The Question of Antarctica and the Problem of Sovereignty
| Date | 01 April 1987 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788700900104 |
| Published date | 01 April 1987 |
| Author | Jesper Grolin |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
39
THE
QUESTION
OF
ANTARCTICA
AND
THE
PROBLEM
OF
SOVEREIGNTY
JESPER
GROLIN
IN
1959,
twelve
countries
concluded
the
Antarctic
Treaty.
The
purpose
was
to
ensure
peace,
co-operation
and
freedom
of
scientific
research
on
the
continent
of
the
South
Pole.
The
Treaty
v
may
be
acceded
to
by
any
country,
but
only
states
&dquo;conducting
substantial
scientific
research
activity&dquo;
in
Antarctica
can
become
Consultative
Parties
and,
as
such,
participate
in
the
decision-
making
process.’
This
has-intentionally
or
not-kept
the
group
fairly
small.
Since
the
Treaty
entered
into
force
in
1961,
only
six
new
countries
have
attained
the
status
of
Consultative
Party.
(see
table
1).
Table
1
ANTARCTIC
TREATY
MEMBERS
1
The
Antarctic
Treaty,
art.
IX,
para.
2.
x)
original
non-claimant
member
xx)
claimant
state
xxx)
claimant
state
with
overlapping
claim
Source:
compiled
by
the
author.
40
The
exclusiveness
of
the
Antarctic
regime
encountered
few,
if
any,
objections
as
long
as
scientific
research
remained
the
name
of
the
game.
Since
the
early
1970s,
however,
resource
exploitation
has
entered
the
picture.
Fishing
around
Antarctica
has
increased,
and
speculation
about
oil
and
minerals
in
the
Antarctic
has
intensified.
This
has
acted
as
a
powerful
magnet
of
attention,
and
it
has
put
the
regime
under
considerable
external
pressure.
Both
environmentalist
groups
and
developing
countries
have
criticized
the
exclusiveness
or
elitism
of’the
Antarctic
club’,
and
particularly
among
the
developing
countries
there
has
been
an
increasingly
strong
demand
that
Antarctica,
like
the
deep
seabed,
be
considered
the
Common
Heritage
of
Mankind
and
as
such
administered
within
the
framework
of
the
United
Nations.
In
addition
to
the
external
pressures,
the
Antartic
Treaty
regime
suffers
from
an
internal
weakness.
Apart
from
one
sentence
stipulating
a
duty
to
ensure
the
&dquo;preservation
and
conservation of
living
resources
in
Antarctica&dquo;,
the
Treaty
provides
no
basis
for
dealing
with
resource
exploitation,
and
the
Consultative
Parties
have,
in
fact,
had
serious
difficulties
in
developing
effective
instruments
of
resource
management.
Even
so,
the
creation
of a
new
regime
in
Antarctica
is
unlikely,
not
to
say
impossible.
The
primary
reason
is
the
unresolved-and
probably
unresolvable-problem
of
sovereignty.
Side-stepping
the
Sovereignty
Problem
Between
1908
and
1943,
seven
countries
claimed
territorial
sovereignty
to
parts
of
Antarctica.
The
claimant
states
were
Argentina,
Australia,
Chile,
France,
New
Zealand,
Norway
and
the
UK
The
claims,
which
cover
about
85
per
cent
of
the
continent,
were
based
on
factors
such
as
geographical
proximity,
discovery
by
earlier
expeditions
of
explorers
and
subsequent
maintenance
of
stations
in
Antarctica.
Yet
the
claims
were
problematic.
Not
only
did
the
areas
claimed
by
Chile,
Argentina
and
the
UK
overlap
considerably
(see
figure
1),
but
a
number
of
other
countries
with
substantial
research
interests
in
Antarctica
refused
to
accept
any
territorial
claims
whatsoever.
These
non-claimant
states
included
the
US,
the
Soviet
Union,
Belgium,
South
Africa,
Japan,
Poland
and
the
Federal
Republic
of
Germany.
This
sovereignty
conflict
created
a
dangerously
labile
situation.
In
addition
to
several
incidents
of
mutual
chicanery
between
the
British
and
Argentines
in
the
1940s
and
1950s,
the
ever
colder
war
between
the
US
and
the
Soviet
Union
created
the
fear
of
a
gradual
militarisation
of
the
continent.
It
led
to
a
number
of
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