The Role of Self-Interest in Deliberation: A Theory of Deliberative Capital
| Author | Afsoun Afsahi |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720981491 |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720981491
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(3) 701 –718
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720981491
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The Role of Self-Interest in
Deliberation: A Theory of
Deliberative Capital
Afsoun Afsahi
Abstract
How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when they unravel? In this article, I
propose that we think of the dynamics of participant engagement within deliberation as series
of self-interested and reciprocal investments in and divestments from deliberative capital. This
article has three parts. First, I draw on the literatures on deliberative democracy and social capital
to outline a theory of deliberative capital. I highlight the important role self-interest plays in the
process of those initial investments – instances of engagement in positive deliberative behaviours.
Second, drawing from my experience as a facilitator, I give an account of the particular indicators
of investments and divestments that we might expect to see in a given deliberative engagement.
Third, I briefly outline two innovative facilitation techniques that can be utilized at the beginning
or during a deliberative process that trigger self-interest, which incentivizes investments and
discourages divestments.
Keywords
deliberative capital, social capital, self-interest, deliberative democracy, investments, divestments,
facilitation
Accepted: 26 November 2020
Over the past three decades, deliberative democracy has become ubiquitous. Deliberative
democracy ‘is premised on the assumption that under the right conditions, people are able
and willing to communicate with each other in an open manner and offer reasons and
explanations for their positions’ and make decisions together (Afsahi, 2020a: 3). Both
democratic theorists and empirical political scientists have looked to deliberation with its
promises of ‘better-informed and more engaged [citizenry] [. . .] aware of their own
interests and tolerant of the values of others’ (Afsahi, 2020b: 1) as a panacea to problems
of legitimacy and accountability. Experiments in deliberative democracy have ‘refute[d]
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Afsoun Afsahi, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Roeterseiland Campus, Room
B10.00, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018WV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: a.afsahi@uva.nl
981491PSX0010.1177/0032321720981491Political StudiesAfsahi
research-article2021
Article
702 Political Studies 70(3)
many of the more pessimistic claims about the citizenry’s ability to make sound judg-
ments’ and mini-publics carried out under conditions of current and past conflict in
‘Colombia, Belgium, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia [have shown] that properly structured
deliberation can promote recognition, understanding, and learning’ (Dryzek et al., 2019:
1145). In fact, between January 2010 and January 2020, more than 850 participatory pro-
cesses around the world brought individuals together to deliberate and make decisions
together (Fung and Warren, 2020). Considering the increasing use of deliberative and
participatory practices in consultation and governance processes, this article takes as its
starting point the value of small-scale deliberation as a useful and even necessary tool
within democratic systems (for a discussion on this, see Beauvais and Warren, 2019;
Warren, 2017). Instead of challenging the basic presumptions of deliberative democratic
theorists and practitioners, I focus on the dynamics within such small-scale deliberations
and ask: how do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when deliberations
unravel? These are not novel questions. Many scholars have attempted to crack the ‘black
box’ of deliberation (Mendelberg et al., 2014; also see Jaramillo and Steiner, 2014;
Mansbridge et al., 2006; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004). My response,
however, is novel. I propose that we think of the dynamics of participant engagement
within deliberation as series of self-interested and reciprocal investments in and divest-
ments from deliberative capital.
This article has three sections. First, I draw on the literature on deliberative democracy
and social capital to outline a theory of deliberative capital. I posit investments as
instances of engagement in positive deliberative behaviours and reframe engagement in
negative deliberative behaviours as instances of divestments. I highlight the important
role self-interest plays in the process of those initial investments in a deliberative engage-
ment. Self-interest rather than a generalized commitment to common interest or general
good establishes the possibility of initial investments and the subsequent virtuous cycles.
This new focus on self-interest explains how we may, and often do, overcome the
problem of pre-commitment within deliberative democratic practices. Successful delib-
erations are in need of participants who show up with some degree of pre-commitment to
the basic norms of deliberation such as justification, respect, listening and reciprocity.
However, this may not be the case and we have no way of assuring that we have the right
kind of participants – nor can we see our deliberation as inclusive if we only have indi-
viduals who are already committed to such norms. This problem is further complicated by
theorists and practitioners who argue that commitment to these norms is an outcome of
deliberation – something that participants learn and become better at as a result of partici-
pating (for a brief discussion, see Beauvais, 2020). So how do we get around this causal-
ity dilemma? I argue that we do so by recognizing the role that self-interest plays in
kickstarting reciprocal investments.
Second, I go into detail about what constitutes an investment or a divestment during
deliberation. Drawing from the literature on deliberative democracy and my experience
as a facilitator, I give an account of the particular indicators of investments and divest-
ments that we might expect to see in a given deliberative engagement.1 Finally, I briefly
outline two innovative facilitation techniques that can be utilized at the beginning or dur-
ing a deliberative process to incentivize investments and discourage divestments – or to
get deliberation back on track. The first is simulated representation, which gets partici-
pants to switch places by learning, presenting and defending each other’s views for a
portion of deliberation. The second facilitation technique is that of deliberative worth
exercises, which asks participants to keep track of each other’s behaviours and rate each
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