in to
participate in the assembled institution. Second, the governing bodies of assembled institutions are weak relative to the
prominent IOs incorporated in their designs. The home governing bodies of these institutions often do little to reinforce the
importance of coordination, hampering performance. These challenges are illustrated in the case of the GEF and UNAIDS.
Policy Implications
•States and other donors should have realistic expectations about their ability to force international organizations to coordi-
nate action through assembled institutions (AIs).
•Policy makers should design assembled institutions with substantial administrative capacity; ‘lean’institutional designs are
often ineffective and leave AIs incapable of affecting coordination.
•States should encourage and offer support to IO-initiated coordination efforts as these are more likely to succeed than
their state imposed counterparts.
•Member states should work to send consistent messages to IO staff across governance forums to encourage coordination.
•Strong monetary incentives are critical to the success of coordination. Donors should make access to funding contingent
on joint proposals when collaboration between IOs is desirable.
Contemporary global governance architecture is often char-
acterized as fragmented and incoherent (Alter and Meunier,
2009; Keohane and Victor, 2011; Oberthur and Stokke, 2011;
Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2013;). Rising institutional density
has led to overlapping mandates and duplication in the
work of many international organizations (IOs). The Global
Environment Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Joint Pro-
gram on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) represent two ambitious
attempts to mitigate these problems in their respective
fields. Both were established to coordinate the work of
prominent IOs by incorporating those IOs formally, and per-
manently, in their institutional designs. Established as a pilot
program in 1991 and made permanent in 1994, the GEF
design sought to coordinate the work of the World Bank,
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The design was
intended to capitalize on the strengths of the three agen-
cies, which would contribute to GEF projects based on a
system of comparative advantage. The logic of the UNAIDS
design was similar. Frustrated with inadequate coordination,
donors sought a new institution, which would include the
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank, to
facilitate a more coherent and efficient approach to HIV/
AIDS issues.
The GEF and UNAIDS, along with institutions like the Con-
sultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Global
Fund, the Rollback Malaria Partnership, and UN-REDD, repre-
sent a unique institutional form. They are formal institutions
established with an explicit coordination mandate and are
further distinguished in that they are effectively assembled
using existing IOs. In a context of inefficient global gover-
nance architecture, assembled institutions hold great pro-
mise. Through coordination they are designed to eliminate
©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12359
Global Policy Volume 8 . Issue 1 . February 2017
52
Research Article
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