The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence
| Author | Andrew Brown,Lorna Arnold |
| Published date | 01 September 2010 |
| Date | 01 September 2010 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0047117810377278 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
THE QUIRKS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 293
The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence
Andrew Brown and Lorna Arnold
Abstract
From 1945 to 1949 the USA was the world’s only nuclear power. Although the nuclear
arsenal was overestimated both in terms of size and readiness by the US military in its war
plans, atom bombs came to be seen as the essential counter to conventional Soviet forces.
The USSR constructed its own bombs in turn, and for decades the analysis of nuclear
deterrence was almost exclusively concerned with the two superpowers. In the twenty-first
century, the nuclear world no longer displays that mirror-image symmetry and can now be
viewed as unipolar, regional, multipolar or stateless. Nuclear deterrence that seemed such an
established technical reality during the Cold War should be recognized as a psychological
construct that depends on threat perception and cultural attitudes, as well as the values,
rationality and strength of political leaders who themselves have to mediate between
groups with vested economic or military interests. As the number of nuclear weapons
states increases, the logic of nuclear deterrence becomes less obvious and it should not be
casually invoked as a general security factor without regard to a specific context. Nuclear
weapons have become emblems of geopolitical power under the guise of deterrence. We
argue that nuclear deterrence is meaningless against extremist terrorists. Our survey of its
quirks leads us to believe that nuclear deterrence is a far less foolproof and reliable global
security mechanism than many assume.
Keywords: Cold War, deterrence theory and evolution, nuclear deterrence, nuclear history,
nuclear terrorists, nuclear weapons, regional nuclear rivals
Deterrence is ubiquitous in the natural world, where potential preys employ a
variety of defences against would-be predators. Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace
corresponded about the question of repellent defences, such as spines, stings and
toxins, and noted that they are usually conspicuous to convince a predator that attack
will be costly.1 The shaping of deterrent responses by natural selection takes thousands
of generations, during which time prey and predator co-evolve from no fixed starting
point. The process is not purposive, resulting from a random mutation in the genes of
an individual organism, but it depends on prior adaptations that have been successful.
For the individual animal or plant, the emergence of a novel deterrent is a highly risky
event since it may not be instantly recognized by a potential predator.2
The advent of nuclear deterrence, by contrast, marked a sudden, deliberate
departure in defence planning, developing in earnest after the Soviets exploded their
first nuclear device in 1949. It is unprecedented in terms of the scale of the existential
risk to human populations posed by its failure. It depends on physical weapons, even
the controlled testing of which caused worldwide public alarm, and presents statesmen
with international conundrums as well as sometimes placing them at odds with their
© The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions:
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[DOI: 10.1177/0047117810377278]
294 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(3)
own militaries, for example. The historical evasions, missteps, subtleties and shifts –
quirks – of nuclear deterrence were the complex products of human psychology,
their significance magnified by the destructive power of the weapons themselves.
Early history
When Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, two refugee physicists from Europe working
in Birmingham, wrote their revolutionary memorandum on the construction and
implications of an atom bomb in the spring of 1940, they pointed out that such a
weapon, if exploded on a city, would kill large numbers of civilians and give rise
to widespread radioactive contamination. Thinking ‘this may make it unsuitable as
a weapon for use by this country’, they worried that all the technical data available
to them were available to their ex-colleagues in Germany. Since there would be no
defence against its effects, Frisch and Peierls suggested that ‘the most effective reply
would be a counter-threat with a similar bomb. Therefore, it seems to us important
[they wrote] to start production as soon as possible, even if it is not intended to use
the bomb as a means of attack.’3 So at the outset, at a time when a German invasion
seemed imminent, the rationale for Britain to become a nuclear power was grounded
in the notion of deterrence – even if the Nazis were successful in developing an atom
bomb, they would not dare use it confronted with the prospect of retaliation with a
British bomb. By the time the Maud Report appeared in the summer of 1941,4 setting
out a path to constructing a bomb from enriched uranium, the clear objective was to
produce an offensive weapon of great destructive power – there was no mention of
deterrence. Reasons can be advanced for the change in emphasis: Churchill had come
to power and the national mood was more bellicose after many months under siege.
The Maud Report rather than the Frisch–Peierls memorandum informed the
Manhattan Project, and although scientists such as Niels Bohr warned of the risks
of a future nuclear arms race, their influence on policy makers declined as military
considerations became paramount. After his first visit to Los Alamos at the end
of 1943, Bohr was convinced that traditional international diplomacy would not
be adequate to address the unfolding nuclear problem, and thought a new level of
mutual confidence between nations needed to be forged because, in his eyes, the
bomb could become a threat to the security of all mankind. He tried unsuccessfully
to convince the top British and American statesmen to prepare for a secure post-war
world by informing the Soviets about the atomic bomb before there could be any
question of using it.5 The Manhattan Project scientists working in Chicago who
wrote the Franck Report in June 1945 echoed Bohr’s fears when they warned: ‘if
no efficient international agreement is achieved, the race for nuclear armaments
will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the
existence of nuclear weapons’.6 Truman cryptically mentioned the existence of an
atomic weapon to Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Stalin, who had
already been informed of its development through spies such as John Cairncross
and Klaus Fuchs, castigated Lavrenty Beria (the NKVD chief supervising the Soviet
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