The responsive public: How European Union decisions shape public opinion on salient policies
| Published date | 01 December 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14651165231190322 |
| Author | Christoph Mikulaschek |
| Date | 01 December 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The responsive public: How
European Union decisions
shape public opinion on
salient policies
Christoph Mikulaschek
Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA, USA
Abstract
This study argues that the adoption of a policy by the European Union increases popular
support for that policy. Elite cue theory implies that this effect only materializes among
those members of the public who trust European Union institutions. Moreover,
European Union member states’unanimous policy support conveys a stronger cue
than the Union’s policy endorsement despite vocal dissent. The argument is tested
through original survey experiments and the quasi-experimental analysis of a survey
that was fielded while the European Council endorsed a salient policy proposal.
Support of the policy surged immediately after this decision—but only among
Europeans who trust the Union. Experiments in original national surveys confirm that
citizens who trust the European Union respond to signals from Brussels. Unanimity in
the Council of the European Union augments the impact of these cues.
Keywords
Council of the European Union, European Council, unanimity, survey experiment,
quasi-experiment
Do European Union (EU) decisions affect public opinion about electorally salient pol-
icies? Recent studies show that the Union’s policy choices have become politicized
(Hagemann et al., 2017). Eager to avoid being punished by voters for taking unpopular
decisions, European governments signal responsiveness to domestic electorates during
Corresponding author:
Christoph Mikulaschek, Department of Government, Harvard University,1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge,
MA 02138, USA.
Email: mikulaschek@gov.harvard.edu
Article
European Union Politics
2023, Vol. 24(4) 645–665
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14651165231190322
journals.sagepub.com/home/eup
negotiations in Brussels (Schneider, 2019). In contrast to the existing literature, this
article argues that EU decisions do not merely respond to public opinion. Instead, they
also shape how European publics think about electorally salient policies. Specifically,
the adoption of a policy by the EU increases popular support for that policy, but only
among those Europeans who trust EU decision-makers. Policy decisions by a united
Union have a bigger impact on public opinion than those taken by a divided one.
Public opinion scholarship indicates that most Europeans tend to be rationally ignorant
about European integration and form their political attitudes based on cues from trusted
elites (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Gabel and Scheve, 2007). Empirical tests of elite cue
theory focus on political parties’communications about the EU (Franklin et al., 1994;
Ray, 2003). We know much less about the impact of cues conveyed by another set of
elites whose policy positions are widely reported by the mass media: the Council of
the EU and the European Council. I argue that the approval of an electorally salient
policy by the Union’s main legislative body or its supreme agenda-setter increases
public support for that policy. Elite cue theory leads me to expect that this effect only
materializes among citizens who trust EU institutions. Moreover, the adoption of a
policy by a unanimous Council of the EU signals unity among European government
elites while the Council’s endorsement of the same policy despite vocal dissent indicates
divisions between member states, and the latter should trigger a smaller rally in public
support of the policy than the former.
A two-pronged empirical strategy tests this argument. It combines original survey
experiments with the quasi-experimental analysis of Eurobarometer survey data. Large
nationally representative samples in Austria and Germany participated in experiments
on two salient policies: EU coronavirus economic recovery aid and refugee redistribution
between member states. Respondents were randomly assigned to different cues about
policy endorsement or disapproval by a united or divided Council of the EU and asked
to express their own opinion about these policies. Quasi-experimental analyses of
2020 Eurobarometer data complement these experiments. They leverage the fact that
the European Council took a key decision on pandemic recovery relief while the
survey was in the field. Whether a given Eurobarometer respondent was interviewed
before or after this decision was exogenously determined. Therefore, I can estimate the
decision’s impact on public attitudes toward pandemic-era economic aid by comparing
survey responses obtained before this event to those gathered soon thereafter.
The quasi-experiment and the survey experiments indicate that European publics
respond to signals from Brussels. Cues about EU endorsement of fiscal transfers to
member states hit hardest by the pandemic and of refugee redistribution from Europe’s
South to its North increased popular support of these policies by two to five percentage
points. As expected, this average effect was driven by the subset of respondents who
viewed EU elites as trustworthy; their response to EU cues was more than twice as
strong as it was in the full sample. Unanimous decisions tended to trigger an even
larger public opinion rally than policy choices made by a divided Council.
This study makes several contributions to the literature on European integration. First,
it presents the argument that European publics take cues from the EU when they form
opinions about salient policies. Thus, it extends elite cue theory and sheds new light
646 European Union Politics 24(4)
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