The sorcerer’s apprentice: Liberalism, ideology, and religion in world politics
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117819834647 |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Author | Beate Jahn |
| Subject Matter | Part Two: Norms and Process |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117819834647
International Relations
2019, Vol. 33(2) 322 –337
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117819834647
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The sorcerer’s apprentice:
Liberalism, ideology, and
religion in world politics
Beate Jahn
University of Sussex
Abstract
Despite repeated announcements of the end of ideology and the demise of religion during the
twentieth century, both play a crucial role in world politics today. This disjuncture between
theoretical expectations and historical developments has its roots in conventional conceptions
of ideology. While the latter grasp the representative nature of ideology as an expression of
historical forces and political interests, they miss its constitutive role for modern politics. Based on
an analysis of its historical origins and political implications, this article develops a new conception
of ideology which accounts for the resilience and historical dynamics of ideological struggle. Like
the sorcerer’s apprentice, I show, liberalism has called ideology into being but lost control of its
own creation.
Keywords
ideology, liberalism, religion, twentieth century, world order
Herr, die Not ist groß! Die ich rief, die Geister, werd ich nun nicht los.1
Johann Wolfgang Goethe
In Goethe’s famous poem, the sorcerer’s apprentice summons spirits he cannot control
– and each attempt to stop them multiplies their powers. And so it appears to be with
ideology and religion. Every pronouncement of the end of ideology or the demise of
religion seems to breathe new life into ideological or religious struggle.
Corresponding author:
Beate Jahn, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ, UK
Email: B.Jahn@sussex.ac.uk
834647IRE0010.1177/0047117819834647International RelationsJahn
research-article2019
Article
Jahn 323
In 1960, Daniel Bell declared ‘the end of ideology’.2 In developed Western societies,
he argued, social democracy had resolved the problems generated by the industrial revo-
lution which had given rise to the great nineteenth-century ideologies – liberalism,
Marxism, and conservatism – and thus removed the basis for ideological struggles. But
as soon as Bell made this announcement, the 1960s erupted into intensive ideological
struggles: the civil rights movement in America, the student revolution in Europe, the
Prague Spring in the Eastern Bloc, and a communist turn in national liberation move-
ments and newly independent states in the Third World.
Despite this sobering experience, in 1998, Francis Fukuyama once more proclaimed
‘the end of mankinds ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government’.3 Like Bell, Fukuyama argued that
liberalism had triumphed over its fascist and communist competitors because it was
capable of resolving all ‘fundamental contradictions’ within society – including reli-
gion.4 Again, however, this proclamation was quickly followed by the rise of explicitly
anti-liberal movements on the left and on the right all over the world and revealed deep
divisions – ‘fundamental contradictions’ – within core liberal states themselves.
Religion, too, defied similar predictions. While the widely influential secularization
thesis held that the modernization of society would lead to the gradual demise of reli-
gion, today its revival in all parts of the world has given rise to debates about a postsecu-
lar society.5 This liberal conception of ideology and religion as a reflection of social and
political tensions destined to be resolved in the course of historical development thus
repeatedly misjudged their resilience.
But realists did not fare much better. Seton-Watson held 50 years ago that world poli-
tics was driven by ‘conventional state interest’ and the intense ideological struggles of
the interwar period were simply the result of the democratization of politics, and hence
the need of professional politicians ‘to explain politics in terms of simple moral issues’,
in a ‘language easily intelligible’ to the masses.6 State interest defined in terms of power
was used to explain both the Cold War and its end, with ideology playing a secondary
role.7 And yet, radical changes in the professed state interests of Britain and the United
States today seem to have been triggered by shifts in the dominant ideology – rather than
the other way around.
In both cases, ideology and religion are thus understood as reflections or expressions
of underlying historical forces and political interests. These conceptions appear to miss,
however, their role in constituting state interests and misjudge the dynamic rise, fall, and
revival of their historical development. Addressing these shortcomings in two steps, I
will first provide an historical account of the role of ideology and religion in world poli-
tics between 1919 and 2019. It shows that while reflecting historical developments and
political interests, ideology and religion also systematically constitute these forces and
interests. In order to recover this constitutive dimension, I will then provide an analysis
of the origins of the concept of ideology and its theoretical and political implications.
Designed to justify the power of liberal forces, the concept of ideology provided a new
epistemological basis for modern politics – forcing political struggle onto the ideological
battlefield and (re)constituting political actors, principles, practices, and institutions,
including religion. Unlike conventional approaches, the article concludes, this concep-
tion of ideology does account for its historical dynamics.
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