The Third Generation of Deliberative Democracy
| Date | 01 September 2010 |
| Author | Stephen Elstub |
| Published date | 01 September 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00216.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Third Generation of Deliberative Democracy
Stephen Elstub
University of the West of Scotlandpsr_216291..307
The article argues that deliberative democracy has now entered a third generation,to which the three recent books
considered here contribute. The first generation included the normative assertions of Habermas and Rawls. The
second generation involved the fusing of these two first generationalists, and reconciling them with features of social
complexity.The second generation has rendered deliberative democracy more practically achievable, and the three
books here seize this opportunity to provide considerable institutional innovation about how to achieve the
reformed deliberative theory in practice. In doing this the third generation of deliberative democracy is emerging.
In the main, a more practically relevant version of deliberative democracy is welcomed, but we must also guard
against jettisoning its normative ideals in the process.
Baber,W.F.and Bar tlett, R.V. (2005) Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological Rationality.Cambr idge
MA: MIT Press.
O’Flynn, I. (2006) Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Parkinson, J. (2006) Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
The recent history of the theory of deliberative democracy has been auspicious, to the
extent that it now dominates theoretical discussions of democracy, and is starting to
receive broad coverage in practical discussions of democracy. Not only does this suggest
that deliberative democracy has ‘come of age’ (Bohman, 1998), and taken an ‘empirical
turn’ (Dryzek, 2008), but that a third generation of deliberative democracy is emerging,
of which the books considered here are a part. Fir st-generation deliberative democrats,
like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, debated the normative justifications of deliberative
democracy, interpretations and necessary components of the theory, but failed to take
account of the sheer complexity of contemporary societies. First-generation deliberative
democrats thought reason exchange to be the only applicable form of communication,
which would result in uniform preference change, ending in consensus.
Second-generation deliberative democrats, particularly James Bohman (1996) and Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), in considering the institutionalisation of delib-
erative democracy, took complexity seriously, and reformed the theory of deliberative
democracy in the process.They have fused the first-generation deliberative democracy of
Habermas and Rawls with practical requirements. Our understandings of deliberative
democracy have been transformed in the process. For the second-generation deliberative
democrats the predominant view is that preferences will adapt to public reason and new
information, but not in a uniform manner. Consequently consensus will not be reached
and forms of communication other than reason exchange can, will and should be
included. However, they still offered little substantive detail in terms of the types of
POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW: 2010 VOL 8, 291–307
doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00216.x
© 2010 TheAuthor. Journal compilation © 2010 Political Studies Association
institution required to ensure that deliberative democracy could be actualised in complex
societies. This has paved the way for a third generation to emerge, who have sought to
establish the nature of the institutions required to achieve this reconciliation in practice.
Work by Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett (2005), Ian O’Flynn (2006) and John
Parkinson (2006), all considered here,contr ibute to the emergence of this third generation
of deliberative democracy, and provide many interesting ideas on the directions that
deliberative democracy needs to move in if it is to become a theoretically robust,
sustainable and dominant model of democracy in practice.The movement from first- to
second-generation deliberative democracy, together with how the three books covered
here accept these revised second-generation premises, is set out in the first section of the
article.
The second section considers the varying approaches to institutionalisation covered in the
texts. These books are very different, as they attempt to offer practically applicable
solutions to achieve deliberatively democratic public policy making in very different
contexts. Baber and Bartlett’s (2005) concern is environmental policy, with most of the
evidence drawn from the USA, which leads to a call for transnational deliberative
democracy. O’Flynn (2006) considers public policy in general in deeply divided societies
and the need for an inclusive national identity. Parkinson (2006) considers public policy
in established liberal democracies, although his empir ical evidence is drawn from health
policy in the UK, and makes suggestions for a democratic agenda-setting process. Despite
these differences all three works accept the increasing focus on institutionalisation.
Moreover, the empirical evidence, apparent in these three works, points clearly to the
growing trend of deliberative theorists to accept aspects of second-generation deliberative
democracy and its accommodation of social complexity. This leads to other similarities
and, central to the third generation of deliberative democracy, and reflected in the books
here, is a distinction between micro and macro approaches to institutionalisation. Baber
and Bartlett (2005) argue that it is essential for a range of institutional types to adapt
deliberative democracy to the features of social complexity. Parkinson (2006) agrees, but
underlines the need for decision-making, opinion-forming and agenda-setting deliberative
institutions to be integrated. Finally, O’Flynn (2006), in applying deliberative democracy
to the intensely socially complex entities of ethnically divided societies, argues that
consociational democracy should be supplemented with deliberative processes in civil
society. The symbiotic relationship between empirical research and normative theory
present in the third generation is welcomed,but we must also guard against jettisoning the
normative ideals of deliberative democracy in the process.
From First- to Second-Generation Deliberative Democracy:
Fusing Habermas and Rawls
Baber and Bartlett (2005) identify three broad versions of deliberative democracy:
Rawlsian, Habermasian and ‘full liberalism’.The main proponents of full liberalism are the
Habermasian Bohman (1996) and the Rawlsian Gutmann and Thompson (1996)
(although Bohman’s work receives by far the most coverage by Baber and Bartlett). In
essence it is a fusion of Habermas’ and Rawls’ work, with the features of social
292 STEPHEN ELSTUB
© 2010 TheAuthor. Journal compilation © 2010 Political Studies Association
Political Studies Review: 2010, 8(3)
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