The Prospects for Arms Control after the Summit
| Author | Steve Smith |
| Published date | 01 February 1986 |
| Date | 01 February 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.1986.tb00155.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
THE
PROSPECTS
FOR
ARMS
CONTROL
AFTER
THE
SWMIT
STEVE
SMITH
The Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
on 19-21 November
1985
received surprisingly optimistic treatment
in
the British
Press. In co,7mon with much of the Western press, British media coverage before
the Summit focussed on the possibilities of the two individuals ushering
in
a new
era of US-Soviet relations. After the event,
it
was widely portrayed as a great
success with the acceptance at face value of the two leaders' statements that
they wished for arms control. The argument
of
this paper
is
that the prospects
of agreement are low, and that the Summit, precisely because
it
concentrates on
individuals, is a misleading focus for any evaluation of the arms control agenda.
In fact,
it
is worth beginning by noting that the Summit was portrayed in
a rather different way in the
US
press.
A
comparison of the reports in the
Guardian and the Times with those of the Washington Post and the New York Times
indicates that there was much more scepticism in the
US
about the effect of the
-
Summit on arms control and the impact of the meeting on US-Soviet relations.
Indeed, according to a story carried in the New York Times: 'American officials
grew
so
concerned about the outcome of the Summit meeting that a "blow-up scenario"
was devised to
limit
political damage in case the meeting collapsed at the final
ceremony.' (Weinraub,
1985,
p 1). Apparently, the joint statement issued on the
last day of the Summit (21 November) was only agreed at 4.30am that day.
differences between the two sides were so wide that considerable compromises were
necessary in order to arrive at a final agreed joint statement. This, of course,
will
not surprise anyone who knows the history of US-Soviet arms control, but
it
is a picture of events that bears little resemblance to the public presentation,
and management,
of
the Summit.
The
In order to assess the prospects for superpower arms control after the
Summit
it
is
necessary to go back to the reasons why the last set of talks broke
down (For a discussion of the progress of arms control from 1972-1984, see Smith,
1984). The
US
and the Soviets, having reached agreement on a
SALT
I
I
Treaty in
1979,
did not talk about further arms control for the first eighteen months of
the Reagan administration. President Reagan came to power arguing that the
US
was lagging in the arms race, and that
it
needed to build up its strength
so
as
to be in a better position to negotiate. (Paradoxically, a comparison of the
strategic forces of the two sides in 1980 and
1985
ind4cates that the Soviets
have actually improved their relative warhead standing, yet the
US
is now said
to be in a position of strength from which to negotiate!).
eventually became involved in two sets of arms control negotiations:
START
(Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) concerned with strategic systems, and
INF
(Intermediate Nuclear Forces Talks) which was concerned with theatre nuclear
systems.
and Pershing
II
systems to Europe in November
1983.
The Soviets claimed that
they would not return to the negotiating table until these systems were removed.
The two sides
But these two sets of talks broke down when the
US
introduced Cruise
By then,
of
course, a new issue was receiving public attention, and this
was President Reagan's 23 March
1983
announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative
(SDI)
which became better known
as
the 'Star Wars'. Since then, most
media attention has concentrated on the relationship between
SDI
and arms control,
so
that the crucial issue is seen as being whether or not the President
is
willing to make concessions. Naturally this
is
a critical issue for the
evaluation of the prospects for arms control, but to a significant extent
it
is
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