The Role of Self-Control in Crime Causation
| Author | Kyle Treiber,Per-Olof H. Wikström |
| Published date | 01 April 2007 |
| Date | 01 April 2007 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1477370807074858 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Volume 4 (2): 237–264: 1477-3708
DOI: 10.1177/1477370807074858
Copyright © 2007 European Society of
Criminology and SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore
www.sagepublications.com
The Role of Self-Control in Crime
Causation
Beyond Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of
Crime
Per-Olof H. Wikström
University of Cambridge, UK
Kyle Treiber
University of Cambridge, UK
ABSTRACT
In this paper we present an alternative conception of self-control and its role in
crime causation to the one advanced by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) in their
influential General Theory of Crime. Our conception is based on the theoretical
framework outlined in the situational action theory of crime causation (e.g.
Wikström 2006a). We propose that self-control is best analysed as a situational
concept (a factor in the process of choice) rather than as an individual trait. We
suggest that the core individual trait influencing an individual’s ability to exercise
self-control is executive capability. We maintain that there are also important
environmental influences on an individual’s ability to exercise self-control. We
submit that the ability to exercise self-control is a relevant factor in crime
causation only in situations where an individual considers (deliberates) whether
or not to engage in an act of crime. We argue that for most people (in most
circumstances) whether or not they engage in acts of crime is not a question of
their ability to exercise self-control but rather a question of their morality. In
short, this paper aims to clarify the concepts of ‘executive capability’, ‘self-
control’ and ‘crime’, and to specify their relationships and role in the explanation
of crime.
KEY WORDS
Crime / Crime Causation / Executive Capabilities / Morality / Self-Control /
Situational Action Theory.
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In this paper we present an alternative conception of self-control and its role
in crime causation from the one Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) advance in
their General Theory of Crime. Although their theory has many advocates,
it has also inspired a considerable amount of debate. Various aspects of the
theory have been criticized, including its definition of crime, its tautological
description of self-control, its testability and explanatory power, its unidi-
mensionality and factorization, its stability postulate, and its claim to be a
general theory of crime (Akers 1991; Arneklev et al. 1999; Geis 2000;
Grasmick et al. 1993; LaGrange and Silverman 1999; Marcus 2004; Piquero
and Rosay 1998; Pratt and Cullen 2000; Turner and Piquero 2002).
Our alternative conception is based on the theoretical framework out-
lined in the situational action theory of crime causation (Wikström 2004,
2005, 2006a). We aim to advance the understanding of the role of self-
control in crime causation by presenting a more in-depth analysis of the
concept of self-control and its role in crime causation than any previously
undertaken.
We argue that self-control is best analysed as a situational concept
rather than an individual trait. We submit that an individual’s ability to exer-
cise self-control is an outcome of the interaction between his/her executive
capabilities (an individual trait) and the settings in which he/she takes part
(his/her environment). Critically, this implies that stability and change in an
individual’s ability to exercise self-control depend not only on the stability
and change in his/her executive capabilities (an individual trait) but also on
the stability and change in the environment(s) in which he/she operates.
We submit that the ability to exercise self-control is relevant as a fac-
tor in crime causation only when an individual considers (deliberates)
whether or not to engage in an act of crime. Many people never consider
committing acts of crime, whereas others commit some acts of crime out of
habit (without deliberating). The ability to exercise self-control is irrelevant
in both cases because the action choice involves no deliberation (see
Wikström 2006a). This implies that for most people (in most circum-
stances) the ability to exercise self-control is not a relevant factor in whether
or not they engage in acts of crime.
We will begin this paper by summarizing and then critiquing the main
arguments of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory of self-control in
crime causation. We will suggest an alternative conception of self-control
and its role in crime causation and posit this within the wider theoretical
framework of the situational action theory of crime causation (e.g.
Wikström 2006a). In the focal, and final, part of the paper, we will develop
one important aspect of this theory: the specific relationships between execu-
tive capabilities (an individual trait), self-control (as a mechanism in the
process of choice linking individuals to their environments) and crime
238 European Journal of Criminology 4(2)
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