The Puzzle of Democratic Authorization
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00906.x |
| Author | Andrew Volmert |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 2 VO L 6 0 , 2 8 7 – 3 0 5
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00906.x
The Puzzle of Democratic Authorizationpost_906287..305
Andrew Volmert
Brown University
Most of the dominant versions of democratic theory conceive of political decisions as authorized by citizens, either
directly or indirectly through their representatives, yet theorists rarely attend directly to the meaning of the concept
of authorization itself. Theorists frequently debate the character of democratic authorization, yet they rarely ask the
prior question of whether the concept of authorization can properly be applied to democratic citizens’ conduct in the
first place. After submitting the concept to critical scrutiny, the article reaches the surprising conclusion that, contrary
to expectations, contemporary democratic practice cannot, strictly speaking, be properly characterized as a practice of
citizen authorization at all. Although incorrect, there is an element of truth in the characterization of democratic
decision making as a practice of citizen authorization. Understanding what is true and false in this characterization
illuminates the distinctive character of modern democratic politics.
Keywords: authorization; democracy; the people; consent; representation
The concept of authorization is central to the idea of democratic decision making, yet it has
received remarkably little attention within contemporary democratic theory. Democratic
decisions are widely assumed to be authorized by citizens, either directly or indirectly
through their representatives. As David Estlund (2008, p. 65) recently remarked, ‘the core
idea of democracy is, or at least includes, the idea of citizens collectively authorizing laws
by voting for them, and/or for officeholders who make them’. Yet dominant theories rely
upon the concept of authorization without offering clear accounts of its meaning. Theo-
rists frequently debate the character of democratic authorization, painting pictures of the
authorizing process within which voting, deliberation, citizen participation and represen-
tation, for example, occupy different roles, yet they rarely justify the prior assumption that
the concept of authorization can properly be applied to citizens’ political conduct in the
first place. Closer examination of the meaning of authorization, I want to suggest, calls into
question whether democratic practice can properly be characterized as a practice of citizen
authorization at all.
Any appeal to the meaning of a concept will rightly be met with skepticism. In the wake
of the widespread rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction and the increased recog-
nition that meaning is both sensitive to context and dependent on textured and historically
variable practices of usage, it is clear that meanings cannot be exhaustively specified with a
single simple definition. Authorization means somewhat different things in different
contexts, and it would be a mistake to attempt a neat specification of the concept. Yet an
exhaustive account of the meaning of authorization is not necessary to raise genuine
problems for its application in the democratic context. It is easy to identify a couple of basic
elements without which a practice seems not to be a practice of authorization and,
strikingly, it is difficult to identify these elements in the practice of democratic citizens.
In ordinary practices of authorization, the authorizing party gives the authorized party
permission to do certain things within a domain over which the authorizing party has a
© 2011 The Author. Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
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A N D R E W VO L M E RT
right to control (compare Castiglione and Warren, 2008, p. 7). Authorization (1) involves
giving someone permission to do something, and (2) presupposes that the authorizing party
has a right to decide what happens within the domain at stake. I take these elements to be
relatively uncontroversial components of authorization, although they are often simply
assumed rather than explicitly discussed. Because it is difficult to imagine any practice that
lacks these basic elements that would count as a practice of authorization, I treat these very
general elements as being constitutive, but not exhaustive, of the meaning of authorization.1
To use a non-political case for illustration, consider how authorization works with
respect to one’s home. I can authorize persons to enter or stay in my home; I can authorize
people to perform repairs on it or to put up yard signs in front of it. I give such
authorization by indicating my permission to these actions being taken, and such autho-
rization is only possible because I have a right to decide, within certain bounds, what
happens on my property. If I have never indicated my permission for these things, then I
have not authorized them. By the same token, I cannot ordinarily authorize these same
actions with respect to another person’s home, because I have no right to decide whether
these sorts of actions can or cannot be taken in other people’s homes.
Authorization as a social practice includes not only the act of authorization but also its
reception. A social or legal practice of authorization is only in effect if others do not act
within the relevant domain unless they receive the authorizing party’s permission to do so.
The general acceptance of social or legal norms that prescribe conditions under which a
person’s permission is needed for particular actions or types of action – in other words, the
general recognition of the authorizer’s right to decide what happens within a domain – is
a precondition for acts of authorization to have practical effect.
The puzzle that arises in examining the idea of democratic authorization is that the basic
elements of a practice of authorization cannot be found in the political practice of
democratic citizens, at least in contemporary democracies. As a result, democratic decision
making cannot, strictly speaking, be properly characterized as a practice of citizen autho-
rization at all. Democratic decisions are not truly authorized by citizens. This conclusion
is surprising and strange. In this article, I will explain why this conclusion cannot be avoided
but also why it is sometimes reasonable to speak as if citizens have authorized democratic
decisions. There is both truth and falsity in the characterization of democratic decision
making as a practice of citizen authorization, and understanding what is true and false about
this characterization illuminates the distinctive character of democratic politics.
Before explicating the puzzle of democratic authorization, it is important to delineate
more precisely the topic of this article through a brief discussion of the relationship between
authorization and authority, as these are closely related concepts and, unlike authorization,
the concept of authority has been extensively discussed within political philosophy.
Authorization and Authority
Political authority is generally understood by political philosophers as the ‘right to rule’.
Specifications of what this right involves differ around the edges, but theorists converge in
conceiving of political authority as, roughly, the morally justified power of a political agent
or of a political practice to regulate the conduct of subjects of the political community,
typically through the issuing of commands, which generate corresponding political obliga-
© 2011 The Author. Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
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tions of obedience by subjects (see, e.g., Christiano, 2004; Estlund, 2008; Friedman, 1990;
Raz, 1986, p. 23; 2006, p. 2, pp. 41–2; compare Flathman, 1980; Oakeshott, 1975, pp. 149–57).
Authorization is invoked within political theory as a means both of constituting and of
exercising political authority. According to the social contract tradition, political authority
must be constituted through the authorization of individuals, who consent to subject
themselves to the rule of the sovereign or of the government chosen by the community. On
this model, the individuals who authorize the sovereign or the government are not
themselves authorities, but rather constitute authority by transferring or extending to the
sovereign or the government their individual right to self-government. By contrast, the
authorization of laws, policies or particular state actions within an established political
system is a means of exercising political authority. In authorizing laws, legislative authorities
enable government and state officials to promulgate and enforce rules regulating the
community’s affairs, and governmental authorization of particular state actions, such as
wars, permits state actors such as the military to engage in conduct that was previously not
allowed.When political authorities create and authorize political and legal bodies or offices
to govern particular regions, to regulate particular types of affairs within the political
community or to enforce or interpret the law, they constitute subordinate authorities
through the exercise of their prior authority.
Democratic authorization is a means of exercising political authority. It presupposes the
established political authority of the people or of democratic procedure. Democratic
authorization can serve as a means of constituting subordinate political authorities, but these
authorities derive their right to rule...
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