The Queen against The Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Liverpool
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 11 January 1839 |
| Date | 11 January 1839 |
| Court | Court of the Queen's Bench |
English Reports Citation: 112 E.R. 1276
IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH
8 L. J. M. C. 41. Overruled, Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 1865, 11 H. L. C. 503.
the queen against the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough OF liverpool. Friday, January llth, 1839. Where a municipal corporation had been rateable and rated to the relief of the poor, in respect of town and anchorage dues, before stat. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76 (for the regulation of municipal corporations): Held, that sect. 92 of that Act, by appropriating all the corporate funda to purposes of a public nature, exempted the above dues from further rateability. [8 L. J. M. C. 41. Overruled, Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 1865, 11 H. L. C. 803.] On appeal against a rate for the relief of the poor of the parish of Liverpool, in which the appellants were rated as follows:-Town dues 48,7161., anchorage dues 5841.; the sessions confirmed the rate, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following ease. The several properties rated are the revenue of the Municipal Corporation of the Borough of Liverpool, collected by their officers (who are paid by salaries), and by them paid over to the treasurer of the borough, to the account of the Borough Fund. Before the passing of the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, these properties were rated to the relief of the poor, which rating was always acquiesced 1 AD. & B. 436. THE QUEEN V. THE MAYOR, ETC., OF LIVERPOOL 1277 in, and these properties are still rateable to the poor, unless they are exempt under the operation of the above Act. The question for the opinion of the Court ia, whether the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Liverpool are still rateable to the relief of the poor in respect of these properties. If the Court shall be of opinion that the appellants are not so rateable, then the rate to be amended by striking out the said properties and the names of the appellants. [436] The case was argued at the sittings in Bane after Michaelmas term last (a). Cresswell, Henderson, and Greaves, in support of the rate. It is not disputed that the corporation is rateable unless exempted by the operation of 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76. Sect. 92 provides that the rents and profits of all hereditaments," and the "annual proceeds of all monies," &c. belonging or payable to the corporate body, shall be paid to the treasurer of the borough, and carried to the account of the Borough Fund. The rents and profits intended, are the net rents after payment of all outgoings. The Legislature did not mean to deprive the poor of their interest in the corporate property, but to point out the future application of the surplus profits, and to make the corporation trustees for the purpose of such application. The rateability of the corporate property tends to reduce the burden of the rate upon others, and thus operates to the benefit of the borough, which is one of the avowed objects of the Act; but it cannot have been meant to benefit the borough at the expense of the parish, especially as the two are not found to be co-extensive. The expression "annual proceeds," seems to imply that annual charges are to be deducted, otherwise the word " annual "ia superfluous. The word "profits "is explained by Hex v. Joddrell (1 B. & Ad. 403, 407), to mean the "average annual profits, after every outgoing is paid." In wills and other instruments it has been construed to mean net profits. If an exemption had been intended, it would have been declared in express [437] terms, and not left to be inferred from an affirmative statute passed entirely alio intuitu. It will be contended that this is now become a public fund applicable to public purposes only, and therefore no longer rateable; Rex v. Commissioners of Sailer's Load Sluice (4 T. R. 730). In that case neither any particular place nor person was benefited, but the public in general; and the same Act which created the toll was also held to exempt it from rates. In Rex v. Liverpool (7 B. & C. 61), the dues were solely applicable to a public dock and harbour used by all the world ; and in Rex v. The Trustees of the River Weaver Navigation (7 B. & C. 70, note(c)), the tolls were appropriated by Parliament to the repair of county bridges and public highways. Here the Borough Fund is to be applied to purposes of a local arid private nature. These are, 1. The payment of debts : an Act to compel the corporation to pay its debts cannot be considered as giving a public character to its revenues; nor is it necessary that the debts should have been incurred for the public benefit. 2. The payment of the salaries of the mayor and other officers : these are all strictly private purposes. 3. The surplus is to be spent for the " public benefit of the inhabitants, arid improvement of the borough." Under this power the corporation may purchase rateable property ; they may erect public buildings or lay out a square or a market, which would be rateable, Rex v. Gardner (Cowp. 79). Then why should not the fund, out of which such expenses must be supplied, be itself rated? The Act does not authorize a borough rate for mere improvements, thereby intimating an intention that the subject should riot be taxed for such purposes ; yet if a surplus shall result in consequence [438] of an exemption from rateability, the deficiency in the rate must be made up by the parishioners, and thus the parish will be indirectly taxed for improvements. Even if some of the purposes specified in sect. 92 be admitted to be of a public nature, as the expenses of prosecuting offenders, &c., yet a partial application of property to such purposes has never been held to be a ground of total exemption. The Attorney-General v. Aspinall (2 Myl. & C. 613), shews that the benefit intended by the Act is that of the borough only, which is not strictly a public benefit like that derived from bridges, highways, or harbours. Property is...
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