The Radical Sources of the Crisis in West European Communist Parties

AuthorMichael Waller
Published date01 March 1989
Date01 March 1989
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1989.tb00264.x
Subject MatterArticle
Political Studies
(1989),
XXXVII,
39-61
The Radical Sources
of
the Crisis in West
European Communist Parties
MICHAEL
WALLER*
University
of
Manchester
The wave of radicalism that swept through Europe from the late
1960s
did not pass the
communist parties by but struck them with particular force. Evidence of this impact
can be found in a study of the social composition of congress delegates, and from
recent accounts
of
the experiences of the communist parties during the
1970s.
The
story
of
this trauma
over
one decade requires
us
to
rethink the notion of
Eurocommunism. What emerges from such a reconsideration is a distinction between
a process of modernization on which many communist parties have embarked in the
post-war period, and particularly since
1956,
and a ‘new member’ factor which
characterized the radical surge of the
1970s.
This ‘new member’ factor brought a new
style of militancy into the communist parties which challenged their traditional norms.
This radicalism raised the fortunes of the communist parties during the
1970s,
but
it
also brought about the crisis of the end of the decade. Whilst it has been responsible for
the destruction of the crisis period,
it
has also provided the ideas and the forces for
possible new strategies.
Like the Spartans and like the tortoise, communist parties have equipped
themselves for adversity. The equipment has been put to the test often enough in
the past and no doubt the communist parties of Western Europe will survive the
crisis through which they have been passing during this decade. Survival,
however, will mean adaptation, and indeed the outlines
of
new possible patterns
of adaptation are beginning to emerge. This article will show that the immediate
origins of the present crisis lie in an important sea-change that came over the
communist parties in the
1970s.
It will make it clear that the wave of radicalism
that swept through Europe from the late
1960s
did not, contrary to the
suppositions of many, pass the communist parties by, but struck them with
particular force. Secondly, evidence
of
this impact will be presented, drawn from
a study of the social composition of congress delegates and from recent accounts
of
the experiences
of
the communist parties during the
1970s.
Thirdly, the story of
this trauma over one decade will be related to the longer process of adaptation
and modernization that has gone under the label of Eurocommunism. Finally, it
will be shown that this change has had a series of apparently conflicting results. It
raised the fortunes
of
the communist parties during the
1970s
but it also brought
about the crisis
of
the end
of
the decade; and whilst it has been responsible for the
*
The research on which this article
is
based was conducted on funds provided by the Economic
and Social Research Council, the Nuffield Foundation, and the British Academy.
0032-321 7/89/0l/0039-23/%03.00
0
1989
Political Studies
40
Crisis
in
West
European
Communist Parfies
destruction of the crisis period, it has also provided the ideas and the forces for
possible new strategies.
The extent and nature
of
the crisis has now been treated in a number of recent
works,
which record a widely shared decline in electoral performance, member-
ship, organizational cohesion and militancy.' Electoral performance tells a
dramatic tale (see Table
l),
but it is in less quantifiable areas that the crisis has
struck at the very heart of the communist parties, affecting their traditional
organizational norms, and indeed their very identity.
TABLE
1.
Cases
of
Severe
Electoral
Decline
of
West European Communist
Parties from
1976
Party
PCI (Italy)
PCF (France)
SKDL (Finland)*
PCE (Spain)
PCL (Luxemburg)
PCB/KPB (Belgium)
CPN (Netherlands)
Years
1976-1987
1978-1986
1979-1 983
1974-1 984
1979-1 982
1978-1985
1977-1986
Percentage
of
poll
34.4-26.6
18.G13.8
10.6-3.8
20.5-9.8
10.5-5.0
3.3-1.2
1.7-0.6
(4.5
in
1972)
*The SKDL is an electoral alliance around the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). Since 1983 the party
has split, with the minority standing separately in elections as the Democratic Alternative (DEVA).
Sources:
Klaus Von Beyme,
Parteien in Westlichen Demokrutien
(R.
Piper, Munich, 1982);
Chronick
of
Purliamenlury Elections,
IX
(1975).
XI1
(1978) (CIDF, Geneva). Figures after 1981 are taken
from
the
European Journal
of
Political Research
An overall perspective on this trauma of the
1970s
has
so
far been difficult to
achieve, for certain rather particular reasons. It was experienced differently by
each West European communist party and both the parties themselves and
commentators on their affairs quite naturally tended to analyse it in local terms.
Thus in France it was seen as a crisis phase in the story of relations between the
Communist and Socialist Parties, in Italy it was to some extent concealed behind
the debates and anxieties surrounding the historic compromise, whilst
in
Belgium
tensions between traditionalists and modernizers in the party were often seen in
terms of the differences between regions and the two language communities.
Furthermore, such analysts as did take a synoptic view of what was happening
tended to assume that it was part
of
a gradual evolution within West European
communism associated with the notion of Eurocommunism. Preoccupied as
commentators on communism have been with Eurocommunism and the splits
and strains that it has engendered, the tendency has naturally been to assimilate
the recent crisis to that phenomenon.
'
Le Communisme en Europe occidentale. DCclin
ou
Mutation?,
Nos
11-12 of
Communistne
(Paris,
L'Age
d'Homme, 1986); Michael Waller and Meindert Fennema (eds),
Communist Parties in
Western Europe
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988); Marc Lazar, 'Communism in Western Europe in the
1980s',
The Journal
of
Communist Studies,
4:3
(Sept. 1988).

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