The Tuc's Bridlington Principles and The Law
| Author | Bob Simpson |
| Date | 01 September 1983 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1983.tb02539.x |
| Published date | 01 September 1983 |
Sept. 19831
NOTES
OF
CASES
635
(c) Making the Law
There are other errors in the opinion. Lord Diplock repeated the
mistaken view, noted by commentators
in
his speech in Hadmore
Productions Ltd.
v.
Hamilton,ls that (the now repealed) section 13
(2)
of
T.U.L.R.A. provided an immunity in trade disputes for interference
with trade
or
business
by
unlakvfulmeans. The section does not say that;
and there is binding authority to say that its words do not mean that.”
Indeed, if Lord Diplock’s view were correct that section 13
(2)
was the
“
genus immunity
”
to which section
13
(I)
was a
“
specie~,”’~ it is
even likely that section 13
(1)
would be otiose; but in the current state
of
the law that
is
a less important consideration.
What is important is the way our law is being made. Common law
is
being declared in confused categories because the complex authorities
are inadequately sifted. The skein of tangled statute is not properly
explored. Authority is ignored. And all this largely because the careful
presentation of the precedents
is
now judicially regarded as of dubious
benefit. Great judges have taken a different approach.
“
I
have never
felt the tyranny of prededent. It is a tie certainly, but
so
is the rope that
mountaineers use.
.
.
.
The proper handling of precedent is part of
judicial craftsman~hip.”~~ It is to be hoped that Lord Diplock’s
successors will restore such a view
to
our judiciary.
W.
THE
TUC’S
BRIDLINGTON
PRINCIPLES AND
THE
LAW
I
THE
Bridlington principles
of
the Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.) are
designed both to minimise disputes between affiliated unions and to
provide procedures for resolving such disputes
as
do
arise. First
adopted in 1924, the current principles are those established at the
Bridlington Congress in 1939 as subsequently amended, most recently in
1979.’ The general
“
no poaching
”
obligation they impose requires
unions not to start recruiting groups
of
workers where another union
~ ~~
l6
119821 2
W.L.R.
322,333-334;
see R. Simpson
(1982) 45
M.L.R.
447,450.
S.
13
(2).
T.U.L.R.A.
1974,
being enacted
“
for the avoidance
of
doubt
”
clearly referred
to
its
predecessors.
3
(second limb), Trade Disputes Act
1906;
it
was repealed by
s.
19,
Employ-
ment Act
1982.
The interim view
of
the Scottish courts that
s.
13
(2)
protected the unlawful
interference
of
trespass, in
PIessey
Co.
v.
Wilson 119821
I.R.L.R.
198,
was seriously
questioned by the Court of Session in
The Phesros Shipping
Co.
v.
Kurmiawan, 1982,
unreported.
’’
See
Rookes
V.
Barnard(19641
A.C.
1129, 1177, 1192, 1203, 1318, 1236.
A
glanceat
the
literature reveals the point:
see
Davies and Freedland,
Labour Law Text and Materials
(1979),
p.
602;
Hepple and O’Higgins,
Emploi,ment
Law
(1981),
pp.
41-42; Winfield and
Jolobicz on Torrs
(11th
ed.,
1979),
p.
504; Salniond
and
Heuston
on
Torts
(18th ed.,
1981),
pp.
340, 362; Clerk andfindsellon
Torts(15th
ed.,
19821,
p.
785;
0.
Kahn-Freund,
Labour
and the Law (1977),
pp.
258-259;
R. Rideout,
Principles
of
Labour Law
(3rd ed.,
1979),
pp.
322-323;
K.
W. Wedderburn,
The Worker and the Law
(2nd ed.,
1971),
pp.
358-368;
Elias, Napier and Wallington,
Labour Law, Cases and Materials (1980),
p.
245.
(19831
2
W.L.R.
784,
788.
l9
Lord Devlin,
The Judge (1979),
p.
297.
See
T. U.C. Dispures Principles andProcedures
(T.U.C.,
1979).
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