The shifting landscape of prime ministerial accountability to parliament: An analysis of Liaison Committee scrutiny sessions
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148116633438 |
| Date | 01 August 2016 |
| Published date | 01 August 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2016, Vol. 18(3) 740 –754
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148116633438
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The shifting landscape
of prime ministerial
accountability to parliament:
An analysis of Liaison
Committee scrutiny sessions
Alexandra Kelso1, Mark Bennister2
and Phil Larkin3
Abstract
Prime ministerial power is always contingent, based on the utilisation of personal and institutional
resources, subject to various formal and informal constraints. Parliament is both a political
resource to be utilised, but also a veto-player. In the absence of formal mechanisms setting out
the requirements for the UK prime ministerial accountability to parliament, a fluid and essentially
personalised relationship has developed. Regular prime ministerial appearances before the House
of Commons Liaison Committee, begun in 2002, have added to parliament’s scrutiny toolkit. This
article considers the accountability of the prime minister to parliament by analysing the emergence
and development of the Liaison Committee evidence sessions, and draws on interviews with
participants and examination of the session transcripts, in order to assess the value of this scrutiny
mechanism within the broader framework of prime ministerial-legislative relations.
Keywords
executive scrutiny, Liaison Committee, prime minister, UK parliament
Introduction
Standing at the apex of the ministerial ‘cone’ that characterises the UK central govern-
ment (Mackintosh, 1962: 452), the prime minister is an obviously powerful political actor
and one who prompts extensive debate both about how executive powers are utilised and
how they are constrained. Hennessy (2000: 6) argued that this debate ‘lies at the heart of
the British constitution’, involving as it does ‘the necessary restraint of the potentially
1University of Southampton, UK
2Canterbury Christ Church University, UK
3University of Canberra, Australia
Corresponding author:
Alexandra Kelso, Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of
Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK.
Email: a.kelso@soton.ac.uk
633438BPI0010.1177/1369148116633438The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsKelso et al.
research-article2016
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