The Role of Process in Arms Control Negotiations
| Author | Gerald M. Steinberg |
| Published date | 01 September 1985 |
| Date | 01 September 1985 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002234338502200307 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Role
of
Process
in
Arms
Control
Negotiations
GERALD
M.
STEINBERG
Department
of
Political
Science,
Hebrew
University
of
Jerusalem
Arms
control
efforts
tend
to
proceed
through
highly
formalized
and
very
visible
direct
negotiations
between
the
U.S.
and
U.S.S.R.
There
is
evidence,
however,
that
even
when
political
and
technological
conditions
might
otherwise
produce
agreements,
this
formal
process
itself
tends
to
impede
the
flexibility
necessary
for
compromise
and
successful
negotiations.
The
examination
of
the
role
of
process
in
negotiation
is
based
on
the
analysis
of
the
particular
structures
of
decision
making
adopted
by
the
participants,
and
of
the
modes
of
communication
they
use
to
convey
information,
offers,
and
responses.
Given
the
number
of
bureaucratic
actors
generally
involved
in
arms
control,
full
participation
by
all
in
a
decentralized
decision-making
process
can
be
expected
to
lead
to
slow
and
inflexible
negotiating
positions.
Similarly,
direct
communication
is
likely
to
highlight
concerns
for
status
and
bargaining
reputation
which
impede
concessions
and
agreement.
In
analyzing
the
Test
Ban
and
Salt
I negotiations
from
this
perspective,
centrally
controlled
decision-
making,
combined
with
informal
and
closely
held
communication,
is
shown
to
have
contributed
to
the
eventual
success
of
the
negotiations.
While
the
formal
negotiations
of
the
Test
Ban
and
SALT
process
frequently
became
blocked,
the
informal
back-channels,
from
which
most
bureaucratic
actors
were
excluded,
led
to
concessions
and
progress.
Centralized
decision
making
and
the
informal
’off
the
record’
communica-
tion
of
proposals
and
responses,
in
these
cases,
facilitated
agreements.
While
these
procedures
are
not
cost
free,
particularly
for
pluralistic
and
open
societies,
they
suggest
that
formal
processes
of
negotiation
should
not
automatically
be
sought
in
the
context
of
arms
control
efforts.
1.
Introduction
During
the
past
thirty-five
years,
arms
control
negotiations
have
become
a
major
international
enterprise.
Diplomats,
academics,
political
leaders
and
scientists
have
devoted
a
great
deal
of
time
in
the
effort
to
limit
instability
and
improve
security
through
mutual
con-
straints.
Yet,
despite
these
efforts,
the
results
have
been
meager.
Although
a
number
of
’arms
control’
agreements
have
been
reached
-
most
notably,
the
Limited
Test
Ban,
ABM
and
SALT
I
Treaties
-
the
objectives
of
arms
control
are
still
far
from
realization.
As
these
agreements
were
sought,
a
number
of
new,
costly,
destruc-
tive
and
highly
destabilizing
systems,
including
thermonuclear
weapons,
ICBMs,
SLBMs,
MIRVs
and
cruise
missiles,
were
developed
and
deployed.
Only
ABM
development
and
deployment
have
been
controlled
by
mutual
agreement,
and
even
this
relative
success
is
now
threatened.
The
outcome
of
the
international
negotia-
tions
in
general,
and
arms
control
efforts
in
particular,
is
determined
by
a
myriad
of
factors.
Perhaps
most
important
for
success
is
the
recognition
by
the
participants
of
the
common
benefits
which
can
be
attained
through
agree-
ment.
In
most
periods
of
U.S: Soviet
relations,
one
or
both
sides
have
lacked
this
perception
and
arms
control
negotiations,
if
conducted
at
all,
were
political
charades.
There
have
been
’windows’,
however,
in
which
there
is
evidence
that
both
sides
did
seek
arms
control
agree-
ments
in
order
to
enhance
their
common
security.
Periods
of
detente
during
the
late
1950s,
after
the
1962
Cuban
Missile
Crisis,
and
in
the
late
1960s
and
early
1970s,
seem
to
have
been
characterized
by
a
desire
on
the
part
of
the
U.S.
and
USSR
to
reach
agreements.
During
such
periods,
other
necessary
conditions
often
appear.
Technology,
for
example,
must
generally
be
sufficiently
developed
to
be
identified,
yet
sufficiently
undeveloped
to
prevent
testing
and
deployment.
A
MIRV
ban
became
far
more
difficult
after
this
technology
was
tested.
Even
in
those
rare
periods
in
which
the
political
and
technical
conditions
necessary
for
arms
control
appear
to
be
present,
agree-
ments
are
generally
difficult
to
achieve
and
are
often
lacking
in
substance.
At
this
stage,
a
closer
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